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ABSTRACT 
 
Collaborators and Competitors Negotiating in Gains and Losses  
 
Eva Chen, Ph.D. Candidate 
Concordia University, 2010 
 
 
The economy is driven by everyday negotiations between sellers and buyers. 
Electronic Negotiation Systems (ENSs) are embedded with features and methods that 
help users better manage their negotiation processes, and work with their counterparts 
in order to achieve superior outcomes. As ENSs inevitably mediate the information 
exchange, the representation of this information plays a crucial role in decision 
support. Still, there is a lack of empirical research on ENSs, especially on the impact 
of information framing on the process, as well as on the outcomes of interactions. 
Research in this area is further complicated when the interactions of users with 
dissimilar motivations are taken into account. This project aims at investigating how 
framing by the ENS impacts the negotiation process and outcomes for different 
motivational orientations. It proposes a research framework that examines the effects 
of ENS framing of outcomes (i.e., as gains or losses) and motivational orientation 
(i.e., competitive or collaborative) on the negotiation process and consequences at the 
dyadic and individual levels.  
An experimental 2X2 factor design was used to test the underlying 
hypotheses, which: (1) examined the outcomes (i.e., higher joint outcome and 
contract balance) and the process (i.e., greater number of offers and cooperativeness) 
affected by different ENS frames for different motivational orientations; (2) 
contrasted the difference between the gain and loss frames for collaborative and 
   iv 
competitive dyads; and (3) detailed the impact of ENS framing and motivational 
orientation on individual perceptions (i.e., cognitive effort, discussion climate, 
outcome satisfaction and relationship). The experiments were conducted in two 
environments (laboratory with 276 and quasi-field with 490 participants) to increase 
external validity of the results. In general, the findings showed that:  (1) collaborative 
dyads have higher joint outcome in the loss than gain frame, while the opposite was 
found for competitive ones (i.e., higher joint outcome in the gain rather than loss 
frame); (2) the impacts of ENS framing was stronger for collaborative dyads; (3) loss 
frame caused less disparities in terms of number of offers and joint outcome between 
the two orientations; and (4) negotiators did not perceive any differences of framing 
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1 Introduction 
Globalization trends and advancements in information communications have engendered 
greater dependency on technology to mediate human-to-human interaction, especially 
when transacting in virtual marketplaces. For example, from the consumer‘s perspective, 
eBay allows market participants to sell goods through an English auction, and it also 
provides a text communication medium for users who wish to engage in bilateral 
negotiations. Unwant‘d encourages users to gain value by swapping goods with others 
via posted messages. From the organizational perspective, supply chain management 
systems incorporate negotiation and auction modules that allow suppliers and buyers to 
manage contracting (Eng 2004). Project management systems allow managers negotiate 
optimal solutions for internal resource allocation (Boehm and Ross 1989).  
In any marketplace, mechanisms are employed to help distribute the resources. 
One such mechanism is negotiation; it requires two or more parties to reach an agreement 
by consensus. Electronic Negotiation Systems (ENSs) support the parties‘ discussions 
and other activities required for arriving at a settlement; they facilitate negotiations by 
guiding the decision-making process (Keersten and Lai 2007).  
Research on negotiation has drawn on two rich traditions: one of a motivational 
and the other of a cognitive perspective (Carnevale and Pruitt 1992).  
The motivational perspective describes negotiators as having different social 
motives that influence their behavior and negotiation outcomes (Dawes 1980). The 
motives are classified based on the value that an individual places on the interest and 
outcome for self and the collective  (McClintock 1977). Two types of motivational 
orientations constitute the focus of this work: the competitive orientation describes those 
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who seek to maximize one‘s own gains regardless of the cost to the other parties, while 
the collaborative orientation defines those who strive to maximize one‘s own gains as 
well as those of the others.  Individual differences (e.g., inherent disposition) and the 
context (e.g., business negotiation versus family conflict) have been shown to influence 
the motivational orientations adopted by negotiators (Bazerman, Curhan et al. 2000; De 
Dreu, Weingart et al. 2000). In online trading, for example, members of a partnership 
network, who are known to each other, see one another as collaborators and search for 
mutually beneficial solutions (Powell 1990). This is also true for organizations 
negotiating the allocation of resources. These organizations must take into account future 
dealings with their counterparts (Poole and DeSanctis 1990). In large markets of 
strangers, future relationships are of little concern as the emphasis is placed on the 
immediate transaction (Soh and Markus 2002). As a consequence, where the focus is on 
singular transactions, the participants often adopt a competitive orientation, centering 
only on their own gains.   
Collaborative and competitive orientations provide an important basis for research 
because they show different social motives that underline trade. The pairing of these 
fundamentally different orientations creates dyadic compositions that lead to different 
behaviors and outcomes. Overall collaborative dyads demand less, concede more and 
have a higher rate of agreement; while competitive dyads are more contentious, and they 
can jostle each other towards a high quality settlement (De Dreu, Weingart et al. 2000). 
The cognitive perspective examines how people make decisions. Decision theory 
points to deficiencies and judgment biases resulting from mental shortcuts taken by 
negotiators to manage information. Rooted in Kahneman and Tversky‘s (1979) prospect 
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theory, Neale and Bazerman (1985) have explained that the bias derived from the framing 
of potential outcomes in negotiations is based on the individual‘s conception of the 
outcome in terms of gains or losses, depending on some point of reference. For example, 
when selling a car that was bought for $10,000 three years ago, in the gain frame, one 
may evaluate a potential buyer‘s offer of $4,000 as a gain relative to $0. However, in the 
loss frame, one can also perceive the same offer as a loss of $6,000 relative to the car‘s 
original price. Research shows that negotiators with the gain frame are less resistant to 
concessions, make fewer demands and settle more easily compared to those with a loss 
frame (Carnevale and Pruitt 1992).  
Until recently, these two perspectives of behavioral research have existed 
independently of each other. The integration of both perspectives, suggested by many 
researchers, can paint a richer picture to describe negotiation behaviors and outcomes 
(Carnevale and Pruitt 1992; Bazerman, Curhan et al. 2000; De Dreu and Carnevale 
2003). Studies that examined social motives and outcome frames have reported mixed 
results. De Dreu, Carnevale et al. (1995) have argued that collaborative negotiators 
operating in the loss frame are more likely to reach higher joint outcomes than those 
negotiating in the gain frame.  The reason is that the loss frame prevents negotiators from 
accepting any solution, and this resistance to concessions pushes them to agreements that 
can yield greater benefits for both sides. However, Olekalns (1994; 1997) has suggested 
that the cognitive barrier imposed by the loss frame is difficult to overcome, even for 
collaborative dyads. Negotiations in the loss frame fail more often than those conducted 
in the gain frame. 
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ENSs mediate the interaction between negotiators through structuring the process, 
displaying information, and providing support tools. Therefore, the system necessarily 
frames outcome information as it is displayed to the user. This begs the question as to 
what framing effect the system would have on the process and outcome of negotiation.  
Beginning with a prescriptive view, ENSs were first built to improve economic 
and other outcomes, as well as bring satisfaction to the users (Jelassi and Foroughi 1989; 
Rangaswamy and Shell 1997). They were designed to help users surpass their limited 
computational abilities (Foroughi, Perkins et al. 1995). The use of these systems has been 
studied with contingency theories (Keersten and Lai 2007). For example, the task-
technology fit model has been applied to explain that the increased performance from 
ENS usage is the result of a fit between the characteristics of the task and the features of 
the system. These studies suggested that: (1) decision support features enabled greater 
efficiency (i.e. joint gains) for integrative tasks as opposed to highly divergence tasks 
(Delaney, Foroughi et al. 1997); (2) rich communication features allowed for greater 
satisfaction with the outcome for conflict tasks (Suh 1999); and (3) increased software 
assistance (i.e., evaluation and suggestion of offers by the ENS) permitted negotiators to 
tackle cognitively complex tasks (Chen, Kersten et al. 2005).  
As ENS researchers aim to provide users with better systems to negotiate, the 
concern is on how the conflict is framed through the system, and how this framing of 
information affects the interaction between negotiators and their counterparts. More 
specifically, this thesis addresses the following question:  
How does the framing by the ENS impact the negotiation process and outcome for 
different motivational orientations?  
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The objective of this work is to explore and answer this question by integrating 
both motivational and cognitive theories, as well as relating them to the assessment of 
ENS at the dyadic and individual levels. Two experimental settings (laboratory and 
quasi-field) were used to: (1) examine the outcomes (i.e., joint outcome and contract 
balance) and the process variables (i.e., number of offers and cooperativeness), (2) 
contrast the difference between the gain and loss frames for collaborative and competitive 
orientations, and (3) detail the impact of ENS framing and motivational orientation on 
individual perceptions (i.e., cognitive effort, discussion climate, outcome satisfaction and 
relationship).  
The rest of the thesis is divided into eight sections. The first three sections review 
the literature on motivational orientation, ENSs and outcome framing in negotiation, - the 
three areas which form the premise of the research question. Specifically, Section 2 
examines and summaries research on the motivational orientations. It reviews empirical 
studies on the antecedents driving motivational orientation and the influence of 
collaborative and competitive orientation on the negotiation process and outcome.  
Section 3 describes ENSs, the various supports that such systems provide, along with the 
theories and approaches used to assess them. This section also points to the deficiencies 
in ENS research and the need to incorporate behavioral theories in studying negotiations.  
Section 4 discusses outcome framing in negotiation and the implication of ENS display 
on the framing of outcomes. It explores the concept of framing outcomes, not solely 
through the business or social problem (i.e., the case describing the decision dilemma), as 
it has been previously done by Bazerman, Magliozzi et al. (1985), but also through the 
information presented by the system over the entire process.  
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The next two sections describe the research framework and methodology 
employed to answer the question. In essence, Section 5 illustrates the research framework 
and hypotheses related to motivational orientation and ENS framing of outcomes. Section 
6 details the methodology, which includes the operationalization of treatment and 
dependent variables, and the experimental design (i.e., the description of the participants, 
case, procedures and materials for the experiments, laboratory and quasi-field settings, 
and three pretests).  
The last sections present the findings and answer the research question.  Section 7 
presents the results from the laboratory and quasi-field experiments. Section 8 discusses 
the findings in relation to the literature and ENS design. Section 9 illustrates the value of 
the findings for: (1) assisting ENS designers in developing systems that are better aligned 
to different orientations; (2) giving IS researchers a deeper understanding of the interplay 
between motivational orientation and framing as well as methodological consideration of 
combining laboratory and quasi-field settings; and (3) helping negotiators in obtaining 
greater mutual benefits. 
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2 Motivational Orientation 
The interest in motivational orientation derives from the fundamental question of whether 
humans act on behalf of their own self-interest or pursue a more prosocial motive toward 
the well-being of the collective. The concerns for self and for the others have been 
addressed mostly in behavioral research in negotiations (De Dreu, Giebels et al. 1998). 
Early works have aimed at understanding why, under similar circumstances, some 
negotiators were friendly and accommodating, while others were contentious and 
unyielding. Their investigation into the argumentations and persuasions used in 
communication exchanges had led them to ascertain that behavior is influenced by the 
motivational orientation of the negotiators.  
Motivational orientation is defined as the social motives that govern people‘s 
values for outcome distribution between self and another (McClintock 1977). The 
findings from this area of research have provided insight into different orientations and 
their likelihood of achieved certain economic and social outcomes. The competitive 
orientation (also known as individualistic) refers to individuals who have the sole goal of 
maximizing their own gains, whereas the collaborative orientation describes those who 
are interested in maximizing not only their own gains, but also those of their counterparts 
(Pruitt and Rubin 1986). Other orientations have also been studied and described, but 
competitive and collaborative orientations are the main focus of this work. 
 The focus of this section is on motivational orientation and its role in negotiators‘ 
behaviors. Section 2.1 describes the origins of research in motivational orientation, and 
the competing theories that explain the various orientations. Section 2.2 integrates key 
reviews on motivational orientations up to the 1990s and shows the antecedents, 
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moderators and outcomes of the collaborative and competitive orientations. Recent 
empirical studies are presented in Section 2.3. The experiments described in this section 
illustrate the influence of motivational orientation on the process along with the role of 
technology in moderating this influence. Section 2.4 presents an overview of the current 
perspective on of motivational orientation together with a discussion on research 
directions to advance understanding in this area. This section also projects the potential 
contributions of motivational research in describing functioning of firms in markets and 
networks. 
2.1 Foundation of Social Motive Research 
Negotiation as a mixed-motive interaction was first described by Schelling (1960), who 
showed that two or more parties need to be simultaneously governed by motives to 
cooperate and compete with each other. In essence, each party competes to obtain a larger 
distribution of resources, while all parties need to cooperate in order to arrive at an 
agreement. Nevertheless, economists and operation researchers have argued that in 
bargaining situations, individuals follow a competitive orientation that drives them to 
seek only benefits for themselves (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947; Rapoport 1968). 
Negotiators will only behave collaboratively if it yields higher benefit for them in the 
long-run, implying that their true orientation is a competitive one.  
To prove this point game theory experiments using the prisoner dilemma have 
been conducted. They showed that, at first, participants behaved competitively with their 
opponents. When the games were repeated, they moved to a more collaborative strategy, 
which generated more revenue. However, at the end they went back to a competitive 
orientation in hopes of benefiting from a collaborative opponent (see Axelrod 1997 for a 
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review on the prisoner dilemma game and strategies taken by participants). Economists 
claim that rationally bounded negotiators are inherently competitive, and therefore the 
negotiators are willing to cooperate as long as the results bring more value to them. 
Under such an assumption, negotiators have only one motive, which is to maximize self-
gains, thus, collaboration is in fact part of competition.  
Alternatively, psychologists study negotiations that are complex and from which 
participants are generally not driven by a single wish of utility maximization. They 
disagree with the use of a single, competitive motive to describe the complex interaction 
between participants. They view competitive and collaborative orientations as governed 
by very different social motives that serve to explain different behaviors and outcomes 
(Thompson 1990).  They allude to cooperative choices that individuals make in social 
dilemma, e.g., their response to an offer made in the ultimatum game (cf. Dawes 1980). 
Furthermore, situational factors can sway people‘s motives, such as when subjects in a 
laboratory experiment are placed under different sanction systems (e.g., an ethical or 
business dilemma), which affect their motives to behave cooperatively or competitively 
(Tenbrunsel and Messick 1999).  
Most importantly, negotiation experiments on motivational orientation have 
demonstrated that different social motives result in different behaviors and outcomes (De 
Dreu, Weingart et al. 2000). In these studies, participants were separated into competitive 
and collaborative orientations through instructional manipulation, reward structure or 
psychological assessment. Collaborative dyads, in general, obtained more agreements 
than either competitive or mixed dyads, even in repeated games. The difference in 
outcome is attributed to the openness of collaborative dyads to exchange information, 
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which can lead to solutions that benefit both sides - a behavior that competitive dyads had 
trouble adopting despite the predictions from game theory (De Dreu and Carnevale 
2003).  
 Motivation orientations have provided a stable predictor of outcome, much more 
than the strategy-based models from game theory (Rhoades and Carnevale 1999). 
Essentially, negotiators may vary their plans and actions to attain their goals, but rarely 
vary the goals. The two main premises for motivational orientations are: the theory of 
cooperation and competition (Deutsch 1949) and the dual concern model (Pruitt and 
Rubin 1986), both of which examine negotiators‘ social motives as the substrate for 
behavior, but draw separate conclusions on outcomes (De Dreu, Weingart et al. 2000). 
2.1.1 Theory of Cooperation and Competition 
The theory of cooperation and competition has been first proposed by Deutsch (1949), 
who hypothesized that bargainers are driven into two general social motives, which are 
based on their preference of outcome for self and others. On one side of the spectrum, the 
proself (or egoistic) motivated negotiators are those who try to maximize their own 
outcome, and on the other side, the prosocial negotiators aim to maximize the group‘s 
outcome (McClintock 1977). Researchers later divided the two sides into motivational 
orientations relative to their goals regarding the other party. Figure 1 shows the 
breakdown: 
 Altruistic negotiators are at the extreme end of the prosocial orientation. They are 
concerned with the group‘s outcome to the extent that they place greater emphasis 
on the preference of the other than on that of their own. Altruists are rarely found 
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in the conflict literature as they avoid representation of their interest and simply 
concede to the wishes of the other (Thompson 2007). 
 Cooperative negotiators are also prosocially oriented. They care for the 
preference of the group, in the sense that, they seek to pursue a united group goal 
that encompasses benefits for all sides.   
 Competitive bargainers, which are labeled as individualistic by McClintock 
(1977), have a proself orientation. They aim to pursue their own interest 
regardless of the group.  
 Extreme competitive bargainers, which in the original model McClintock (1977) 
simply called competitive, are the extreme end of the proself orientation. In fact, 
they view negotiations as a distributive situation, where the gains of one party 
necessarily imply losses for the other. Extreme competitive negotiators not only 










Figure 1 Value orientation based on McClintock (1977) 
 
 Studies relating personal traits to the four orientations showed that these 
orientations are in part derived from an individual‘s innate characteristics (Hermann and 
Kogan 1977) and the situation that the individual encounters (De Dreu and McCusker 
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1997). When prosocial and proself orientations were manipulated through the use of 
monetary incentives and/or instructions, the findings were mixed on which dyadic 
composition fairs best. In some cases, the results showed that prosocial groups (Weingart, 
Bennett et al. 1993) or dyads (De Dreu, Giebels et al. 1998) engaged in more problem-
solving behaviors and obtained greater joint outcome than those in proself treatments. 
Other experiments fell short of finding any differences (Weingart, Hyder et al. 1996), 
while O‘Connor and Carnevale (1997) have reported that proself motivated negotiators 
achieved higher joint gains than prosocial negotiators.  
2.1.2 Dual Concern Model 
The dual concern model was proposed by Pruitt and Rubin (1986) to reconcile the works 
by Deutsch (1949) and Blake and Mouton (1964) on conflict styles derived from different 
intensity of concerns for self and others. Contrary to the theory of cooperation and 
competition, the dual concern model does not view the two concerns as dichotomous 
social motives, but rather orthogonal dimensions (De Dreu, Weingart et al. 2000). In fact, 
different orientations are proposed based on the various degrees of concerns.  
 Competitive negotiators are similar to individualistic negotiators described in the 
theory of cooperation and competition. They express high concerns for their 
interests and none for those of the others.  
 Collaborative negotiators are similar to cooperators. However, the model 
emphasizes equal importance for maximizing preferences of self as well as of the 
other. Collaborators aim to achieve high outcomes for themselves, but in a 
manner that is beneficial to both parties. This orientation is only possible in multi-
issue negotiations, because it requires a focus on problem-solving behaviors that 
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aim to satisfy all parties without yielding to anyone‘s preferences (Pruitt 1981). A 
single issue negotiation implies that gains made by one side results in losses for 
the other side. 
 Accommodating bargainers resemble the altruistic orientation. They place greater 
value on the concerns of the other rather than that of selves. They may view the 
situation from a distributive perspective (i.e., a gain by one side necessarily means 
a loss for the other), where they must sacrifice their interests for the other.  
 Avoiding negotiators are neither proself nor prosocial. They are uninterested, 
afraid or unwilling to pursue negotiations because they are not motivated to 
achieve gains for themselves or the other through negotiation. 
 Compromising negotiators have limited concerns for both sides and wish to 
achieve an agreement quickly. Their distributive frame of reference implies that 
outcomes should be split equally to satisfy both parties. 
 Figure 2 depicts the dual concern model that describes these motivational 

























Figure 2 Dual concern model adapted from Kilmann and Thomas (1977) 
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The mixed findings vis-à-vis cooperators from previous works are explained by 
the model. When prosocially-oriented individuals exhibit low concern for selves (i.e., 
adopting an accommodating orientation), they yield easily to their opponents‘ 
preferences, and thus achieve lower joint outcomes. However, when prosocially-oriented 
individuals have high concern for selves (i.e., adopting a collaborative orientation) they 
are more resistant to concessions and engage in problem-solving behaviors, which can 
lead to higher joint gains.  
Experimental manipulations of aspiration levels of subjects and social motives 
showed that, indeed, collaborative dyads produced higher joint gains than those who were 
competitive or accommodating (Carnevale and Lawler 1986). For example, when 
subjects were told that they must reach an explicit goal as well as continue a future 
relationship with their negotiating partners, they sought to understand the position and 
concerns of their counterparts. They also made concessions that enabled joint gains (Ben-
Yoav and Pruitt 1984b).  
Other studies suggested that, although orientations can be elicited by influencing 
the context of the negotiation, the extent to which individuals express concern for their 
own interest and that of the other varied greatly among individuals within a given 
orientation (Carnevale and Pruitt 1992). Psychometric studies on the dual concern model 
proposed that accommodating and avoiding orientations are closer to each other when 
compared to competitive vs. avoiding orientations. Factor analyses on self-reported 
assessment of the orientations showed that compromising is closer to collaborative than it 
is to avoiding, and avoiding is closer to collaborative than it is to competitive one (Rubin 
and Thomas 1976; Van de Vliert and Prien 1989). The above findings suggest that these 
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orientations are distinguishable, but not necessarily according to the intensity of concern 
theorized by the model.  
 Research on the predictability of motivational orientation, in terms of negotiation 
outcome and behavior, has generated much criticism (Thompson 1990). The areas of 
contentions are:  
 The model neglects to consider the effect of the opponent‘s behavior on the 
characteristics exhibited by the various orientations (e.g., a collaborative 
individual may be able to search for better joint solutions with a collaborative 
partner than one who is avoiding, and in turn can produce a more favorable 
agreement). 
 The axes of concern do not reflect other dimensions of the conflict, such as the 
individual‘s emotional state, degree of conflict or existing relationship between 
parties. For example, when bargainers are given a gift to put them in a good 
mood, they are more cooperative (Pruitt and Rubin 1986). 
 The model assumes that behaviors associated with each orientation are static. It 
fails to explain how and why people change from one strategy to another during 
negotiation (Kilmann and Thomas 1977). 
Although these are valid points, it is important to remember that the orientations 
are developed based on the motivations present in pre-negotiation, and they do not 
necessarily represent strategies implemented during negotiation. The effects of the 
counterpart and process occur after individuals have established their motives for the 
negotiation. As a consequence, motivational research hold the assumption that the 
negotiation is a goal-driven activity, which dictates behavior during the process and 
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affects the outcome (Brett, Shapiro et al. 1998). The motivational orientations describe 
expected behavior and possible outcomes associated with these behaviors, but the actual 
behavior is subject to other factors (e.g., the behavior of the opponent) that transpire in 
the negotiation. To address the shortcoming of motivational orientations, the findings 
from various reviews on motivational orientation are summarized to provide insights into 
the antecedents that influence social motives, and the moderators that impact different 
orientations during negotiation.  
2.2 Review of Motivational Orientations up to the 1990s 
Research in social motives has a long tradition in examining the effects of 
motivational orientation in decision-making. Deutsch (1958) started research in this area 
by using instructions to induce collaborative, competitive and extreme competitive 
orientations in order to observe how people negotiate. Over the years, there have been 
numerous laboratory experiments, surveys and field studies that examined the 
antecedents, moderators and outcomes associated with collaborative and competitive 
orientations. There have also been several meta-studies (i.e., Thompson 1990 covering 
more than 50 studies; Carnevale and Pruitt 1992; Bazerman, Curhan et al. 2000; De Dreu, 
Weingart et al. 2000), which presented a concise picture of relationships between 
variables that influence and interact with collaborative and competitive orientations. 
These meta-studies are discussed in this section. 
2.2.1 Antecedents of Motivational Orientation 
The most influential antecedents on social motives are the individual differences and the 
contextual dimensions that characterize a negotiation. In fact, individual differences and 
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contextual manipulations yield positive and significant effects on joint outcome, but no 
difference in effect size between the two antecedents, meaning that both antecedents are 
equally significant at inducing motivational orientation. Furthermore, other factors (such 
as task complexity) have failed to generate any difference between collaborative and 
competitive negotiators (De Dreu, Weingart et al. 2000).  
 The influence of individual differences has been argued to be the most relevant 
explanation for motivational orientation. It relates to the negotiators‘ predisposition 
towards one or several orientations, rather than their perception of the bargaining 
situation (Hermann and Kogan 1977). Kilmann and Thomas (1977) have claimed that 
people have various mixtures of the five orientations depicted in the dual concern model. 
The degree to which one orientation is favored is dependent on the negotiators‘ social 
values and their judgment of fairness and morality, which may stem from their culture 
(e.g., individualism fosters proself, whereas collectivism promotes prosocial orientation) 
and competitiveness (Thompson 1990; Bazerman, Curhan et al. 2000). Studies, which 
looked at the composition of the five orientations, showed that people often start with 
their predominant orientation, and they move to the next orientation if this first one 
proves unsuccessful. However, they are unable to adopt an orientation that is external to 
their inherent nature (Shell 2001).  
 Individual differences constitute one possible explanation for the orientation 
adopted by the negotiator; another one is the context (Carnevale and Probst 1998). For 
example, the same person may negotiate very differently when buying a car versus 
ensuring the safety of his or her child in a terrorist situation. The contextual effects are 
conceivably based on the individual‘s perception of threats and opportunities presented in 
   18 
the conflict. Pinkley and Northcraft (1994) illustrated these as images being invoked, at 
some subconscious level, by particular schemata and scripts that represent reality. These 
guide individuals in their search for information, as well as the process and evaluation of 
this information. Consequently, the context can take multiple dimensions. But the 
important dimensions are those that relate to a goal, and bring about a direction or 
process for negotiators to formulate a plan towards achieving this goal.  
 The following key effects describing the negotiation context were proposed by 
Bazerman, Curhan et al. (2000): 
(1) Relational: refers to the individual‘s focus on the ongoing relationship with the 
other party (Savage, Blair et al. 1989; Pinkley and Northcraft 1994; Bazerman, 
Curhan et al. 2000). Loewenstein, Thompson et al. (1989) demonstrated that the 
individuals‘ perceived relationship with the counterpart has a great impact on the 
adoption of a prosocial orientation. In laboratory experiments, Carnevale and 
Lawler (1986) manipulated the orientation through the context by giving subjects 
instructions to maximize the outcome of the counterpart, while Giebels, De Dreu 
et al. (2003) referred to the counterpart as the ―partner‖ in the negotiation rather 
than the ―opponent‖ to create strong social motives. Another contextual handling 
on this dimension involves leading subjects to expect future interactions with the 
counterpart (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt 1984b). Overall, an emphasis on the relational 
effect induces negotiators to be more concerned for the others. 
(2) Substantive: describes the concern that the individual places on the economic 
aspects of the dispute (Savage, Blair et al. 1989; Pinkley and Northcraft 1994; 
Bazerman, Curhan et al. 2000). This represents the instrumental payoff of the 
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agreement. Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) reported that the more the parties 
focused on their substantive outcome, the more likely they were to assume a 
competitive orientation, and the more challenging it was for them to achieve an 
agreement. Emphasizing the substantive context, such as directing subjects to 
maximize their own gain may, therefore, increase proself motives. Other 
substantive type of contextual manipulations include explicitly setting high 
aspirations (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt 1984a) and applying constituency pressure for 
achieving large gains (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt 1984b). Any emphasis on the 
substantive effect promotes concern for self.  
(3) Divergent: relates to the degree that individuals believe that the counterpart‘s 
interests are opposite to theirs (Thompson and Hastie 1990). A study of 
interpersonal conflict in IS development, determined that the stronger is the 
perception of disagreement (divergent interest), the greater is the assessment of 
interpersonal conflict, and the more difficult it is to consider the preference of the 
other party when searching for an agreement (Barki and Hartwick 2001). When 
subjects were told to view their counterpart as the ―opponent‖, they developed a 
less prosocial orientation (Burnham, McCabe et al. 2000). Cognitive studies have 
shown that the more the negotiators enter a fixed-pie perception (i.e., your win is 
my loss) the more difficult it is for them to accurately assess the interests of the 
counterpart and find jointly beneficial solutions (Bazerman, Curhan et al. 2000). 
The importance placed on the divergent effect reduces concern for the other.  
(4) Emotional: reflects the degree of concern that individuals have for the affective 
components of the negotiation problem. Here, the focus is on the feelings 
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involved in the dispute (Pinkley and Northcraft 1994; Barki and Hartwick 2001; 
Curhan, Elfenbein et al. 2005). The study of emotions is a growing area in 
negotiation research. Emotions and affect delineate feeling, moods and emotional 
state, which an individual experiences in response to the negotiation problem. In 
terms of conflict resolution, the more individuals focus on emotions the less they 
are able to concentrate on their own goals. In a study looking at the effect of 
emotional states, van Kleef, De Dreu et al. (2004) showed that negotiator who 
believed their opponents were angry with the dispute conceded more than those 
who did not receive any information on the emotional state of the opponent. This 
is due to the fact that participants used the emotion information to deduce the 
other's expectations and adjusted their demands accordingly.  
When professional mediators in a family case used humor to lessen anger 
and overt hostility, disputants shifted their attention to each other‘s interests and 
applied problem solving behavior in the negotiation (Carnevale and Pruitt 1992). 
In general, emotional distress decreases concern for self as it removes focus on 
self-gain and places it onto the affective conflict with the counterpart (Curhan, 
Elfenbein et al. 2005). 
Taken together, these contextual effects describe the antecedents that build the 
negotiator‘s orientation in pre-negotiation. They have been mapped onto the dual concern 
model to show their effect on the various concerns related to the different orientations 
(Gross and Guerrero 2000). Figure 3 summarizes the dimensions in respect to the dual 
concern model. The four contextual effects can drive individuals to adopt different 
orientations based on their assessment of the situation.  
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The substantive effect is indicative of negotiators who place importance on 
economic gains, such that an emphasis on this contextual effect leads to collaborative or 
competitive orientations.  The relational effect is concerned with social ties, and an 
increase in this engenders accommodating and collaborative orientations. Negotiators 
who pay attention to the emotional effect are concentrated on the feelings involved, rather 
than the substantive outcome achieved (Pinkley and Northcraft 1994). The greater is the 
emotional toll of the negotiation, the more likely negotiators disengage from cognitive 
actions resulting in self-destructive choices (O'Connor and Carnevale 1997). The 
negotiators would choose to either forfeit their gains (i.e., adopt an accommodating 
orientation) or resist engaging in negotiations (i.e., adopt an avoiding orientation). As the 
divergence of interest is perceived to be high, negotiators tend to exhibit less concern for 
the other and follow a competitive or avoiding orientation (Bazerman, Curhan et al. 
2000). Figure 3 shows that an increase along different contextual dimensions affects the 
































Figure 3 Mapping contextual effects to the dual concern model 
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 The influence of the different contextual effects on orientations allows for greater 
understanding of discrepancies between one choice of orientation and another. This is 
especially the case for individuals who change orientations based on modification of the 
context among substantive, relational, divergent and emotional effects (Pinkley and 
Northcraft 1994; Bazerman, Curhan et al. 2000). 
2.2.2 Dyadic Composition  
Although negotiators can be classified into different orientations, the outcome is not 
necessarily implied solely by motivation. The dyadic composition has been found to 
promote or limit certain behaviors related to collaborative and competitive orientations. 
This explain why people often shift from one strategy to another despite their inherent 
orientation (Thompson 1990; Carnevale and Pruitt 1992; Bazerman, Curhan et al. 2000; 
De Dreu, Weingart et al. 2000). 
 The dyadic composition (or group composition in a few studies reviewed to by 
De Dreu, Weingart et al. 2000) describes the matching of collaboratively and 
competitively oriented individuals, and it allows for the interplay of different dynamics 
that contribute to diverse outcomes.  
 For collaborative dyads, experimental results showed that rate of agreement was 
high, but the joint outcome was not necessarily so because negotiators tended to 
weaken their demand and conceded easily to a suboptimal solution for the sake of 
trying to please the other party. When prosocially inclined dyads resisted the urge 
to yield readily to the demands of the other by adopting high aspirations, they 
pushed each other towards better solutions.  
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 For competitive dyads, the challenge was to resist contentious behavior (i.e., a 
focus on mainly directing the other party to one‘s wishes) that ignites retaliation, 
which leads to deadlock in the experiments. Agreements with elevated joint 
outcomes were possible for competitive dyads, once negotiators were aware of the 
other party‘s interest and behaved more flexibly to maximize each other‘s needs. 
Rubin (1991) called this the enlightened self-interest based on postulations that 
competitive negotiators, who knew that the other party shared their orientation, 
realized that the best solution was to work together towards an efficient 
agreement.  
 For mixed dyads, the expectation of researchers was that this would be the ideal 
situation for joint gains; whereby the collaborative individual would introduce 
elements of flexibility and cooperation, while the competitive counterpart would 
press the dyad to hold their interests firmly (Fisher and Ury 1981; Pruitt and 
Rubin 1986). However, the studies on mixed dyads have shown that mixed dyads 
produced poorer results than pure ones. The two main reasons are: (1) mixed 
composition prevented negotiators from sharing a similar mental image (i.e., 
cognitive mapping of important constructs that describe the negotiation situation) 
that would guide them towards an integrative solution (Bazerman, Curhan et al. 
2000); (2) collaborative individuals tended to reciprocate contentious behavior 
initiated by the competitive counterpart, whereas competitive negotiators were 
less affected by the counterparts‘ cooperative behavior. The resistance exhibited 
by the competitive side was due to a perception of divergence of interest and 
reactive devaluation of the counterpart‘s proposal (Carnevale and Pruitt 1992).  
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2.2.3 Moderating Negotiations 
The negotiation process is moderated by the rules of engagement dictated in the 
experimental design. These rules can be more favorable towards one orientation versus 
another. Three moderators have been found to greatly affect the different orientations: 
time pressure, handling of impasses and communication medium (De Dreu, Weingart et 
al. 2000). 
As negotiations generally progress according to the two-phase model described by 
Walton and McKersie (1965), the first phase is spent on clarifying positions and 
demands, and the second is on finding integrative solutions that satisfy both parties. 
Reducing the time span disfavored competitive individuals who needed more time to 
enter the second phase. Time pressure affects problem-solving behavior that is mostly 
present in the second phase of negotiation, in which competitive negotiators enter later 
and thus lack time to find integrative solutions (Thompson 1990).  
The handling of impasses has been reported to either encourage an agreement 
(i.e., no impasses allowed) or discourage one by implementing a walk-away value (e.g., a 
compromise ―50-50 split‖ or the lowest agreement value from the sample). The first 
option favors competitive dyads as they are given more time to negotiate, whereas the 
second one reduces their gains as unresolved conflicts generally result in lower values 
(De Dreu, Weingart et al. 2000).  
Collaborative individuals were found to be more affected by the communication 
medium. When negotiators were required to transmit offers through written messages, 
competitive dyads performed better than collaborative ones, however, this effect 
dissipated once negotiators communicated face-to-face.  Collaborative dyads gained 
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advantage over competitive ones by openly revealing their interest to each other, but 
when the communication medium restricted direct communication this advantage was 
lost (Thompson and Hastie 1990).  
2.2.4 Negotiation Outcome for Collaborators and Competitors 
The negotiation outcomes have been assessed by economic measures such as joint 
outcome and number of agreements, while psychological measures reflected individual 
perceptions of the process and the counterpart.  
Most studies on motivational orientation looked at joint outcome (i.e., the 
aggregation of gains by both sides) as the measure of performance (Carnevale and Pruitt 
1992; Bazerman, Curhan et al. 2000; De Dreu, Weingart et al. 2000). More specifically, 
they found that collaborative dyads used less contentious behaviors and openly 
communicated their preferences with each other to reach more agreements, but not 
necessarily efficient ones.  
Competitive dyads may have suffered from a ―fixed-pie‖ bias leading to a vicious 
cycle of contentious behaviors that prevented constructive communication between the 
parties. In some occasions, against their bias, competitive dyads were able to move to an 
enlighten state of communication and worked together to reach jointly favorable 
solutions (Carnevale and Pruitt 1992).  
Thompson (1990) has argued that, as important as it is to measure economic 
performance, individual perceptions are equally valid in determining the success of a 
negotiation and the possibility of future relationship between negotiators. She showed 
that perceptions do not necessarily reflect economic outcome achieved, instead they 
provide insight as to why the discrepancies exist between different orientations. Both 
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perception of the process (i.e., judgment of the fairness of the procedures, their 
expectations and perceived norms concerning appropriate behavior) and the counterpart 
(i.e., impression formed of the opponent in terms of trustworthiness and fairness) are 
deemed more favorably by collaborative negotiators. Collaborators viewed the bargaining 
situation as more productive and their counterparts as more friendly to work with, when 
compared to competitors. These findings coincide with the expectation that collaborative 
negotiators have a vested interest to help the opponent and maximize both parties‘ 
welfare by behaving more cooperatively, which eventually influences their perceptions 
(Bazerman, Curhan et al. 2000).  
2.2.5 Integrating Reviews on Motivational Orientation 
Figure 4 summarizes the results obtained from the literature review. It points to the 
antecedents of motivational orientation and the moderators that impact the relationship 































Figure 4 Antecedents, moderators and outcomes of motivational orientation 
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The key reviews on motivational studies up to the 1990s (Thompson 1990; 
Carnevale and Pruitt 1992; Bazerman, Curhan et al. 2000; De Dreu, Weingart et al. 2000) 
reveal that the antecedents leading to different orientations can come from individual 
differences or contextual effects. Based on collaborative and competitive orientations, 
three dyadic parings are possible: two of which are homogenous compositions of 
competitive and collaborative dyads, while the third one is a mix of a competitor with a 
collaborator. These dyad compositions play an important factor in the interaction between 
negotiators. The reviews showed that collaborative dyads were more agreeable, but they 
could settle easily with suboptimal solutions. Competitive dyads may not have reached as 
many agreements as collaborative ones, but their agreements tended to produce higher 
joint outcomes. Mixed dyads fared the worst, as collaborators and competitors were 
unable to influence each other with their strength for cooperation on one side and holding 
high aspiration on the other side.  
The moderators of time pressure, impasse handling and communication medium 
were shown to affect the dyadic compositions differently (De Dreu, Weingart et al. 
2000). An increase in time pressure favored collaborative dyads as they had an inherent 
objective for cooperation, while a restrictive communication medium reduced the 
collaborative dyads‘ abilities to openly reveal their preferences. Depending on the 
method used to handle impasses, the outcomes for each orientation varied greatly.  The 
negotiated outcomes have mostly been based on objective measures such as the number 
of agreements and joint outcome of the dyad. Thompson (1990), however, espoused the 
view that individual perceptions (such as perception of the process and counterpart) may 
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be more important to establishing future relationships; hence they should also be 
assessed. 
Despite the comprehensive analysis of works on orientation, the reviewers 
pointed to deficiencies in these studies, in terms of characterizing the process or the 
influence of technology. For example, it is unclear what types of interactions bring each 
orientation to favorable or unfavorable consequences.  
2.3 Recent Studies on Motivational Orientations 
The present review, based on experiments published in 1993 and later, examines the 
effects of different combinations of orientations (i.e., dyadic or group compositions) on 
the process and outcomes. The review details the activities in the negotiation process that 
allow different dyadic compositions to reach greater joint outcomes. It also highlights 
works that involve electronic negotiation. Eighteen empirical studies on motivational 
orientation, from 1993 on, show that different motivational compositions affect the 
process activities and sequences of these activities. Based on the different dyadic 
compositions, this section also presents the key characteristics of the process that lead to 
different individual and dyadic outcomes, as well as the moderators that influence the 
process.  
2.3.1 Dyad Composition 
Overall, three types of dyadic (or group) compositions are formed from different methods 
of inducing or selecting for collaborative and competitive orientations: homogenous 
collaborative and competitive dyads, and mixed dyads. These orientations were most 
often paired in homogenous dyads or group to draw conclusions on the impact of 
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motivation. For example, collaborative dyads were shown to arrive at more agreements, 
which were not necessarily better than those achieved by competitive dyads (Olekalns 
and Smith 2003a; Schei, Rognes et al. 2006).  Other studies found that collaborative 
dyads performed better because they could introduce many issues in the discussion that 
would allow for integrative agreements (Weingart, Bennett et al. 1993; Schei and Rognes 
2003; Beersma and De Dreu 2005) 
Mixed compositions of competitive and collaborative individuals introduced 
additional conflict to the dynamics of the dyad (Olekalns and Smith 2003b; Schei and 
Rognes 2003; Olekalns and Smith 2005; Schei, Rognes et al. 2006). Mixed dyads 
generally performed worst because they lacked a common understanding of the 
bargaining situation. In addition, the contract balance (i.e., the difference between gains 
of one side compare to the other) was found to be low in mixed dyads because 
competitors took advantage of the openness of collaborative negotiators (Schei and 
Rognes 2003).  
2.3.2 Negotiation Process 
Earlier reviews have explained that collaborative dyads tended to yield to each other‘s 
interests leading them to suboptimal gains, whereas competitive dyads were inclined 
towards contentious behaviors that prevented them from reaching agreements (Thompson 
1990; De Dreu, Weingart et al. 2000). The present literature review examines the process 
in more detail to highlight activities and sequences of activities that characterize the 
different dyad compositions. In most of the process analyses, the exchange between the 
parties was broken down into integrative or distributive activities.  
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Integrative activities describe actions that promote problem-solving and joint 
gains. These activities allow for the creation of value for both parties such as (1) process 
management, which seeks to strengthen the underlying relationship between parties by 
supporting the other‘s argument and introducing new issues; (2) priority information, 
which is directly divulging information on one‘s needs and interests; and (3) multi-issue 
offer, which consists of making offers on more than one issue at once to find mutual 
benefits. 
Distributive activities direct negotiations towards solely self gains, i.e. claiming 
value for selves. Distributive activities are:  (i) contention, which demands the other party 
to concede his/her needs; (ii) positional information, which serves to strengthen one‘s 
own position; and (iii) proposal modification, which consists of changing the other‘s 
offer and focusing the discussion on a single issue exchange (Olekalns and Smith 1999; 
2003a; 2003b).  
In a series of experiments, Olekalns and Smith (1999; 2003a; 2003b) examined 
the use of these activities in pure dyadic and mixed dyadic compositions. They found that 
pure dyads achieved higher joint gains due to their goal congruency, but required a 
combination of integrative and distributive activities as well as different sequences of 
activities to reach this effect. In collaborative dyads, negotiators who used priority 
information and process management obtained higher joint gains, than those who 
engaged in contention and proposal modification. In competitive dyads, negotiators used 
multi-issue offers to indirectly show their preference to the other party as well as 
positional information, but those who employed contention and proposal modification 
also obtained poor results. Mixed dyads focused on distributive activities, in particular on 
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positional information, and used few integrative activities, which caused them to obtain 
inferior results compared to those obtained by pure dyads.  
The activity-based sequence, in Olekalns and Smith‘s (1999; 2003a; 2003b) 
experiments also differed between dyads. In collaborative dyads the parties trusted each 
other and reciprocated integrative activities to coordinate offers and obtained high gains, 
while the parties in competitive dyads had a tendency to behave contentiously and 
followed a non-reciprocal sequence that combined integrative and distributive activities. 
Therefore, collaborative negotiators were susceptible to mutuality and reciprocity what 
enabled them to trust and coordinate integrative activities. Conversely, competitive 
negotiators who deviated from reciprocity of contentious activities by breaking the 
distributive cycle with integrative cycle were able to reach favorable joint outcomes.  
These finding were confirmed by Schei, Rognes et al. (2006), who examined the 
sequence in terms of three phases. They found that if competitive dyads were able to 
move to integrative activities in the final stage of negotiation, then they could obtain 
higher joint gains. While collaborative dyads did not necessarily achieve better economic 
results, they reported greater outcome satisfaction. Again, mixed dyads performed the 
worst because their behaviors were centered on distributive activities.  
The inclination towards different types of negotiation activities by different 
orientations can be seen early on, even in pre-negotiation stage. De Dreu and Boles 
(1998) studied pre-negotiation and found that social values influence cognition in terms 
of selection and recall of distributive and integrative activities. In essence, collaboratively 
oriented individuals selected and recalled integrative activities more often than 
distributive ones, as opposed to competitively oriented individuals who leaned more 
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towards distributive activities. Interestingly, integrative activities were judged to be the 
most appropriate by both orientations as they acknowledged that negotiation requires 
cooperation to be successful. The difference in mindsets between collaborative and 
competitive individuals persisted even to post-negotiation tasks. Although collaborative 
groups performed better in negotiations by engaging in more integrative activities to 
reach a larger number of agreements, they failed to outperform competitive groups in 
divergent post-negotiation tasks (i.e., those that did not require joint decision-making), 
which indicates that the behaviors and attitudes adopted during negotiation endure into 
post-negotiation (Beersma and De Dreu 2005). 
Even though mixed dyads were theorized by Lax and Sebenius (1986) and  
Thompson (1990) to produce the best outcome, seventeen out of the eighteen
1
 studies 
showed that pure dyads achieved better outcomes (e.g., joint gains and satisfaction with 
outcome). Pure dyads had comparable cognitive representation of the negotiation that 
enabled them to better communicate with each other, and they even reported a greater 
perception of the counterpart and the process (Olekalns and Smith 2005). Moreover, in 
the experiments, collaborative dyads that engaged in competitive behaviors (i.e., 
contention and proposal modification) fare poorly, but those who made efforts to directly 
communicate their preferences (i.e., priority information) and to handle information 
sharing (i.e., process management) were rewarded with superior outcomes and reported 
better relationships with their counterparts. Competitive dyads succeeded when they 
engaged in a mix of distributive and integrative activities; that is, they first stated their 
positions (i.e., positional information) and then indirectly divulged their preferences (e.g., 
                                                 
1
 With the exception of the study by Olekalns, Smith et al. (1996) that had a very small sample seize and 
used repeated measures. The authors further acknowledged these factors to have affected the results.  
 
   33 
through offer-making) (Olekalns and Smith 1999; Olekalns and Smith 2003a; Olekalns 
and Smith 2003b; Olekalns and Smith 2005).  
2.3.3 Moderators of the Process 
In the post1993 experiments, additional moderators of the process were introduced, 
including technology and characteristics of the task. Experimental designs that promoted 
distributive activities were more damaging on competitive dyads as they fostered 
contentious behavior (Weingart, Bennett et al. 1993). Although four out of the eighteen 
studies employed technology to mediate the negotiation process (De Dreu and Van Lange 
1995, in the third experiment; Jain and Solomon 2000; Montoya-Weiss, Massey et al. 
2001; Trötschel and Gollwitzer 2007), only two highlighted the effect of technology on 
negotiation, showing that the communication medium and system features affected 
motivational orientations (Jain and Solomon 2000; Montoya-Weiss, Massey et al. 2001).  
In their meta-analysis, De Dreu, Weingart et al. (2000) found that difference of 
task (e.g., business or political scenarios) failed to induce any difference between 
collaborative and competitive negotiators as previously expected from Tenbrunsel and 
Messick (1999). As moderator to the negotiation process, cognitive biases derived from 
the outcome framing (Olekalns 1994; Olekalns 1997; Trötschel and Gollwitzer 2007) 
strongly interacted with different motivational orientations. 
 Studies with different experimental protocols suggested that collaborative dyads 
perform better with those that require increased efforts to resist yielding. On the other 
hand, rules which promote distributive activities were found most harmful to competitive 
dyads. When the experimental protocol was designed to test the effect of issue 
consideration (i.e., single issue vs. multi-issue offers), Weingart, Bennett et al. (1993) 
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reported that multi-issue offers produced better results than single issue offers for both 
collaborative and competitive dyads. However, collaborative dyads reciprocated 
concessions to overcome the lack of tradeoffs in single issue negotiations. In group 
negotiations of three similarly orientated members, the implementation of majority or 
unanimity decision rules impacted the group structures differently (Beersma and De Dreu 
2002). Collaborative groups achieved better results in terms of joint gains and perception 
of process with unanimity rule, a protocol that forced them to work together; whereas 
competitive groups needed a protocol that would mitigate their difference of opinion and 
impose a decision, such as the majority rule. 
 In a series of experiments, De Dreu, Beersma et al. (2006) induced epistemic 
motivation, which is the desire to develop and hold accurate and well-informed 
conclusions about the world, by requiring subjects to put greater efforts into negotiations. 
They found that epistemic motivation increased joint outcome (i.e., gains and efficiency), 
perceptions of the process and the counterpart for collaborative dyads only, but had no 
effect on competitive dyads. In fact, this supports past finding that collaborative dyads 
need to resist yielding and search of joint improvements (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt 1984b).  
 The studies that employed technology to mediate negotiation also showed that 
different motivational orientations reacted differently to the technology. When 
appropriation support (i.e., that helped mixed groups to negotiate and develop a business 
strategy) was added to a groupware, the system increased decision quality for less 
motivated orientations, such as avoiding and compromising (Montoya-Weiss, Massey et 
al. 2001). In an experiment to study the influence of the communication medium, Jain 
and Solomon (2000) suggested that collaborative dyads are most affected by a reduction 
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of media richness. Collaborative dyads had more trouble communicating their preference 
through electronic messaging, and thus they reported a poorer perception of the process 
with electronic messaging compared to face-to-face and with competitive dyads. The 
authors suggested that motivational orientation is not only influenced by the 
communication medium, but also by the decision support provided by the ENS. As of 
yet, little is known about the moderation effects of decision support on different 
motivational orientations.  
In an experiment using a software agent as a counterpart that was neither 
collaborative nor competitive, De Dreu and Van Lange (1995) found that collaborators 
were more responsive to the counterpart and had a better perception of the opponent. 
Competitors, in contrast, only made concessions when initiated and met by the other side. 
The results supported the expectation that prosocial-oriented individuals reciprocate the 
counterpart‘s level of demand and concession.  
 In an effort to merge various research streams from the cognitive perspective, 
different outcome frames (i.e., in terms of losses and gains) have been studied along 
with collaborative and competitive orientations. De Dreu, Van Lange et al. (1995) cited 
an unpublished study by Carnvale, De Dreu et al. (1994) that reported collaborative 
dyads achieving better joint outcomes with a loss frame than a gain frame. However, 
Olekalns (1994; 1997) observed contradicting results. She saw that collaborative and 
competitive dyads had difficulties overcoming the cognitive barriers of a loss frame. She 
indicated that when collaborative dyads were placed in a loss frame the task required 
more cognitive effort, because the loss frame promoted selfish actions, which conflicted 
with prosocial motives. In contrast, Trötschel and Gollwitzer (2007) showed that 
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prosocial goal intentions (i.e., specifying the desire for participants to reach a prosocial 
outcome) reduced the negative effect of a loss frame and produced higher joint gains. 
Furthermore, when implementation intentions (i.e., specifying a plan to obtaining the 
desired goal) were added to goal intentions in the protocol, negotiators surpassed the 
barrier of a loss frame and achieved results similar to those in a gain frame. The 
researchers found that implementation intention moderates the middle and later phase of 
negotiation by engendering integrative activities. 
2.3.4 Review of Studies on Motivational Orientation  
The review of literature on experiments shows similar results with those described in 
Section 2.2. However, studies, which examined the negotiation process, provided greater 
descriptive analysis of the activities and sequence of activities. These allowed 
collaborative and competitive dyads to obtain high joint gains and equity. Outcome frame 
and technology were demonstrated to be important moderators on the negotiation 
process. Figure 5 shows the different dyadic compositions and diverse negotiation 
activities that define the negotiation process. 



























Figure 5 Reviews of process, moderators and outcomes of dyadic structure 
 
Collaborative dyads were found to engage in reciprocally integrative activities 
that enabled them to obtain greater joint gains, compared with those who followed a non-
reciprocal sequence of mixed activities. As competitive dyads tended to start with 
distributive activities, they needed to break the cycle of contention by engaging in 
integrative activities towards the end of negotiations to achieve the same results as high 
performing collaborators (Olekalns and Smith 1999; Olekalns and Smith 2003b).  
 The moderating effect of technology was examined mostly by comparing face-to-
face communication with electronic text communication. In those experiments, 
collaborative dyads had more difficulty revealing their preference through electronic 
messaging than in person. They reported an inferior perception of the counterpart and 
process with electronic negotiation (Jain and Solomon 2000). Similarly to Section 2.2, 
the negotiation protocol was found to moderate the process. Experiments looking at 
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outcome frames illustrated the potential of framing to differently affect collaborative and 
competitive dyads. Competitive dyads appeared to benefit from a gain frame, while 
collaborative dyads seemed to perform better in a loss frame (Carnevale, De Dreu et al. 
1994).  
 Although the experiments provided a better understanding of the process for 
collaborators and competitors, none of the studies reported the effect of decision support 
by an ENS on enhancing or inhibiting negotiation activities. Furthermore, the studies that 
relate outcome framing to motivational orientation had a small sample size and showed 
mixed results (Olekalns 1994; 1997). The use of outcome framing to help collaborative 
and competitive dyads reach better results is still unclear.   
 The empirical studies examined are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1 Studies of motivational orientation2 




Group composition: either 
competitor or collaborators 
 
- Issue consideration: 
sequential vs. simultaneous 
issue consideration  
- Case: four party 5 issue 
negotiation 
- Joint outcome (best for 
collaborators and simultaneous 
issue consideration) 
- Process:  (1) collaborators were 
more trusting and less 
argumentative (2) simultaneous 
issue consideration allow for 
more exchange of information 
and greater insight into the 
preference of the other parties 
(3) logrolling was done mostly 
with two issues at a time.   
- Study the impact of motivational 
orientation and issue consideration  
- Motivational orientation affect 
coordination of behavior: 
collaborators match the other party 
and competitors remain the same  
- Collaborators can reciprocate 
concessions to overcome 
sequential limitations 
- Structure of the decision process 
can improve decision making 
Olekalns 
(1994) 
Dyad composition: pairing 
of negotiators with same or 
different motivational 
orientations: competitor 
and cooperator  
- Outcome frame 
(negotiator‘s 
conceptualization of 
potential outcomes in either 
gain or losses) 
o Manipulated using 
different profit 
schedules (profit or 
cost) 
- Pay-off structure (the 
allowance of the 
negotiation problem for 
trade-offs, possible by 
variable-sum and not 
possible by fixed-sum) 
o Manipulated using 
different pairing of 
profit schedules  
- Case: negotiate broker 
profit schedule with 4 
issues  
- Individual and joint outcome : 
o No real difference when 
partner is of the same 
frame (gain with gain or 
loss with loss), but with 
different framed partners 
gain frame is advantaged 
o Cooperator got better 
results in gain frame than 
in loss, but competitors 
were less affected by 
outcome frame 
o These differences are only 
seen in variable-sum pay-
off as fixed-sum does not 
allow for trade-off that 
provide integrative 
solutions 
- Test the effects of situational cues 
such as motivational orientation, 
pairing of opponent and pay-off 
schedule on outcome frames 
- Results show that variable-sum 
pay-off is best for reaching 
integrative agreements, gain frame 
negotiators do better than loss 
frame especially when paired with 
loss frame opponent, cooperative 
orientation are able to reap the 
benefits of gain frame and 
variable-sum 
- No difference in performance 
between gain or loss frame for 
competitors 
- Congruency among: gain frame, 
cooperative pairing and variable-
sum vs. loss frame competitive 
paring and fixed-sum 
                                                 
2
 In this table, the various orientations are described based on the following definition: collaborative  (or cooperative) is to maximize ones and other‘s welfare, 
competitive (or individualistic) is only to maximize one‘s welfare and extreme competitive is to minimize the gain of the other while maximizing one‘s gains. 
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Dyad composition: pairing 





- Computer counterpart  
acted as buyer (made the 
first offer in the mid-range) 
- Case: buy-sell negotiation 
with a computer for 3 
issues 
- Number of agreements: no 
agreements reached after 7 
rounds 
- Process 
o Level of demand: same for 
all at the first 2 rounds, 
but collaborators 
decreased demand more 
rapidly as negotiation 
progressed 
o Level of concession: 
collaborators started with 
higher levels of 
concession and leveled 
off, while the competitors 
made consistent lower 
levels of concession 
- Perceived opponent to be more 
fair and considerate: 
collaborators had better 
perception than competitors 
- Computer mediated negotiation 
with a agent partner that was 
neither cooperative nor 
competitive to observe the effect of 
social value orientation on process 
and perception of opponent  
- Social value orientation affects 
cognition, motivation and behavior 
- Collaborators were more 
responsive to the opponent that the 
others 
- Competitors differ from extreme-
competitors by making more 
cooperative offers if it is met by 
the opponent 




Dyad composition: pairing 
of negotiators with same or 
different motivational 
orientations: competitors 
and collaborators  
- Case: buy-sell negotiation 
case with 5 issues   
- Confounding effects from role 
and order of negotiation 
- Joint outcome: 
o Competitors had a 
constant contentious 
behavior and obtain the 
worst outcome 
o Individualists with 
collaborators got the best 
results (mixed dyad) 
o Collaborators with 
collaborators were second  
 
- Look at the effect of dyad structure 
on outcome, and the negotiators‘ 
ability to maximize outcome is 
dependent on the congruence of 
their goals with that of their partner 
- Dyad structure plays and important 
role on behavior and outcome. 
- Collaborators will adapt their 
behavior to their partners 
- Individualist can adapt to partner 
but less than collaborators  
- Competitors don‘t adapt their 
behavior  
- Small sample size (36 students 
negotiated with all three 
orientations) and effects of 
confounding variables could have 
affect the conclusions 
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Authors Motivation orientation Moderators and case Process and outcome Comments 
Olekalns 
(1997) 
Dyad composition: pairing 





- Outcome frame 
(negotiator‘s 
conceptualization of 
potential outcomes in either 
gain or losses) 
o Manipulated using 
different profit 
schedules (profit or 
cost) 
- Pay-off structure (the 
allowance of the 
negotiation problem for 
trade-offs, possible by 
variable-sum and not 
possible by fixed-sum) 
o Manipulated using 
different pairing of 
profit schedules  
- Settlement rule (alteration 
to market dynamics by 
having either no settlement 
vs. BATNA)  
o Manipulated using 
negotiation protocol 
- Case: negotiate broker 















- Outcomes were sign. lower for 
loss frame negotiators 
especially if their partner shared 
this frame, but when off-set by 
a gain frame partner or one that 
was cooperative, they were able 
to increase profits. 
- Concession rate was most sign. 
by cooperative, gain frame 
partners.  
2. Study 
- Outcomes were worst for 
individualistic, loss frame 
negotiators with a loss frame or 
individualistic partner.  
- Concession rate was affected 
by settlement rule. No 
settlement pushed collaborators 
to make smaller concessions  
- Examine the effects of situational 
cues over cognitive factors 
- Same loss frame presented a 
challenge for  the dyad, but is 
helped with cooperative motives 
- Mixed frame dyads allow loss 
frame negotiator to reap benefit 
from gain frame negotiator or via a 
cooperative partner 
- A cooperative gain frame provided 
with similar partner obtained high 
outcomes when no settlement was 
given upon impasse 
- When in variable-sum conditions 
the results are very mixed due to 
the cognitive effort required by the 
ill-structured problem. Additional 
ambiguity (cooperative and gain-
frame) create more confusion 
- Concession rate was not 
differentiated between logrolling 
or unilateral concession  
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Dyad composition: pairing 






 - 1. Study:  Selection of 
cooperative, neutral or 
competitive strategies in pre-
negotiation 
- 2. Study: Selection, recall, and 
rate competitive and 
cooperative strategies in pre-
negotiation 
- Process: 
o Cooperative strategies 
(most often selected by 
collaborators) 
o Competitive strategies 
(most often selected by 
individualist and 
competitors)  
o Cooperative strategies 
was judge most 
appropriate by all three 
(case and social setting) 
- Study the effects of motivation on 
cognition in pre-negotiation 
- Motivation and cognition work 
together to direct behavior 
- Social value influence cognition 
(selection, recall and judgment of 





Dyad composition: pairing 
of negotiators with same 





- Communication channel: 
Face-to-face (f2f) vs. 
electronic meeting system 
(EMS) 
- Case: two plant manager 
negotiating 4 issues 
- Effectiveness of communication 
(f2f was sign. better than EMS; 
competitors were sign. better 
than collaborators 
- Satisfaction with outcome no 
effect 
- Perception of group process 
(f2f was sign. better than EMS; 
weak indication that 
collaborators benefit more from 









- 2X2 design: conflict  style 
(collaborating or competing), 
communication medium (f2f or 
EMS) 
- Looked only at perceptions (no 
mention of economic performance) 
- Authors concluded that the DSS is 
what brings benefits to NSS, the 
limited communication channel 
(EMS) adds little value (group 
memory or anonymity)   
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Dyad composition: pairing 




- Case: employment contract 
with 8 issues 
- Types of strategies:  
o Collaborators use mostly 
relationship-focus 
strategies related to the 
process such as 
restructuring (asking the 
opponent for more 
information and trying to 
expand the parameters of 
exchange)  
o Competitors use a mix 
between relationship and 
task focus (priority 
information and 
concession)  
o Mixed dyads use mostly a 
task-focused strategy, 
positional information 
that is more related to 
distributive bargaining 
- Joint outcome: pure dyads 
achieved better outcomes  
- The sequence of activities were 
also different between dyads  
- Markov chain analysis was used to 
determine the frequency and 
sequence of negotiation strategies 
with different dyad structures 
- Dyad structure affects how people 
respond to strategies  
- Small sample size of 45 dyads and 
only 39 reached agreements. 
- Distinction between different 
activities is not clear.  
- Negotiators‘ ability to maximize 
outcome is dependent on the 
congruence of their goals with that 
of their partner 
Montoya-
Weiss et 
al. (2001)  
Group composition: all 
groups consist of mixed 
orientations based on 
inherent conflict styles 
(adapted Rahim 1983 
instrument) 
 
- Appropriation support 
(temporal coordination 
mechanism) 
- Case: develop a business 
strategy (required decision 
consensus on plan) with 
five diverse members 
- Decision quality (only 
competing and collaborating 
individuals had a positive effect 
on performance)  
 
- Examine the interaction between 
appropriation support and various 
conflict style in a mixed structure 
- Appropriation support only helped 
avoiding and compromising styles 
- Competing and collaborating styles 
showed a positive effect on 
performance without the need of 
appropriation support 
- Accommodating style has a 
negative effect, but appropriation 
support did not moderate this 
- No description of the mix of styles 
in the group or their interactions 
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interest for majority)  
- Decision rule (unanimity 
vs. majority) 
- Case: negotiate market of 
three merchants discussing 
3 issues 
 
- Process: Integrative behavior 
(more for symmetric task 
structure, majority rule and 
cooperative groups)  
- Joint outcome (more for 
symmetric task structure, 
cooperative groups) 
- Group climate (more for 
symmetric task, majority rule 
and cooperative groups)  
 
- 2X2X2 design: social motives 
(cooperative or competitive), task 
structure (symmetric or 
asymmetric), decision rule 
(majority or unanimity)  
- Contingency among social 
motives, task structure and 
decision rule 
- Competitive + asymmetric task 
structure + unanimity rule leads to 
distributive behavior, lower joint 
outcome and negative group 
climate  
- Competitors do better with 
majority rule, while collaborators 
with unanimity rule 
- No effect between decision rule 




Dyad composition: pairing 




- Case: 5 issue negotiation 
with same type of 
distribution for both cases 
- Number of agreements all 34 
dyads reached an agreement for 
collaborators and only 27 dyads 
reached an agreement for 
individualists  
- Type of strategies 
o Competitors who used 
multi-issue offers, 
positional arguments got 
better joint outcomes, then 
when they engaged in 
substantiation, demand 
and proposal modification 
o Collaborators used 
priority information and 
process management got 
higher joint gains, while 
those who engage in 
substantiation and 
proposal modification got 
low gains. 
- Markov chain analysis was used to 
determine the frequency and 
sequence of negotiation strategies 
with different dyad structures 
- Dyad structure in terms of 
motivational orientation affect 
strategic choices and sequences of 
action that result in different levels 
of joint gains 
- Individualist use multi-issue offers 
to indirectly exchange information 
about their priorities for issues, 
whereas collaborators use direct 
communication of preferences 
- Collaborators also need to work at 
process management that allows 
them to see greater possibilities for 
join improvement 
- Reciprocity is important for 
collaborators and not form 
individualists  
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Dyad composition: pairing 




- Case: either a union or a 
two country negotiation 
- Joint outcome: no significant 
difference between dyads 
- Type of strategy:  
o Distributive strategies 
(contention and proposal 
modification were all 
associated with low gains 
in all dyads) 
o Cooperative negotiators 
used process management 
(moving to new issues 
and expanding the 
process) and priority 
information (tell the other  
their preference for 
issues) to improve gains 
in pure and mixed dyads 
o Competitive dyads that 
achieve high joint gains 
were difficult to predict 
- Strategy sequence 
o Reciprocity was important 
in cooperative dyads but 
not in competitive dyads 
- Markov chain analysis was used to 
determine the frequency and 
sequence of negotiation strategies 
with different dyad structure 
- Social motives assume that 
negotiations are goal-driven 
activities, such that different dyad 
structures require different 
strategies to achieve high joint 
outcome. 
- Cooperative negotiators are 
susceptible to mutuality and thus 
reciprocity enables them to trust 
and coordinate integrative 
strategies 
- Competitive negotiators need to 
deviate from reciprocating 
contentious strategies, so they need 





Dyad composition: pairing 
of negotiators with same or 
different motivational 
orientations: competitors 
(i.e., individualist) and 
collaborators 
 
- Knowledge of opponent 
o Pure dyads CC and II 
o Mixed dyads CI (only 
cooperator knows 
individualist‘s 
orientation) and IC 
(vice versa) 
- Case: buy-sell case with 3 
issues   
- Joint outcome (CC= CI> IC=II) 
- Integrative activities (CC and 
CI increase their integrative 
activities in phase III, everyone 
started at about the same level 
of integrative activities)  
- Individual outcome 
(Individualist in IC got the most 







- Examine the effect of dyad 
structure and knowledge of 
opponent on process and outcome 
- CC and CI were able to increase 
integrative activities in the last 
phase to increase joint outcome. 
- Individualists can exploit 
collaborators when they know 
about their orientation.  
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- Task (negotiation or no 
negotiation)  
- Task type (divergent vs. 
convergent) 
- Case: negotiate market of 
three merchants discussing 
3 issues 
 
- Prosocial groups engage in 
more integrative behavior, 
more number of agreements, 
and higher joint outcome; than 
proself group 
- Prosocial groups perform better 
on convergent post-negotiation 
task, but not on divergent post-
negotiation tasks.  
- 2X2X2 design: social motives 
(prosocial or proself), negotiation 
(yes or no), task type (divergent or 
convergent)  
- Propose a contingency framework 
between social motives and task 
characteristics (convergent vs. 
divergent)  
- Behaviors and attitudes adopted 





Dyad composition: pairing 





- Case: two merchant 
negotiation with 4 issues 
- Perceived fairness: higher for 
pure dyads  
- Relationship: higher for pure 
dyads  
- Flexibility: adapt to the other‘s 
needs is important for 
individualist dyads and mixed, 
but is counterproductive for 
cooperative dyads 
- Mental maps were used to 
understand negotiators cognitive 
representation of the negotiations  
- Negotiators that share the same 
motivational orientation report a 
more positive negotiation 
experience 
- Dyad structure affects their 





1. & 2. Study  
- Collaborators 
(instructions- ―think of 
the other as your 
partner‖) 
- Competitors 
(instructions- ―think of 
the other as your 
opponent‖) 
3. Study 
- Dyad composition: 
pairing of negotiators 
with same orientation 
- Collaborators and 
competitors (induced 
using a list of 
cooperative tactics)  
- Epistemic motivation 
(desire to develop and hold 
accurate and well-informed 
conclusions about the 
world) 
o Manipulated using 
process 
accountability (PA) 
by suggesting a post-
negotiation interview 




and asking the 
subject to take notes 
during the process 
1. Study 
- Competitive strategies were 
recalled by competitors (PA)  
- Cooperative strategies were 
recalled by collaborators (PA)  
2. Study 
- Joint outcome PA only 
influenced cooperators 
- Perceived cooperative-trust PA 
only influenced cooperative 
negotiators  
3. Study 
- Perceived cooperative-trust PA 
only influenced collaborators   
- Problem-solving behavior PA 
only influenced collaborators   
- Joint outcome PA only 
influenced collaborators   
- Study the interaction of 
motivational orientation and 
epistemic motivation on cognition, 
perception, process and outcome 
- Epistemic motivation and social 
motivation impact cognitive 
heuristics (recall of strategies) 
- Epistemic motivation moderates 
the effect of social motivation on 
joint outcome for only cooperative 
negotiators 
- Epistemic motivation influences 
cooperative negotiators by  
increasing cooperative-trust, 
problem-solving, joint outcome 
- Structure model show that 
perceived cooperative-trust leads 
to problem-solving,  joint outcome 
   47 




(different mixtures of 
orientation based on 
dominant, majority, 




- Case: negotiate business 
partnership with three 
members over 5 issues 
- Group outcome (joint outcome 
and Pareto efficiency greatest 
for pure individualist groups)  
- Satisfaction with outcome 
(greatest for pure collaborators) 
- Process activities (pure 
individualist groups moved 
from distributive to integrative 
activities at the end of 
negotiation, pure cooperative 
groups were never very 
integrative or distributive)  
- Examine the effect of group 
structure on process and outcome 
- Individualist groups can reach high 
joint outcomes when they start out 
in distributive phase and move to 
integrative ones (enlighten 
individualists) 
- Cooperative group did worst 
because little effort was made 
towards integrative activities 
- Need to hinder parties from 
making inferior compromises 
- Mixed groups did worst by mainly 





Dyad composition: pairing 
of prosocial and proself  
 
- Outcome frame 
(negotiator‘s 
conceptualization of 
potential outcomes in either 
gain or losses) 
o Manipulated using 
endowment of 
regions on an island. 
Gain frame starts off 
with no regions and 
loss frame starts off 
with possession of all 
regions. 
- Goal intention (specify a 
desired end point, which 
can be a behavior or 
outcome) 
Manipulated using 








- Joint outcomes were sign. 
different between gain and loss 
frame negotiators, whereby loss 
frame were more resistant to 
concessions and obtained 
higher profits  
- Equity (contract balance) was 
increased as from control to 
goal intention and most sign. to 
implementation intention 
- implementation intention 
negotiators to achieve high 
outcomes, but gain frame 
negotiators simply claimed 
regions that were best for them 
through distribution   
 
- Examine if cooperative strategies 
(goal and implementation 
intentions) facilitate the attainment 
of cooperative goals when 
negotiators are biased by a loss 
frame and competitive motives. 
- 1. Study shows that prosocial 
implementation intentions reduce 
the inequality of mixed frame 
negotiations with same 
preferences. 
- 2. Study shows that prosocial 
implementation intention mitigates 
the effect of loss frame and 
produces results similar to gain 
frame by logrolling strategy. 
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 - implementation intention 
(specify a when, where and 
how of acting on one‘s goal 
intention) 
o Manipulated using 
instructions from 
goal intention plus: 
―And If I receive a 
proposal on how to 
share the island, then 
I will make a fair 
counterproposal!‖ 
- Case: two neighboring 
countries negotiate the 
division of 25 different 
regions on an island (1. 
Study both sides share 
same preferences, 2. Study 
have different preferences)   
- Case: two heirs negotiate 
the distribution of stocks 
bequeathed from a distant 
relative (3. Study have 
different preferences)   
2. Study 
- Joint outcomes were best for 
gain frame (proself) and worst 
for loss frame (proself). The 
prosocial goal intention 
increased joint outcomes in a 
loss frame, but the barrier of a 
loss frame was most sign. 
reduced by prosocial 
implementation intention (they 
achieved results similar to gain 
frame negotiators). 
Logrolling strategy was mostly 
used by prosocial  
3. Study 
- Joint outcomes were sign. 
different in loss frame from 
control to prosocial goal 
intention and mostly to 
prosocial implementation 
intention. There is no difference 
among the three treatments in a 
gain frame    
- Logrolling strategy was mostly 
used by prosocial 
implementation intention 
negotiators towards the middle 
and end of negotiations. At the 
start, participants only behave 
according to the outcome frame   
 
- 3. Study shows that prosocial 
implementation intention is only 
beneficial in loss frame situations 
and logrolling occurs only towards 
the middle and end of negotiations. 
- The authors hypothesize that 
prosocial implementation intention 
guides behavior and reduces 
cognitive resources that can be 
focused on discovering integrative 
solutions. 
The authors did not compare results to 
explicit prosocial manipulations to see 
if beyond asking for a fair solution, 
participants needed to maximize the 
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2.4 Summary of Motivational Orientations 
Based on the theory of cooperation and competition (Deutsch 1949), the dual concern 
model (Pruitt and Rubin 1986) depicts various motivational orientations based on the 
extent to which negotiators care about their own or the counterpart‘s interests. However, 
this review of motivational studies suggests that negotiators typically hold either 
collaborative motives aimed to create value for both parties, or competitive motives 
focused on claiming value for oneself (De Dreu, Weingart et al. 2000). Experiments on 
motivational orientations demonstrated that:  
(1)  Contextual effects and individual differences are antecedents to competitive 
and collaborative orientations.  
(2) The various dyadic compositions derived from the pairing of orientations 
provide an indication of possible activities undertaken by the negotiators 
(Olekalns and Smith 1999; Olekalns and Smith 2003; Olekalns and Smith 
2003). However, the protocol (Weingart, Bennett et al. 1993), technology 
(Jain and Solomon 2000; Montoya-Weiss, Massey et al. 2001), and outcome 
frames play a pivotal role in promoting continuation of or shift in activities 
(Olekalns 1994; Olekalns 1997; Trötschel and Gollwitzer 2007).  
(3) Economic outcomes are not necessarily mirrored by individual perceptions, 
the psychological assessments are also important to evaluating negotiation 
success (Thompson and Hastie 1990; Bazerman, Curhan et al. 2000). 
 At present, only a handful of studies have examined the impact of technology on 
motivational orientation, and more specifically little is known on the effect of decision 
support of ENS in this regard (Jain and Solomon 2000). Initial works on outcome frames 
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and motivational orientations point to the need for integrating these two areas of study 
(De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 1995).  
Furthermore, motivational orientation can be taken to a firm level by looking at 
inter-firm relationships between trading partners or it can be taken to an individual level 
by studying how people choose to divide resources based on their social motives.  
From the economic literature, inter-firm relationship are assumed to be based on 
transactions that are the result of loose collections of self-interested firms, who uphold 
impersonal, arm‘s length ties, and constantly shift to new exchange partners to capture 
market gains generated by newcomers and avoid commitments or social attachments 
(Wilson 1989). However, the concept that economic actions are embedded in social 
structure has gained popularity with organization theorists, who consider that not all 
economic actions necessarily occur in competitive markets, but that some take place in 
stable networks of exchange partners who have close social relationships among them 
(Powell 1990).  Case studies of supply chain partnerships have shown that trust and 
personal ties are far more valuable than explicit contracts that require high monitoring 
cost (Dore 1983). Firms sacrifice immediate gains in the market for long-term 
relationships that lead to future economic opportunities provided by network alliances. 
Therefore, studies on collaborative and competitive orientations can contribute to 
understanding firm level transactions. 
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3 Electronic Negotiation Systems 
The economy is largely driven by everyday negotiations between sellers and buyers. 
Complex forms of electronic commerce require widespread systems that cover decision, 
communication, knowledge support and even automation of the process (Keersten and 
Lai 2007). ENSs are embedded with features and methods to help users better manage the 
process and work with their counterparts in order to achieve superior outcomes. They 
have the potential to reduce transaction and coordination costs often associated with face-
to-face negotiations, to allow for greater participation in the marketplace, and, thus, to 
foster economic growth (Kersten 2003). Furthermore, governments and financial 
institutions have a vested interest in research associated with electronic exchange systems 
as these systems have regulatory and transactional implications on the market 
infrastructure (Bakos 1998).   
 Over the years, the application of ENS has largely been limited to research and 
training. For example, Inspire
3
 system has been helping people test and practice their 
negotiation skills for more than ten years (Kersten and Noronha 1999). This ENS allows 
anyone around the world to sign up and experiment with electronic negotiations by 
anonymously exchanging offer packages consisting of multiple issues over the maximum 
course of three weeks. Results from data collected in these negotiations showed that 
gender, experience and culture play a vital role in participants‘ perception of system 
success (Vetschera, Kersten et al. 2004).  
 Governments and international organizations employ decision support systems in 
order to aid the resolution of highly complex conflicts among interest groups and 
                                                 
3
 http://www.interneg.org/inspire 
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countries. For example, in light of decision support, Regional Air Pollution INformation 
and Simulation (RAINS) system provides a framework for the analysis of strategies to 
reduce emissions of air pollutants (Amann, Bertok et al. 1999) and helps countries 
negotiate a contract on the anthropogenic driving forces of emissions causing air 
pollution. Software agents for negotiation support have been proposed to help resolve 
boundary conflicts in marine forecasting in Australia. The agents represent regional 
offices that are responsible for all forecast policies in their jurisdiction. When 
inconsistencies in forecast policies arise at the boundary, agents are dispatched to 
negotiate the dispute quickly in order to avoid fatal consequences in critical weather 
events (San Pedro, Burstein et al. 2004).   
 ENSs benefit electronic commerce with communication and decision types of 
services at the enterprise and individual levels. SAP
4
, a business IT solution provider, 
implements a negotiation module to track procurement proposals in supply chain 
management. eBay is partnered with squaretrade
5
 for after-sales service, such as disputes 
between buyers and sellers. The online resolution service helps parties identify the issues 
of concern and advise them on how to enter direct negotiations to settle their 
disagreements. If a settlement cannot be reached, the parties may hire a professional 
mediator via the system. 
ENSs are comprised of a broad range of technologies that enable different aspects 
of the negotiation process and methods for resolving negotiation problems. A historical 
overview of ENSs starting with decision support to automated negotiations is presented 
in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 highlights general features used to support the various stages 
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of negotiations and Section 3.3 reviews empirical studies of ENSs that focus on the cost-
benefit framework, media richness theory and usage models. The discussion on ENSs is 
provided in Section 3.4 summarizing key issues of ENS research and areas that need 
more work.  
3.1 Origins of Negotiation Systems  
In the 1960s, the employment of quantitative methods of Management Science for 
building computerized systems for planning of projects and evaluation of choices led to 
the development of decision support systems (DSSs). The idea of providing information 
support for decision-making was aimed at helping managers enhance organizational 
operations (Davis 1974). One area suggested for improvement was negotiation, where 
face-to-face meetings often led to inefficient outcomes and could negatively impact 
relationships (Nyhart and Goeltner 1987). These early systems sought to simplify and 
structure complex negotiation problems.  
In the context of negotiations, DSSs were standalone systems that helped users 
formalize their objectives and preferences, understand the problem structure, search for 
solutions, and conduct  sensitivity analysis (Starke and Rangaswamy 2000). These 
systems assisted only a single party and did not facilitate the actual communication and 
interaction with others. NEGOPLAN is an example of DSS designed to aid users in their 
identification of underlying interest in the pre-negotiation stage and help them avoid 
potential anchoring and adjustment biases (Matwin, Szpakowics et al. 1989). 
 Progress in computer-based communication (i.e., local and wide area networks) 
led, in the early 1980s, to the development of software capable of facilitating negotiation. 
Models from case-based reasoning and process support systems gave negotiators the 
   54 
means of communicating with each other and even allowed for mediation or post-
settlement improvement (Jelassi and Foroughi 1989; Sycara 1991; Thiessen and Loucks 
1992; Rangaswamy and Shell 1997).  
 The next step in the development of negotiation systems was the integration of 
software tools used in DSS and tools used for communication to create negotiation 
support systems (NSSs). These systems aimed at structuring the process and providing 
both sides with some understanding of the problem with the aid of mainframes and 
terminals for communication (Lim and Benbasat 1992).  
The goals of NSSs are to: (1) help negotiators overcome cognitive limitations 
associated with face-to-face negotiations by focusing people‘s attention on the 
negotiation task and their interests; (2) generate options for joint gains (i.e. create value) 
by using objective modeling techniques to represent the problem; (3) enable negotiators 
to learn about preferences and discover solutions by re-structuring the problem from  
different perspectives; and (4) document the process for negotiators and researchers 
(Kersten 1985; Foroughi, Perkins et al. 1995; Starke and Rangaswamy 2000; Kersten 
2003). For example, according to Rangaswamy and Shell (1997), NSS may help users 
define their goals, limitations and strategies in the pre-negotiation stage. In the exchange 
stage, NSSs, such as NEGO (Kersten 1985), can enable users to construct and evaluate 
proposals by the counterpart, as well as to detail the process for users to act strategically. 
In post-negotiation, users may benefit from models developed to verify Pareto optimal 
solutions and suggest improvements. The technology employed in these systems 
consisted mostly of software operating on local area networks (Foroughi, Perkins et al. 
1995). 
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 The advent of internet technologies encouraged developers to electronically link 
negotiation parties with each other, leading to the construction of ENSs. An ENS is 
essentially a type of web-based system, which enables interaction between negotiators 
and may include analytical capabilities, agents, etc. It is comprised of: DSS, NSS, 
electronic negotiation table (ENT), negotiation assistant-agent (NAA) and negotiation 
software agent (NSA). At first, the focus of ENS support centered more on electronic 
communication rather than on decision support. These communication-based systems 
(ENTs) are software applications, which allow users to undertake negotiation activities in 
virtual environments (Keersten and Lai 2007). Some ENTs have included information 
management that enables rapid search and analysis of discussions (Schoop and Quix 
2001; Yuan, Head et al. 2003). ENTs are important in governing discussions between the 
parties, and thus play the role of helping to formulate opinions about the counterpart and 
prevent non-rational escalation of conflict (DeSanctis and Gallupe 1987).  
 In the mid-1990s, extensive research began on the use of software agents, the 
concept that originated in the area of Artificial Intelligence, in conducting negotiations. 
As users try to manage greater amounts of data, they are exacerbated by the problem of 
information overload (e.g., negotiators, who participate in many bilateral exchanges or 
discussions over a great number of issues, face analyzing a large number of alternatives). 
One possible solution is to use software in the form of an assistant-agent (NAA) that 
would provide timely, context-dependent advice and critique as a domain expert, while 
the negotiator still retained control over decision making. These agents generally use a 
knowledge-base and follow a protocol requiring them to read signals from the 
environment and parse these according to a collection of rules and/or mathematical 
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functions. The results are formed in terms of advice for the negotiator under a given 
circumstance (Negroponte 1997). For example, eAgora is a marketplace that offers an 
agent to help users configure and transact through multi-issue negotiations (Chen, 
Kersten et al. 2005). The eAgora NAA is used to gather preference information and 
reservation values from the user. The system guides the user through the exchange by 
generating possible offer packages, which can be proposed to the counterpart. The system 
also points out mistakes regarding offer preparation and selection. 
 Decision support is pushed even further with NSAs, which are programs that run 
continuously, autonomously with the assigned goal of negotiating on behalf of a human 
or artificial principal (Jennings 2001). NSAs can vary from agents with no intelligence to 
smart agents that exhibit learning behavior and decide when knowledge-based rules 
should be executed (Maes 1994). An early example of such technology is Tête-à-tête, a 
multi-agent system that allowed market participants to negotiate over multiple issues 
using argumentative style of negotiation and multi-attribute utility analysis (Chavez, 
Dreilinger et al. 1997). Experiments with NSAs have shown that these software agent 
systems function within well-defined contexts or environments. NSAs are most suitable 
for repetitive, routine and specified negotiations. In addition, automated negotiations can 
alter the negotiator‘s belief of control over the choice of tactics and decision processes, 
which could lead to negative perceived control and system anxiety (Yang, Lim et al. 
2007) 
 ENSs can be differentiated by functionality and the degree of involvement in 
negotiation activities. The categorization of ENSs ranges from passive facilitation to 
active representation of the user. Kersten and Lai (2007) represented these theoretical 
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distinctions in a Venn diagram. Figure 6 shows the overlapping of models and technology 
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Figure 6 Negotiation systems adapted from Kersten and Lai (2007) 
3.2 Negotiation Support 
Negotiation systems are created to support human interaction through a distributed 
medium, with the exception of NSA that acts on behalf of the user. The classification of 
such systems can take many forms depending on the criteria, which can be based on the 
role played by the system, support of negotiation phases and system functionalities.  Each 
criterion provides a different interpretation of negotiation support.  
3.2.1 Role of Systems in Electronic Negotiation 
The role played by the system focuses on the degree of intervention in the decision and 
exchange process (Keersten and Lai 2007). The system may serve as a:  
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 Facilitator that simply offers a medium for negotiators to communicate with each 
other. WebNS (Yuan, Head et al. 2003), SimpleNS (Kersten 2004) and the ENS 
by Doong and Lai (2007) are examples of systems that facilitate negotiation 
through different communication media (text, audio and video), formats 
(unstructured messages and offers), and structures (synchronous and 
asynchronous), respectively.  
 Supporter that helps negotiators understand the problem and even gives one-sided 
advice during the exchange process. Negoist (Schoop 2003) aids negotiators 
formulate proposals by a document management system. The users can track the 
history of a negotiation through tags embedded in the context of the message. For 
quantitative support of offer generation, the agent in eAgora uses a rule-based 
expert system that takes into account past offers and concessions from both 
parties (Chen, Kersten et al. 2005).   
 Mediator that gathers information from both sides and presents potential 
solutions.  Once negotiators have reached an agreement, the Inspire system 
calculates the efficiency of the solution and, if possible, gives them the 
opportunity to improve the outcome (Kersten and Noronha 1999).   
3.2.2 Negotiation Phases 
The system support of phases is concentrated on the activities that are undertaken in 
different stages of negotiation. As a basic model, negotiation can be classified in three 
phases: pre-negotiation, conduct of negotiation and post-negotiation. Although some 
have suggested that these phases can be expanded (Raiffa 1982; Fang, Hipel et al. 1993; 
Kersten 2003), many negotiation systems have been built based on this three-phase 
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model (Rangaswamy and Shell 1997; Lo and Kersten 2003; De Moor and Weigand 
2004).    
(1) In pre-negotiation, negotiators start by determining their goals and objectives, and 
then they define the issues and alternatives. For example, Inspire uses tools such 
as preference elicitation and utility construction to help users determine the 
importance of issues and alternatives (Kersten and Noronha 1999). Negotiators 
who use systems aiding preparation phase have more realistic expectations, seek 
win-win solutions and produce better joint-outcomes than those who don‘t use 
such tools (Rangaswamy and Shell 1997). 
(2) During the conduct of negotiation, two parties exchange information that allows 
for exploration of preferences, concessions and possibly leads to an accepted 
agreement. For example, Atin, a software agent that monitors negotiations in 
Inspire, supports negotiators during the exchange by offering helpful advice in 
case of stalemate (Lo and Kersten 2003).  
(3) In post-negotiation (i.e., after an agreement is obtained), the verification and 
implementation of settlement terms is actualized and mediation may take place to 
suggest any improvement on the agreement. MeMo, a market system that helps 
people negotiate in different languages, automatically generates a contract that 
legitimizes the agreement reached during negotiation (De Moor and Weigand 
2004). 
3.2.3 System Functionalities 
As the system functionalities mediate the communication channel and even re-structures 
the process, the negotiation game is changed along with the behaviors and outcomes 
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associated with the interaction. The classification in terms of system functionalities is an 
important but contentious endeavor. As some suggest a basic dichotomy of either 
decision or communication support to relate the general functionalities of an ENS (Lim 
and Benbasat 1992), others point to a finer grain of division that is based on twenty three 
functions (Keersten and Lai 2007). However, seven distinguished functionalities are 
described from key requirements set forth by researchers aimed at characterizing ENSs 
(Jelassi and Foroughi 1989; Lim and Benbasat 1992; Holsapple, Lai et al. 1996; 
Rangaswamy and Shell 1997; Shell 2001; Keersten and Lai 2007). These functions are 
presented in Table 2, which also shows the articles that describe them. In the table, each 
of the seven functionalities is discussed in more detail along with examples of ENSs that 
provide such functionalities. 

























X X  X X X 
Electronic 
communication 
 X X  X X 
Information 
presentation 
  X   X 
Process structure X  X X X X 
Mediation X  X X X X 
Assistance   X   X 
 
As some negotiation systems are designed to analyze decisions, preference 
elicitation is a functionality of the system that helps individuals organize private 
information to specify the domain of negotiation (Rangaswamy and Shell 1997; Starke 
and Rangaswamy 2000). Preference elicitation takes the issues at stake and the options 
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that may be considered for each issue and allows individuals to construct a preference 
model through the assessment of these issues and options. Using the preference model, 
the system can represent the problem by identifying the negotiation space, and hence 
assist negotiators in their decision-making (Lim and Benbasat 1992).  
Most authors listed in Table 2, with the exception of Holsapple, Lai et al. (1996), 
stress the importance of preference elicitation as the means to extract the parameters, 
which enable decision and knowledge support.  For example, the additive scoring model, 
proposed by Keeney and Raiffa (1991), allows for the clarification of numerical 
information to represent preferences for Inspire, Aspire and eAgora systems. Once the 
preferences for issues and options are captured in numeric form, a utility function is 
created to help evaluate offers (Jelassi and Foroughi 1989). In Inspire, conjoint analysis is 
further performed to adjust the fit of the utility function to match the relative importance 
placed on the various offer packages (Kersten and Noronha 1999). However, some ENSs, 
such as Negoist that use document management for creating proposal, can also be 
considered a form of decision support (Schoop 2003). 
The modeling of preferences can be of great value to decision-making. It 
introduces consistency and a certain degree of objectivity to prevent possible cognitive 
biases and limitations when dealing with multi-issue decisions. For a detail example of 
problem representation, Hill and Jones (1996) provided a working prototype to 
characterize the feasible settlement space and efficient frontiers shaped by the joint utility 
distribution of negotiators' utilities.  
Electronic communication underlines the interaction between both sides (Starke 
and Rangaswamy 2000). It has a format and medium. ENSs that facilitate communication 
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often have an unstructured format for information exchange (e.g., SimpleNS allows users 
to freely exchange messages), while those that support negotiation impose some structure 
to allow for greater system intervention (e.g., eAgora uses structured offers to enable 
agent monitoring of offer exchange). Electronic communication is believed to shift 
attention from socio-emotional focus to one that is more objective and task-based, 
especially for team negotiations (Guo and Lim 2007). Electronic communication differs 
in terms of the medium that serves that information (Lim and Benbasat 1992). WebNS 
allows negotiators to choose among text, audio and video to discuss the conflict, but most 
ENSs employ only text communication (Yuan, Head et al. 2003). A further discussion on 
media richness of ENSs is found in Section 3.3.2.  
Information presentation describes the manner in which the ENS displays 
information for input and output (Herniter, Carmel et al. 1990). Depending on the 
available data, negotiation process may be structured and represented in terms of graphs, 
tables, lists, text-boxes, etc. This presentation component is important to guide the 
interaction between the users and the system (Holsapple, Lai et al. 1996). The superiority 
of one type of information representation over another is beyond the scope of this project 
as it relates to interface design and usability research. To illustrate the differences 
between the systems and the relationship between the data and its presentation 
screenshots from four ENSs are shown in Table 3. As the information support increases, 
the type of information representation moves from text-box to table, to list, and to graph. 
This is consistent with the guidelines proposed by Herniter and Carmel (1990) on 
designing ENSs‘ interfaces. 
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Table 3 Types of information representation in ENSs 
Information representation Examples from ENSs6 
Graphs serve mainly for pattern 
representation of offers (Weber, 
Kersten et al. 2005). For example, 
the history graph, from the 
perspective of one side, depicts the 
concessions made by both parties 




Tables permit the references and 
comparison of offers and messages 
(Herniter, Carmel et al. 1990). For 
example, offers made by different 
suppliers are compared based on 
three issues: processor and hard 
disk type and price.  
 
 
Lists allow for the selection of 
structured and semi-structured 
communication (Schoop 2003). 
For example, every option of an 
issue is predefined on a drop-down 
list that allows negotiators to 
structure their offers. 
 
 
Text-boxes are applied to 
unstructured communication 
(Koeszegi, Srnka et al. 2004). For 
example, in SimpleNS, negotiators 
are unrestricted in their 
communication. They are not 
obliged to discuss every issue at 
each offer.  
 
 
                                                 
6
 Courtesy of http://invite.concordia.ca 
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Process structure refers to the rules that govern the interactions between the 
system and the user, as well as those between the users (Holsapple, Lai et al. 1996). For 
example, it details how many offers are allowed on the table at a time, what can be added 
to the table, and under what circumstances users can interact. Process structure allows the 
system to manage a negotiation based on a set protocol. The protocol may be complex 
and based on many contextual elements that are permitted in the discussion process. For 
example, eAgora allows negotiators to add issues during negotiation and continuously 
redefine the problem, but process structure follows a sequential order for offer proposal. 
The protocols may be simple with few rules, such as WebNS where users are free to 
discuss any and all parts of the problem without any order for offer proposal. Protocols 
can also be implemented as templates, by means of which users enter information at each 
round of exchange (e.g., Negoist has predefined fields that guide negotiators in the 
drafting of a service contract). Bichler, Kersten et al. (2003) provided a more detailed 
analysis of the role of process structure in electronic negotiations.  
 Every ENS provides certain, albeit often limited, facilitating and mediating 
functions, e.g., offer notification, message organization, offer suggestion and/or critique, 
and search for efficient agreement improvements. A detailed specification of the 
mediation functionality is, however, necessary for ENSs which play the role of a third 
party in the conflict. The purpose of this function is to influence the process and guide 
parties to a solution (Rangaswamy and Shell 1997). Most often, mediation requires that 
both negotiators reveal their interests to the system so that it can search for an agreement 
(Keersten and Lai 2007). In Inspire, after a settlement is reached, the system calculates 
the efficiency of the solution based on the negotiators‘ utility and proposes more efficient 
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agreements if possible. Jelassi and Foroughi (1989) describe the value of mediation in 
greater lengths. They even contemplate the possibility of system use for arbitration and 
promotion of democracy. In another system (Lim and Yang 2008), mediation takes the 
form of a module that computes all possible solutions (given the reservation levels of the 
negotiators) and proposes these to the negotiators before they even start the conduct of 
negotiations. The purpose is to focus negotiation on a feasible space and reduce 
inefficiencies. 
 Assistant-agents were first studied in distributed Artificial Intelligence and multi-
agent systems (Nunamaker, Dennis et al. 1991; Sycara 1991). The assistance function is 
performed by the software, which monitors user‘s actions through warnings, advises 
participants on offers received and suggests offers that they may send. Subsequently, the 
introduction of proactive software to electronic negotiation aimed to revolutionize the 
way exchanges are conducted online (Maes 1994). Unlike the mediation function, the 
assistant works for one side and does not receive information from the other side that is 
hidden from the assisted side. The NAAs, Aspire and eAgora (Lo and Kersten 2003; 
Chen, Kersten et al. 2005), employ a rule-based expert system to direct the assistant‘s 
behavior in helping negotiators, especially novices, manage complex negotiations.  
 As noted in the beginning of Section 3.2, the classification of ENSs can be a 
daunting task, which depends on the criteria used. Table 4 classifies the various ENSs 
discussed into system role, phase and function supported categories. It shows that as 
system involvement increases (from facilitate to mediate), phases and functions increase 
in number (e.g., from only the conduct of negotiation to all three phases) and complexity 
(e.g., from unstructured communication to structured offers). 
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Table 4 Classification of ENSs 
System 
(Authors) 
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  semi-structured 
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Head et al. 
2003) 
facilitate  conduct of 
negotiation 
  unstructured 
messages in text, 
audio and video 
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3.3 Assessment of Negotiation Systems 
ENSs comprise a broad range of technologies, which enable different aspects of the 
negotiation processes, as well as methods to resolving negotiation problems. A review of 
empirical studies focusing on systems in bilateral negotiations and involving multiple 
issues implemented in business-to-business negotiations reveals twenty two journal 
publications that demonstrate the influence of the system on process and outcome 
variables. These studies may be summarized as involving five major components: (1) 
system, (2) process in which the system is involved, (3) perception of the system, (4) 
outcomes, and (5) moderators that affect the use of system. The studies showed that over 
the years research on negotiation systems has centered on:  
(1) Cost-benefit framework to compare negotiation support technology with face-to-
face exchange in terms of effort required in the process and the economic 
outcome (Jelassi and Foroughi 1989; Jones and Jelassi 1990; Foroughi, Perkins et 
al. 1995; Delaney, Foroughi et al. 1997; Rangaswamy and Shell 1997; Lim 2000).  
(2) Media richness theory to examine different media (i.e., text, audio and video) of 
electronic communication in negotiations (Sheffield 1995; Croson 1999; Suh 
1999; Mennecke, Valacich et al. 2000; Purdy, Nye et al. 2000; Foroughi, Perkins 
et al. 2001; Pesendorfer and Koeszegi 2006; Galin, Gross et al. 2007; Pesendorfer 
and Koeszegi 2007).  
(3) Usage model following an IS perspective to establish links among process, 
outcome and system variables. (Kersten and Noronha 1999; Lim 2003; Koeszegi, 
Srnka et al. 2004; Vetschera, Kersten et al. 2004; Weber, Kersten et al. 2005; 
Doong and Lai 2006; Lim and Yang 2008).  
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3.3.1 Cost-Benefit Framework  
Early computerized negotiation systems focused on supporting the decision-making 
process by helping negotiators reach efficient agreements. The early studies were not 
bounded by any underlying theory of assessment. Instead, the researchers‘ aim was to 
validate the advantage of computerized systems over face-to-face exchanges, whereby 
cognitive limitations of humans could be circumvented through decision models. These 
systems (DSSs) guided the users and helped them maintain high aspiration levels (Starke 
and Rangaswamy 2000). As described in Figure 7, DSSs and NSSs were evaluated on the 
benefits (in terms of negotiation outcomes) and the cost to the users (in terms of 
negotiation process).  
The results from empirical testing of DSSs with face-to-face negotiations 
suggested that although joint outcome and contract balance were improved using the 
systems, the greater effort required (time required and the number of offers proposed) led 
users to report a decrease in outcome satisfaction and negative discussion climate. The 
results were also moderated by the conflict levels introduced in the experiments. DSSs 
were found mostly beneficial in low conflict situations where parties had convergent 
preferences for issues (Jones and Jelassi 1990; Delaney, Foroughi et al. 1997).  
The integration of DSS with a communication tool into one system, a NSS, 
allowed the restructuring of the process. When compared to face-to-face negotiations, 
NSSs improved joint outcome and contract balance similar to DSSs. However, NSSs also 
increased outcome satisfaction, and the negotiation process required less effort (i.e., 
number of offers). The NSS users also reported a more positive discussion climate during 
the process when compared to DSS users (Delaney, Foroughi et al. 1997; Rangaswamy 
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and Shell 1997; Lim 2000). In fact, NSSs offered a kind of holistic support that restricted 
exchange and management of information to those activities which were relevant for 
decision-making (Rangaswamy and Shell 1997). This notion challenges the statement 
made by Lim and Benbasat (1992), who suggested that a NSS can be parsed into decision 
and communication support components and assessed along these two dimensions. The 
actual assessment follows more of a cost-benefit framework espoused by Payne et al. 
(1993), whereby an integrated system has the combined objective to maximize decision 
quality while minimizing the effort. In other words, studies on NSSs showed that their 
success is not only due to the decision and communication support, but to the 
restructuring of the process and reduction of effort. Studies have shown that NSSs 
increased the objective outcomes (e.g., joint outcome, contract balance, efficiency, etc, in 














Figure 7 Cost-benefit framework assessments of DSS and NSS 
3.3.2 Media Richness Theory 
Once electronic communication allowed people to connect from different parts of the 
world, behavioural researchers began studying the use and role of ENSs. They focused 
their effort on the electronic medium by employing simple and popular communication 
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software in their research. This expanded ENS research from the DSS domain to the 
communication medium domain.  
 The use of functionally limited software that provides diverse channels for 
communication led to the interest of media richness theory as applied to negotiations 
research. Since different media convey information in different ways, the theory suggests 
that the medium must be suitable to the complexity of the task (Daft and Lengel 1986). 
McGrath and Hollingshead (1993) extended the theory by mapping specific task types to 
various media, whereby the task of negotiating is hypothesized to require a rich medium, 
such as face-to-face or something similar, e.g. video conferencing. Based on the amount 
of information that can be exchanged within a time interval, face-to-face interactions are 
the richest, followed by video then audio, and, finally, text-based communications.    
 Empirical studies using media richness theory (Suh 1999; Mennecke, Valacich et 
al. 2000; Purdy, Nye et al. 2000; Galin, Gross et al. 2007) showed that, although richer 
media reduce effort (e.g., time required and number of offers), joint outcome in 
negotiations does not differ among participants employing different media. One 
exception is the study by Croson (1999). In Croson‘s experiment (1999), email required 
more time for communication than face-to-face, but it provided higher joint outcomes by 
reducing social cues that appeared to distract from the task. In order to expand on the 
theory, conflict level was introduced in the task as a moderator between the ENS and the 
objective outcomes (e.g., joint outcome and number of agreements). The results from 
Sheffield (1995) demonstrated that negotiators in lower levels of conflict benefited from 
increased medium richness, meaning that collaborative negotiators obtained higher joint 
outcome when they saw their counterpart because they could capture social cues to build 
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trust. However, competitors reached lower joint outcomes because visual presence 
introduced emotions, which distracted them from the negotiation task. When the level of 
conflict was varied within competitive dyads (i.e., the level of conflict among negotiation 
issues), the findings from Foroughi, Perkins et al. (2001) suggested that high conflict 
situations required competitors to use a richer medium.  
 Using repeated measures, video, audio and text media have been compared to 
assess their impact on subjective variables (Yuan, Head et al. 2003). The findings pointed 
to equivalency between video and audio, both of which were rated superior to text in 
terms of communication efficiency and effectiveness. Perhaps, the difference rests more 
on the characteristic of the medium rather than the type. As video and audio provided 
immediate feedback, users were not affected by the delays imposed by text-based 
communication.  This new direction led Psendorfer and Koeszegi (2006) to compare 
synchronous and asynchronous text-based communications. They have found that 
uninhibited and competitive behavior was more present in synchronous dyads, and these 
behaviors affected the assessment of discussion climate and outcome satisfaction.  
 Overall, an increase in media richness reduces effort but it does not necessarily 
lead to increase in gains. The intervals between messages appear to have a greater effect 
than the richness of the message conveyed. As these studies span over ten years, the 
change in people‘s abilities, habits and perceptions of electronic communication may 
contribute to the discrepancy among the studies.  
3.3.3 Usage Model on Assessment  
The design of ENSs for electronic commerce has sparked the movement towards IS 
perspective of assessment, which is based upon usage of ENSs rather than a comparison 
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with face-to-face negotiation. Technology acceptance model (TAM) proposed by Davis, 
Baggozi et al. (1989) and the Delone and Mclean model of IS success (1992) serve as the 
premises to the analysis of the impact of different usage patterns on perceptions, and 
objective and subjective outcomes (Lim 2003).  
Inspire is an ENS built to allow users from all over the world to practice 
electronic negotiations (it has been used by more than 6,000 users from 60 different 
countries with). A business case was implemented in Inspire that let the users negotiate 
by exchanging proposals to settle a contract for bicycle parts. The contract involved four 
issues and various options for each issue. The system guided users through the three 
stages of negotiation. Users communicated by sending and receiving offers and messages 
(sent jointly or separately).  
Based on TAM and Delone and Mclean‘s model of IS success, usage of Inspire 
was shown to influence the objective outcomes and perceptions of the ENS, all of which 
ultimately affected outcome satisfaction. Figure 8 depicts these relationships and the 
studies that supported them. 
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Figure 8 Usage model of ENS assessment 
 
At the individual level, the assessment of ENSs focuses on outcome satisfaction, 
which is defined as the extent to which the substantive goals of the user are met by 
negotiating using the system. The interactions between the user and system are assessed 
through usage, which allows individuals to form perception of the system. Usage enables 
viewing objective outcomes, which, in turn, affects ENS perceptions.   
Based on the offer and/or message sent (Kersten and Noronha 1999; Koeszegi et 
al. 2004; Vetschera, Kersten et al. 2004; Lai, Doong et al. 2006) and behaviour patterns 
(Vetchera 2006), usage was shown to positively influence the number of agreements, 
efficiency of agreements (Kersten and Noronha 1999), perceived ease of use and 
usefulness of the system (Vetschera, Kersten et al. 2004). The overall outcome 
satisfaction from electronic negotiation is positively impacted by these objective 
outcomes and ENS perceptions (Vetschera, Kersten et al. 2004; Lai, Doong et al. 2006).   
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In general, perceptions of ISs reflect the users‘ internalization of their interaction 
with the system. However, ENSs differ from traditional ISs. ENSs act as facilitators and 
intermediaries (e.g., mediators or assistants); they mainly focus on helping people make 
decisions and communicate with the other party (Lim and Benbasat 1992). User 
perceptions of the ENS reflect the manner in which individuals see the feature(s) as 
supporting or facilitating their negotiations. ENS perceptions are not only derived from 
the benefits from using the system, but also from the process of exchanges between 
parties mediated by the system.  
ENSs serve as a medium for negotiators to exchange offers and have discussions. 
Therefore, the perceived ease of use, defined as the degree to which negotiating using the 
technology would require little effort (Foroughi, Perkins et al. 1995), provides a 
subjective assessment of the system. Two predominant perceptions of usefulness have 
been examined in ENSs studies relating to communication and decision support. 
Perceived usefulness of analytical support (defined as the degree to which negotiating 
with the technology would facilitate decision-making) and perceived usefulness of 
communication support (defined as the degree to which using the ENS would improve 
understanding between parties) were affected by usage through the moderation of low-
context and high-context cultures (Koeszegi, Vetchera et al. 2004).  The perception of 
control over the process increased as negotiators increased communication with their 
counterparts, implying that the more offers and messages were sent and received the 
greater the negotiators perceived control over negotiations was (Lai, Doong et al. 2006). 
In an experiment using ProNeg, Yang, Lim et al. (2007) found that an agent-based 
negotiation mechanism caused users to experience less perceived control than an ENS 
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with only decision support. This perception of lower control could further influence the 
user‘s anxiety towards using the system. 
 Online negotiations with users from different countries entail different patterns of 
usage (Kersten and Noronha 1999; Koeszegi, Vetchera et al. 2004; Vetschera, Kersten et 
al. 2004; Weber, Kersten et al. 2005; Vetschera 2006). For example, Chinese negotiators 
tended to send more messages than offers alone, which led to less efficient agreements 
compared to other countries (Kersten and Noronha 1999). Lim and Yang (2008) also 
examined Chinese negotiators and found that multi-lingual support actually slowed down 
usage because the language editor reduced typing speed. 
When classified into low-context and high-context cultures (i.e., low-context 
cultures are the ones that use more explicit information in communication, e.g., North 
Americans and western European), negotiators belonging to low-context cultures used 
more structured communication, such as offers alone, than less-structured messages 
(Koeszegi, Vetchera et al. 2004). The difference in usage patterns did not produce any 
effect on perceived ease of use, but users from low-context cultures perceived greater 
usefulness of analytical support. Those users from high-context cultures, who obtained 
high individual outcomes (i.e., the utility achieved through the agreement), reported a 
greater perceived usefulness of communication support. Using the same dataset as 
Koeszegi, Vetchera et al. (2004) and adding more observations, Vetschera, Kersten et al. 
(2004) have confirmed the findings from the previous study and showed that perceived 
usefulness of analytical support is also positively influenced by individual outcome. 
 Based on cluster analysis of motivational orientations, Lai, Doong et al. (2006) 
classified negotiators into collaborative and non-collaborative individuals. In their study, 
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they found that  collaborators sent more unstructured communication (e.g., messages), 
which led them to  report that using the system permitted them to (1) feel in greater 
control of the process,  and (2) achieve more agreements, when compared with non- 
collaborators. Kersten and Noronha (1999) also found that the increased use of messages 
allowed for more agreements, although the agreements were not necessarily efficient 
(i.e., Pareto optimal).  
 The Delone and Mclean‘s model of IS success (1992) suggests that IS success is 
not solely determined by predictions of usage as implied by TAM. User satisfaction plays 
also an important in assessing the value provided by the ENS. Although Delone and 
Mclean (1992) did not give a clear measure for user satisfaction, Vetschera, Kersten et al. 
(2004) and Lai, Doong et al. (2006) showed that usage ultimately impacts outcome 
satisfaction through objective outcomes and ENS perceptions. In fact, outcome 
satisfaction was found to be influenced by individual outcome, perceived ease of use and 
usefulness of analytical and communication support (Vetschera, Kersten et al. 2004).  
3.3.4 Results of System Assessments 
The cost-benefit framework suggests the need to decrease effort while increasing gains. 
This can be achieved by restructuring the process to integrate communication and 
decision support. Empirical studies of ENSs have revealed that the value of negotiation 
support extends beyond the benefits of combining a communication medium with 
decision support functionalities. Instead, the integrated system restructures the process by 
decreasing the cost required in the exchange process and increasing the benefits at the 
dyadic and individual levels (Delaney, Foroughi et al. 1997, Rangaswamy and Shell 
1997, Lim 2000).  
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A rich communication medium does not necessary improve the process and 
outcomes of negotiation. To achieve these improvements, the focus should be on tools 
that facilitate decision-making. Furthermore, contextual differences, such as conflict level 
and motivational orientation strongly moderate the effect of the media on the process and 
outcomes of negotiation. Empirical studies showed that negotiators in low conflict or 
cooperative situations profited from employing richer media, while those in high conflict 
and competitive setting became distracted from the task while using such media 
(Sheffield 1995, Suh 1999, Mennecke, Valacichi et al. 2000, Purdy, Nye et al. 2000, 
Foroughi, Perkins et al. 2001, Psendorfer and Koeszegi 2007).  
The usage models measured ENS perceptions as well as objective and subjective 
outcomes. More specifically, usage, involving the information exchange between parties 
(e.g., offers and messages from Kersten and Noronha 1999 and Vetchera 2006) describes 
the process of negotiations as well as the interaction between the user and the system. 
System usage, through the interaction of the user with the system in order to 
communicate with the other party, affects objective outcomes and ENS perceptions.  
(Kersten and Noronha 1999; Koeszegi, Vetchera et al. 2004; Vetschera, Kersten et al. 
2004; Lai, Doong et al. 2006; Vetschera 2006).     
This review points to the importance of investigating the impact of ENS on the 
process and outcome, in terms of both objective and subjective variables. However, it 
also discloses a lack of research into: (1) how the ENS can help negotiators overcome 
biases in decision-making; (2) the features that promote fruitful exchanges under 
different contextual settings; and (3) integrating cognitive theories established from 
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studying face-to-face negotiations.  As summarized in Table 5, there are few studies that 
link ENS design research to that in decision theory or motivational orientation. 
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Table 5 Review of ENS assessment studies 









- Conflict level: half of 
the participants were 
given preferences that 
are more divergent 
(distributive) than the 
other half (integrative) 
- Joint outcome: DSS improved gains for 
integrative dyads but not for distributive 
ones 
- Settlement time: DSS required more time 
from integrative dyads to reach an 
agreement 
- Discussion climate: was perceived more 
favorably by distributive dyads with DSS, 
but had the opposite effect with integrative 
dyads 
- Perception of counterpart: in terms of 
friendliness was not sign. 
- Outcome satisfaction: integrative dyads 
with DSS reported greater satisfaction 
- Measure the effect of DSS in face-to-
face negotiation with different conflict 
levels 
- DSS allowed integrative dyads to 
achieve greater joint outcome, but 
required more time. This cause 
integrative dyads to perceive greater 
outcome satisfaction, but lower 
discussion climate as DSS prevented 




NSS (DSS + 
communication 
tool) 
- Conflict level: half of 
the participants were 
given preferences that 
are more divergent 
(distributive) than the 
other half (integrative) 
---same case as Jones 
and Jelassi (1990) 
- Joint outcome: NSS improved gains for 
integrative and distributive dyads 
- Contract balance:  NSS improved 
distribution for integrative and distributive 
dyads 
- Settlement time: NSS required more time 
for integrative and distributive dyads 
- Number of contract proposed: in terms of 
offers was not sign. 
- Discussion climate: was perceived more 
favorably by integrative dyads with NSS, 
but no sign effect for distributive dyads 
- Outcome satisfaction: NSS improved 











- Study the effect of NSS in different 
conflict levels  
- NSS improved outcome for both types of 
dyads, but required more time 
- Only integrative dyads reported increase 
in discussion climate (could be due to 
statistical power) 
- This study showed the benefits of 
creating a complete interactive system to 
support negotiations (NSS) 
- Importance of interactive quality  to 
engage user‘s perception of the value of 
the system 
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Authors ENS Moderating variables Process and outcome variables Summary and comments 
Sheffield 
(1995) 
ENT (audio vs. 








maximize joint gains) 
and competitors 
(instruction to 
maximize own gains) 
Manipulation check on 
orientation 
- Joint outcome: Collaborators increase joint 
outcome in visual treatment especially 
when communicating with text. 
Competitors decrease joint outcome in 
visual treatment overall 
- Relative cooperativeness: (measure by 
looking at ratio of cooperative and 
contentious behavior) is higher in visual 
treatment for collaborators (mostly) and 
competitors with audio, but no change for 
competitors with text 
- Examine the effect of ENT, visual 
presence and motivational orientation. 
- 2X2X2 design (audio vs. text) X (visual 
vs. no visual presence) X (cooperator vs. 
competitor) 
- Using a non-zero-sum case, visual 
presence affects joint outcome different 
for collaborators and competitors 
- Collaborators benefit from see their 
partner especially using text 
communication 
- Competitors achieve lower joint 
outcomes when they see the opponent 
- Relative cooperativeness (ambiguously 
measured) is increased in visual 
treatment for collaborators and 
competitor (only with audio), but no 
change for competitor with text 
- Visual presence increase media richness 
(mostly for collaborators), but does not 
necessarily translate to efficiency 
(mostly for competitors) 
Delaney et 
al. (1997) 





- Conflict level: half of 
the participants were 
given preferences that 
are more divergent 
(distributive) than the 
other half (integrative) 
---same case as Jones 
and Jelassi (1990) 
- Joint outcome: DSS > face-to-face, NSS = 
DSS by improving gains for integrative and 
distributive dyads  
- Contract balance:  DSS > face-to-face, 
NSS = DSS by improving distribution for 
integrative and distributive dyads 
- Settlement time: DSS > face-to-face, NSS = 
DSS required more time for integrative and 
distributive dyads 
- Number of contract proposed: DSS > face-
to-face, NSS = face-to-face terms of offers 
for both types of dyads 
- Discussion climate: was perceived more 
favorably by integrative dyads with NSS  
- Outcome satisfaction: NSS improved 
satisfaction for integrative and distributive 
dyads (NSS > face-to-face, NSS=DSS) 
- Examine the effect of various 
negotiation support (NSS and DSS) on 
different conflict levels 
- Objective measures of outcome (joint 
outcome and contract balance) are 
similar between DSS and NSS, both 
better than face-to-face 
- Difference in the process variables, as 
DSS requires more effort (number of 
contract proposed) but for the same 
amount of time as NSS 
- The difference in process is reflect in the 
perceived discussion climate, where 
NSS > DSS 
- NSS is more than the combination of 
DSS + communication as Lim and 
Benbasat (1992) suggested.  
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 - Pareto optimality: (agreement along the 
pareto frontier) NSS = DSS > 
communication tool = face-to-face  
- Perception of process: electronic 
communication (communication tool and 
NSS) was better perceived than face-to-
face communication  
- Outcome satisfaction: improved with more 
support (NSS > DSS > face-to-face > 
communication tool) 
- Study the effects of various negotiation 
support on the stages on negotiation 
- The researchers tried to examine the 
value of NSS by focusing on pre-
negotiation, exchange process, post-
negotiation  
- Preparation for negotiation proved to 
best enable negotiators to reach pareto 
optimality, DSS = NSS 
- Aspiration levels were maintained using 
DSS and NSS to help negotiators reach 
integrative agreements 
- People prefer electronic communication 
as it allowed them to distance 
themselves from the conflict, but only if 
they are able to handle impersonal 
modes of communication 
Croson 
(1999) 
ENT (email)  - Joint outcome: ENT > face-to-face 
- Contract balance: ENT > face-to-face  
- ENT required more time for 
communication and time is suggested as 
factor influencing mixed results in other 
studies 
- ENT reduces social cues, which suggest 
that ENT produced more balanced 





ENS - Culture: national 
culture from Canada, 
China, Finland, India 
and USA  
- Number of agreements: above 2/3 of 
negotiators in most countries reached an 
agreement, except for India 
- Efficiency: most countries achieved above 
50% pareto efficiency agreements, except 
for China 
- Usage: Chinese like to use messages, while 
the Finnish like to send only offers.  
- Outcome satisfaction: Negotiators from 
India expected less and got more, while the 
ones from the USA were just the opposite 
- Relationship: most negotiators reported a 
positive experience with the opponent 
- Exploratory study on the difference 
between various countries and the effect 
on usage and outcome achieved from 
ENS 
- Field experiment using Inspire bicycle 
part contracting case  
- Suggest that greater usage leads to more 
likelihood of agreement, but heavy text 
communication can distract the users 
from the task and lead them to poorer 
agreements 
- Different cultures have different levels 
of expectations  
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Authors ENS Moderating variables Process and outcome variables Summary and comments 
Suh (1999) ENT (text, 
audio, video) 
- Conflict level: 
intellective (problem-









Case: zero-sum game 
 
- Decision quality: no difference between 
different ENT or with face-to-face for 
negotiation or intellective tasks  
- Decision time:  audio > video = face-to-
face > text for negotiation or intellective 
tasks 
- Process satisfaction: Video = face-to-face 
> text > audio for intellective task. 
Negotiation with non-consonance; text > 
face-to-face = video = audio. Negotiation 
with consonance; face-to-face > video > 
audio > text. 
- Outcome satisfaction: no difference 
between media only with task, intellective 
> negotiation in general  
- Test media richness theory (task 
performance improves when there is a fit 
between information required and the 
medium ability to convey this 
information) with 2 types of task and 
four media 
- Media richness theory is not supported 
because there were no interaction effect 
for decision quality and time 
- Audio was fastest but  reported lowest 
process satisfaction 
- High levels of conflict (non-consonance) 
people prefer written vs. oral 
communication 
- Video is similar to face-to-face 
- Text provides rich enough medium for 
negotiation 





- Conflict level: 
intellective (problem-
solving task, each 
party, low conflict) vs. 
negotiation (elicited 
preference on social 
issues, high conflict) 
Negotiation Case: 
funding on social 
issues 
- Decision quality: (objective measure based 
on 1. the parameters of the intellective task 
or 2. the difference between expectation 
and final agreement) Intellective:  video > 
face-to-face > audio > text Negotiation:  
the differences are no sign. 
- Decision time: (time required to complete 
task) Intellective:  the differences are no 
sign. Negotiation: face-to-face = video > 
audio > text 
- Examine the task media fit hypothesis 
proposed by (McGrath and Hollingshead 
1993) using 2 X 4 deign, conflict level 
(intellective vs. negotiation) and 
communication medium (face-to-face, 
video, audio & text) 
- Each participant performs both the 
intellective and negotiation tasks, order 
is random 
- Task media fit hypothesis was partially 
supported by the negotiation task (no 
difference in terms of outcome 
satisfaction, but face-to-face > video > 
audio > text for time required) 
- Increase conflict in the task influences 
greater perception of task media fit 
hypothesis to be supported 
- Difficult to compare results as measures 
for performance are different between 
the two tasks 
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Authors ENS Moderating variables Process and outcome variables Summary and comments 




- NSS (DSS 
with 




 - Individual outcome: supported > non-
supported & face-to-face > distributive  
- Joint outcome: supported > non-supported 
& face-to-face > distributive  
- Perceived fairness: supported > non-
supported  
- Outcome satisfaction: (expectation – final 
agreement) supported negotiators obtained 
positive value, whereas non-supported got 
negative values  
- Test a 2 (support vs. non-support) X 2 
(face-to-face vs. distributive) design 
- Supported (NSS or DSS) allowed for 
better outcomes, but DSS did a little 
better 
- Difficult to compare result because 
preferences were elicited and negotiators 
could add issues during negotiation 
Purdy et al. 
(2000) 
ENT ( text, 
video, audio) 
 - Behavior type : (competitive or 
collaborating self-reported after 
negotiation) Collaborative: face-to-face = 
video > text = audio Competitive: video = 
text > audio > face-to-face 
- Perceived behavior type of opponent: 
Collaborative: face-to-face > text > audio = 
video 
- Negotiation time: most efficient is face-to-
face, audio, video, but text required sign. 
more time than the others 
- Joint outcome: no sign difference for 
different media, but subjected reported to 
use collaborative approach obtained higher 
joint outcome 
- Outcome satisfaction: richer the media 
higher the satisfaction 
- Relationship: (desire for future negotiation) 











- Test a framework linking media richness 
to objective (negotiation time and joint 
outcome) and subjective variables 
(behavior type, outcome satisfaction and 
relationship) 
- Richer media produce higher values for 
subjective variables 
- ENT affects the behavior adopted by the 
negotiator in the process 
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Authors ENS Moderating variables Process and outcome variables Summary and comments 
Foroughi et 
al. (2001) 
NSS ( DSS + text 
or audio 
communication) 
- Conflict level: half of 
the participants were 
given preferences that 
are more divergent 
(distributive) than the 
other half (integrative) 
---same case as Jones 
and Jelassi (1990) 
- Joint outcome: Audio = text  for 
integrative, but audio > text distributive 
dyads  
- Contract balance:  no sign effect for 
integrative and distributive dyads 
- Settlement time: Text required more time 
than audio for integrative and distributive 
dyads 
- Number of contract proposed: Text > audio 
for integrative dyads, but no sign. for 
distributive ones  
- Discussion climate: no sign effect  
- Outcome satisfaction: no sign. effect  
- Examine the effect of various 
communication support in NSS on 
different conflict levels 
- Objective measure of outcome (joint 
outcome) was influenced by 
communication media for those with 
high conflict, but did not interfere in low 
conflict 
- This means that people in high conflict 
need a richer media to find good 
solutions 
- In terms of the process, text require more 
time than audio in general and more 
proposals for integrative bargainers  
- Subjective outcomes had no effect 
although objective ones were sign. 
- The statistical power is weak because 
more than 16 dyads/ treatment is not 
enough for 2X2 design 
Yuan et al. 
(2003) 
ENT ( text alone, 
T; text and 
audio, TA; and 
text with video 
and audio, TAV) 
 - Communication efficiency: TVA = TA > T  
- Communication effectiveness TVA = TA > 
T  
- Positive social-emotional communication: 
TVA = TA > T  
- Negative social-emotional communication: 
TVA > TA = T (mean TVA was more 
distracting to the process)  
- Outcome satisfaction: (the paper calls it 
perceived better solution but the authors 
writes that the items used were based on 
outcome satisfaction) TVA = TA > T  
- Study the value of increase media 
richness to the process of negotiation 
- MBA students negotiate a house 
purchasing case, two rounds with change 
in media and counterpart 
- Once the more richer media were 
provided people refrain from using text 
- An increase from T to TA or TVA 
created an increase in perceptions 
(communication efficiency, 
communication effectiveness and 
positive social-emotional 
communication), but not much 
difference from TA to TVA 
- In fact video distracted negotiators from 
the task as they became more self-aware  
- The results maybe affected by the poor 
quality of the video output  
- No objective results were presented 
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Authors ENS Moderating variables Process and outcome variables Summary and comments 
Koeszegi et 
al. (2004) 
ENS  - Culture: (low-context 
vs. high-context refers 
to the amount of 
implicit information 
captured in the 
message) Asian and 
Latin countries are 
consider to have high-
context, while North 
American and western 
European have low 
context  
- Actual use: record of usage is different 
between cultures. Low-context culture use 
offers only, while high-context culture use 
communication tool more with offers  
- Ease of use: (perception of cognitive effort 
required) no difference between cultures  
- Usefulness of communication: : (perception 
of communication support by ENS 
measured after negotiations) high-context 
perceived usefulness of communication to 
be higher  
- Usefulness of analytical: (perception of 
analytical support by ENS measured after 
negotiations) low-context perceived 
usefulness of analytical to be higher 
- Study the impact of culture on 
perceptions, assessment and use of ENS  
- Field experiment using Inspire bicycle 
part contracting case  
- Usage patterns are different, as high-
context culture included more messages 
with offers, while low-culture resign to 
sending more offers alone 
- High-context cultures value analytical 
support more than low-context culture 
that value by communication support 
Vetschera et 
al. (2004) 
ENS  - Individual differences: age, gender, 
national culture and experience affect 
perceptions of usefulness and ease of use 
as well as individual outcome 
- Actual use: (number of offers and number 
of offer with message) affects perceptions 
of usefulness and ease of use as well as 
individual outcome 
- Individual outcome: (utility achieved) 
impacts perceptions of usefulness and ease 
of use as well as outcome satisfaction 
- Ease of use: (cognitive effort required to 
use the system in general and for analytical 
support) affects outcome satisfaction 
- Usefulness: (divided into analytical and 
communication support) affects outcome 
satisfaction 
- Outcome satisfaction: (measure as 
assessment) has the potential to affect 





- Explore factors that influence intention 
to use ENS 
- Field experiment using Inspire bicycle 
part contracting case  
- User‘s perceptions are influenced by 
individual difference, actual use and 
individual outcomes from use 
- Perceptions of ease of use and usefulness 
lead to outcome satisfaction 
- This exploratory study is based on 
correlation analysis and not structure 
equation modeling 
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 - Perceived usefulness: positively affects 
satisfaction with ENS and ENS 
continuance intention 
- Positive disconfirmation: (expected usage –
actual usage) positively affects perceived 
usefulness and satisfaction with ENS 
- Satisfaction with ENS: (items are similar to 
attitude towards ENS) positively affects  
- ENS continuance intention: greater for 
asynchronous 
- Test a structural model to explain ENS 
continuous intention 
- Perceived usefulness and satisfaction 
with system affect ENS continuous 
intentions 
- Mixed synchronous and asynchronous 
treatments, which provides no insight 
into the difference between the two types 
of communication 
Lai et al. 
(2006) 






- Offer type: cooperative negotiators send 
more offers with message, while non-
cooperative negotiators rely more on offer 
alone  
- Control of process: negotiators who feel in 
control of the process adopt a more 
cooperative strategy  
- Discussion climate: cooperative negotiators 
report a friendlier discussion climate  
- Outcome satisfaction: collaborators have 
greater outcome satisfaction  
- Number of agreements: collaborators have 
greater number of agreements 
- Study the relationship between 
negotiator‘s strategy and negotiation 
process and outcome 
- Field experiment using Inspire bicycle 
part contracting case  
- Cluster analysis of self-reported 
measures for cooperative or non-
cooperative strategies 
- Correlation between self and opponent‘s 
strategy, meaning that they influence 
each other  
- Collaborators send more message with 
their offers and experience greater 
control in the process, discussion 
climate, number of agreements  and 
outcome satisfaction 
- It is not clear if the agreement reached 
by collaborators are actually better 
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 - Behavior type: more uninhibited behavior 
in synchronous. Synchronous users 
engaged in more tactical behavior, while 
asynchronous users engaged in more task-
oriented exchanges 
- Process coordination: synchronous 
communication required more time and 
process coordination 
- Outcome satisfaction: greater for 
asynchronous 
- Discussion climate: greater for 
asynchronous 
- Number of agreement: no sign difference 
- Examine negotiators‘ behavior in 
synchronous and asynchronous 
communication  
- Use two different cases: bicycle parts 
and pharmaceutical products (non-zero-
sum)  
- Synchronous users were more 
uninhibited, competitive and required 
greater process coordination, which lead 
them to report lower outcome 
satisfaction and discussion climate 
- The number of agreement is the same for 
both types of communication 
- Different amount of time was given to 
the two treatments and the two cases was 
given under repeated measure protocol, 
both of which can contribute to the 






- Individual difference: 
gender, age, 
experience, culture 
and understanding of 
case 
- Role: Buyer or seller 
- Behavior consistency: whether behavior 
during negotiation matches preferences 
elicited in pre-negotiation. Examples of 
deviations are: accept an offer that is 
inferior to a previously rejected offer or if 
the final offer proposed and accepted is 
greater than any previous offer (assumption 
of distributive bargaining). Individual 
difference have little influence over 
inconsistency (except for understanding of 
case), but role played by negotiator 
affected their consistency (sellers were 
more likely to be more inconsistent with 








- Examine the consistency of behavior 
with preference structure elicited in pre-
negotiation 
- Field experiment using Inspire bicycle 
part contracting case  
- The person‘s understanding of the case 
affects consistency as well as their role 
- Sellers seem to start the process as being 
more generous, but move to a more 
distributive position once they are more 
engaged in the negotiation 
- The measurement of consistency is 
questionable as the deviations can be 
tactics used by negotiators 
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Authors ENS Moderating variables Process and outcome variables Summary and comments 
Weber et al. 
(2006) 
ENS (graph 
feature as part of 
decision support) 
 - Number of agreements: no difference 
between graph and no graph support  
- Number of offers: (number of offers needed 
to reach an agreement) graph users 
submitted more offers than those with no 
graph  
- Textual communication: (number of 
message and length of message) no 
difference between the number, but no 
graph users submitted longer messages  
supported > non-supported 
- Study the effect of graph representation 
of offer utility on negotiation process 
and outcome 
- Field experiment using Inspire bicycle 
part contracting case  
- No graph support (n=54) and graph 
support (n=2,353), which can cause 
statistical biases when results are 
compared 
- No difference in outcome between graph 
and no graph in term of number of 
agreement 
- No graph users made less offers because 
graph users can have a more holistic 
picture of the offer space presented by 
graphical representation 
- Number of message was the same, but 
no graph users wrote longer messages to 
explain their rational and positioning  
- It appears that graph representation 
enables reduces cognitive effort, but did 
not affect the outcome because of tabular 
information provided to both groups 
Galin et al. 
(2007) 
ENT (text)  - Joint outcome: no sign. difference  
- Time required: ENT required more time 
- Integrative behavior: (soft tactics) were 
greater for face-to-face 
- Distributive behavior: (hard tactics) were 











- Compare ENT with face-to-face  
- No difference in outcome 
- Face-to-face required less time and 
mediated more integrative behavior 
- The results did not show the difference 
between the two cases used 
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ENT (text) - Conflict intensity: 
manipulated by 
extending the case to 
include a history of 
negotiation breakdown 
between the parties 
- Social embeddedness: 
manipulated by asking 
participants to bring 
someone they know 
- Offer quality: (claiming or creating value) 
negotiators with a relationship used value 
creation in low conflict situation, but no 
sign. difference between social 
embeddedness in high conflict 
- Information quality: (integrative vs. 
distributive exchange of information) 
negotiators with a relationship used more 
integrative and less distributive exchange 
in low conflict situation, but no sign. 
difference between social embeddedness in 
high conflict  
- Number of agreements: socially embedded 
negotiators reached more agreements in 
general  
- Study the effect of social embeddedness 
on conflict intensity 
- In weak conflict, socially embedded 
dyads use value creation and more 
integrative vs.  distributive information 
exchange, but did not reach sign. more 
agreements than non-embedded dyads 
- In high conflict, there were no difference 
in behavior between the two social 
groups, but socially embedded dyads 
reached more agreements 
- These findings are surprising, but given 
the sample size and no efficiency of 
agreement measure it is difficult to tell if 
social embeddedness produced better 
results 





- Cognitive complexity: 
measure of tolerance 
for ambiguity.  
- Value orientation: task 
or people oriented 
individuals  
- Perceived control: feeling of control over 
the process of negotiation. 
- System anxiety: unpleasant emotional state 
caused by tension, apprehension or worry 
- ENS caused higher perceived control, 
which led to lower system anxiety. 
- Moderators had no effect. 
Lim and 
Yang (2008) 




 - Individual outcome: increased with NSS  
- Joint outcome: increased with NSS  
- Equality: interaction between NSS and 
multi-lingual support  
- Time: decreased with multi-lingual support  
- Outcome satisfaction: no sign effect 
- Process satisfaction: no sign effect 
- Multi-lingual support helped increase 
equity (when paired with NSS), but 
required more time . 
- NSS helped increase economic outcome 
- Subjective measures were not sign. 
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3.4 Summary of Electronic Negotiation Systems 
The primary objective of ENSs is to provide capabilities for enabling negotiators to learn 
about the problem and possible solutions to resolving their conflicts, as well as to help 
them reach agreements favourable for the individuals as well as the the dyads (Kersten 
2003). The development of ENSs began with: (1) DSS and NSS (comprised of features 
that support decisions on standalone computers, and, possibly communication facilities 
on local networks); (2) progressed to employing internet technology for communications 
(e.g., ENT); (3) followed by the use of software agents in NAA to help with 
computationally intensive activities; and (4) increasing automation by giving agents 
entire control of the negotiation processes with NSA.   
 Over the years, various features have been developed to support pre-negotiation, 
the conduct of negotiation and post-negotiation activities. These features mediate the 
flow of information between parties by facilitating communication and decision making, 
but the impact of these features on the users and negotiated outcomes is still relatively 
unknown. An assessment of ENS studies shows that most research focused on the cost 
benefit framework, media richness theory and IS models of success without much 
consideration of cognitive theories of negotiation.  
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4 Outcome Frames 
This section examines subjective representations of the situation, issues involved, and 
outcomes disputed in a negotiation through the perspective of information framing. In 
essence, it describes the framing of outcomes in terms of the negotiator‘s conception of 
the conflict relating to gains and profits (gain frame), or involving losses and costs (loss 
frame) through information presented in the case or by the mediating system. The frame 
is controlled partly by the formation of the problem found in the case or the system, and 
partly by the norms, habits and inherent biases of the individual.  
Behavioral studies have pointed to the negotiators‘ cognitive limitations, biases 
and/or mistakes in integrating information as reasons for failed or inefficient negotiations 
(Neale and Bazerman 1991). These shortcomings are not necessarily due to humans‘ 
inherent inadequacies, but they may be due to the situational factors and complexity of 
the decision problem (Bazerman 1986). De Dreu and Carnevale (2003) argued that slight 
deviations in the structure of the task can have severe consequences on the manner in 
which people think and behave. 
This section explores the literature on framing effects, especially those of 
outcome framing in negotiations.  The first subsection, Section 4.1, describes the 
cognitive perspective of framing, with risk, attribute or goals. Section 4.2 discusses 
outcome frames and their effects on negotiations. Section 4.3 introduces framing in 
electronic commerce for comparison of objects or events. Section 4.4 points to the 
potential of ENSs for inducing framing outcomes in the negotiation process. Finally, the 
fifth subsection, Section 4.5, summarizes the discussion on outcome frames. 
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4.1 Framing Effect 
Negotiation research follows many research traditions in the applied behavioral sciences, 
such as psychology, political science, law, economics, communication, anthropology, and 
organizational behavior (Bazerman, Curhan et al. 2000). On a theoretical level, 
behavioral researchers study and build models to explain processes and outcomes of 
negotiations. On a practical level, they aim to predict process and outcomes and to help 
people negotiate more effectively and efficiently (Thompson 1990). Over the years, 
research has focused on how the economic and structural characteristics of the 
negotiation context influence human decision processes and outcomes reached (De Dreu, 
Beersma et al. 2006). Behavioral researchers observed that a decision-maker may 
respond differently to slight variations in the descriptions of a problem. Studies in such 
area of human judgment call the phenomenon the framing effect. 
The concept of framing refers to the different manner in which the decision 
problem is presented. A frame affects evaluation of probabilities and outcomes, so that 
the preferences shift when the same problem is framed in different ways. The impact of a 
few words can change the preferences of individuals from one option over to another, 
violating the rationality principles assumed in, for example, expected utility model of von 
Neumann and Morgensten (1947).  
Numerous laboratory studies have shown that when two descriptions of outcomes 
are framed differently (e.g., one in terms of lives saved and another in terms of lives lost), 
people make different choices. The participants would select the riskier option when the 
problem is framed in terms of lives lost. The prospect theory, formulated by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979), describes the differences in decisions made when: (1) outcomes are 
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expressed as positive or negative deviations from a reference point, and (2) risk attitudes 
that are formed when gains and losses are considered.  
The effect of an outcome frame can be interpreted through a value function 
adapted from prospect theory. The function describes the relationship between objective 
outcomes and subjective values (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). To illustrate the different 
perceptions of value generated by different outcome frames, Figure 9 uses the S-shaped 
curve to demonstrate the differences in perception for the same objective values in both 
frames. The objective value stated in the gain frame is the same as that in the loss frame 
(i.e., a difference of 25 points on the x-axis for G and L), but the subjective value is 
greater in the loss frame (i.e., SL is about 20 points on the y-axis) than in the gain frame 
(i.e., SG is about 12 points on the y-axis). Hence, the pleasure associated with gaining a 
sum of money is generally less than the displeasure associated with losing the same 



















Figure 9 Theoretical value function based on Kahneman and Tversky (1979)   
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Prospect theory shows that decision-makers seek more risky options in a loss 
frame, but they prefer less risky options in a gain frame. Their risk attitude follows the S-
shaped value function, whereby they take greater risk associated with losses than they do 
with gains. 
As work in framing effect expands to a large number of scenarios ranging from 
medical judgments to social dilemmas, Levin, Schneiderb et al. (1998) proposed a 
typology to distinguish three different types of framing effects: attribute framing, risk 
choice framing, and goal framing. These types are discussed below. 
4.1.1 Attribute Framing 
Attribute framing is the most straightforward type of framing, as it involves describing 
objects or events in either positive or negative terms (Levin, Schneiderb et al. 1998). 
Studies showed that people evaluate objects more positively when they are framed in a 
positive light than in a negative one. For example, the attribute study of Levin and Gaeth 
(1988) revealed that the perception of quality for ground beef is dependent of whether the 
product is labeled positively ―75% lean‖ or negatively ―25% fat‖. Subjects rated the 
ground beef framed as ―75% lean‖ as being tastier and less greasy that the same product 
but labeled in the negative frame.  
 Attribute framing is at the root of outcome framing studies in negotiations. 
Outcomes can be presented to negotiators in terms of either gains or losses through a 
profit schedule, while the net profit is the same in both frames. The effects of outcome 
framing serve to explain why favorable offers are accepted in the gain frame but not in 
the loss frame Bazerman (1986). Section 4.2 presents an in-depth discussion of outcome 
framing in negotiations. 
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4.1.2 Risk Choice Framing 
Risk choice framing examines decision-making under uncertainty for attribute selection.  
Under risk choice framing, people make different choices depending on the description of 
the options in either positive or negative terms: between a risky vs. a certain (or very low 
risk) option of equal expected value. For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1981, p. 453) 
gave the subjects the following options: 
(1) In the positive risk frame, 
(a) 100% possibility of saving 200 lives; or 
(b) 33% possibility of saving all 600 lives and 66% possibility of saving no lives 
(2) In the negative risk frame, 
(c) 100% possibility of losing 400 lives; or 
(d) 33% possibility of losing no lives and 66% possibility of losing all 600 lives 
 The results of such studies demonstrated that the majority of decision-makers 
selected the riskless option (a) in the positive frame, but reversed their preferences in the 
negative frame to the risky option (d). 
 The notion of risk framing is debated by different researchers in the study of 
negotiations. Neale and Bazerman (1985) argued that risk plays an important part in 
explaining the difference of results obtained from positively vs. negatively framed 
outcomes. They noted that negotiators were more averse to risky arbitration in the 
positive (gain) frame than in the negative (loss) frame. In the gain frame, the negotiators 
were, therefore, more likely to make larger concessions and settle. However, the study 
did not explicitly describe the risk to negotiators, which puts into question the uncertainty 
faced when confronted with arbitration. De Dreu, Carnevale et al. (1995) stated that the 
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lack of explicit risk of non-agreements violates the use of risk choice, and that the 
differences in results between positively and negatively presented outcomes are due to 
the framing of the problem, a question of attribute framing.   
4.1.3 Goal Framing 
Goal framing relates to persuading individuals to act as a consequence of the message 
being presented in either positive or negative terms (Levin, Schneiderb et al. 1998). Goal 
framing in the positive frame is often used in advertisement to emphasize a desirable 
consequence or course of action. But in the negative frame, goal framing seeks to 
underscore the undesirable consequences of the behavior. The positive frame of the 
message focuses on a behavior that entails a positive consequence, whereas negative 
framing highlights the same behavior in avoiding a negative consequence. For example, 
in a medical study that looked at goal framing (Meyerowitz and Chaiken 1987), women 
were more likely to perform self-breast exams when the consequences of not doing so 
were presented in negative terms. The following two statements were used: 
(1) In the positive goal frame,  
―Research shows that women who do breast self-examinations have an increased 
chance of finding a tumor in the early, more treatable stage of the disease.‖  
(2) In the negative goal frame,  
―Research shows that women who do not do breast self-examinations have a 
decreased chance of finding a tumor in the early, more treatable stage of the 
disease.‖  
The difference between attribute and goal framing is that goal framing does not stress 
whether the behavior is positive or negative. Instead, the consequence in the message is 
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framed negatively or positively depending on whether the behavior is performed or not. 
Goal framing appears to be more effective when the message is presented in negative 
consequences, but there is less evidence to this effect than those of other types of framing 
(Levin, Schneiderb et al. 1998). Thus far, the application of goal framing is not reported 
in negotiation research.  
4.2 Outcome Frame in Negotiation 
In negotiation, the framing of an outcome is a form of attribute framing, and it is shown 
to be influential in formulating offers, communicating with the counterpart and judging 
concessions made (De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 1995). The outcome frame refers to the 
negotiator‘s conception of the disputed event as involving gains or losses (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979). Moreover, outcome frames are necessarily present in every negotiation as 
people make decisions based on a comparison of a prospective outcome to a reference 
point, and they subsequently negotiate to seek greater gains or reduce potential losses. 
The outcome frame may be derived from the negotiator‘s cognitive representation of 
potential outcome or from the characterization of the dispute as profit or cost to the 
negotiator (De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 1995).  
 The main premise behind outcome frames is the reference point, which 
negotiators use to compare their outcomes. A gain frame suggests that an outcome 
provides greater profit than the reference value, while a loss frame points to an outcome 
below the reference value. In negotiations, the level of aspiration serves as a reference 
value that individuals use as a basis to evaluate offers. If the received offer falls below 
the expectation level (in terms of gains) then the negotiator views accepting such an offer 
as a loss. To illustrate this point, consider a single issue negotiation between management 
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and a labor union. The union has received a 3% increase in pay last year and expects to 
get the same increase. When the company offers a 2.5% the union views this as a loss of 
0.5% compared to last year‘s 3% increase. If the union expects to receive only a 2% 
increase in this negotiation because of either weaker economic conditions or because 
other unions have accepted a 2% increase, then an offer of 2.5% compared to an 
expectation of 2% is considered to be a gain. Therefore, a high reference point can cause 
negotiators to resist concessions.  
The explanations for outcome framing effect are generally based on two theories: 
(1) heightened risk tolerance (Bazerman 1983), and (2) heightened concern for outcome 
(De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 1995). Both theories assume that framing outcomes as gains 
and losses implies the evaluation of potential outcomes in subjective terms following 
many rounds of offer exchange. 
 The heightened risk tolerance theory argues that negotiators make larger 
concessions in the gain frame because they would rather reach a sure settlement than risk 
arbitration or a non-agreement. But in the loss frame, negotiators are more risk-seeking 
and willing to choose arbitration than accept certain loss. To demonstrate the risk 
tolerance, Bazerman (1983) asked negotiators to choose either accepting a $4,000 offer or 
face arbitration. Negotiators placed in a gain frame, where the reference value was $0, 
were more likely to accept the offer than risk arbitration compared to those in the loss 
frame using a reference value of $8000.  
Subsequently, Neale and Bazerman (1985) tested their risk hypothesis by 
conducting an experiment involving a multi-issue, union-management negotiation, 
whereby subjects played the role of management representatives who were given the 
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instructions to either maximize gains or minimize losses. A trained facilitator played the 
role of the union representative and mimicked the strategy adopted by the subjects. In 
case of an impasse, an arbitrator would make a final decision on the terms of the 
settlement. The results showed that negotiators operating in a gain frame settled more 
often and reported the discussion climate to be less competitive. These findings appeared 
to support the heightened risk tolerance explanation for outcome effect. However, it is 
unclear whether the subject in different treatment assessed the risk of facing an arbitrator 
differently (De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 1995). The theory of heightened risk tolerance 
needs to be extended, especially when uncertainty is not measured or proven to generate 
outcome framing effect without manipulation by a researcher. 
The heightened concern for outcome theory coincides with Kahneman‘s (1992) 
argument that losses loom greater than gains forgone. This theory is based on attribute 
framing (Levin, Schneiderb et al. 1998), and it suggests that negotiators working in a loss 
frame feel that every concession is a loss of revenue, while those in a gain frame see 
concessions as a forgone gain. Therefore, concessions are more difficult to make for 
those in the loss frame. In an experiment on the endowment effect, i.e. when people value 
an object that they possess more than if the same object is not in their ownership (Thaler 
1980), one group of subjects was given a coffee mug and asked to give the value at which 
they would trade this mug, whereas subjects from another group were asked to give the 
value at which they would buy the mug from those in the first group. The results showed 
that subjects in the first group worked with a loss frame, which influenced them to place 
the value of the mug twice as high as those in the gain frame (i.e., subjects in the other 
group). This theory is also supported by other studies (Kahneman, Knetsch et al. 1990; 
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Carnevale and Pruitt 1992; Carnevale, De Dreu et al. 1994; De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 
1995).   
The difference in outcome framing implies that potential outcomes (offers) are 
evaluated based on a reference point A or B as shown in Figure 10. On one hand, a 
negotiator in the gain frame evaluates offers based on A, so that changes are perceived as 
movements along a concave function. On the other hand, a negotiator in the loss frame 
judges offers based on B, so that changes are perceived as movements along a convex 
function. For example, an offer value at 50 is compared to 0 (reference point A) and 
perceived as a gain of 50. However, the same offer in the loss frame (i.e., a comparison to 


















Figure 10 Comparison of outcomes adapted from De Dreu, Carnevale et al. (1995) 
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4.2.1 Loss Frame and Conflict Escalation 
The difference between a loss and a gain frames centers on the reference point, on which 
negotiators judge the prospective outcome. Negotiators given a high reference point 
generally concede less, use more contentious behavior, hold higher expectations, take 
longer to reach settlement, and are less likely to reach an agreement compared to those 
given a low reference point (Carnevale and Pruitt 1992).  
 In an early study on outcome frames, Bazerman, Magliozzi et al. (1985) created 
two markets to test a 3-issue integrative bargaining task. In the gain frame condition 
participants were given a table of all possible agreements expressed in terms of profits, 
while those in the loss frame condition received a table of all possible agreements stated 
in terms of expenses; while both conditions had identical net profits. When the outcomes 
were framed as profits, negotiators reached more agreements, the joint outcome was 
greater, and they reported better perception of relationship with other party than those in 
the loss frame.  
To confirm this difference in perception of gains and losses, De Dreu and his 
colleagues tested the effect of outcome frames by assigning participants to the role of 
seller and asked them to bargain with a computer program (which the participants were 
led to believe was another participant) that played the role of a buyer. The participants 
negotiating over expenses (loss frame) were more demanding and conceded less than 
those operating in a gain frame. Furthermore, the messages sent by the participants (not 
replied to by the computer program) differed between outcome frames, whereby gain 
frame negotiators used more positive communication to express their preferences and 
potential concessions, while those in the loss frame stressed negative consequences 
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towards concessions. The dissimilar perceptions of values is what caused negotiators to 
resist concession-making and engage in more contentious behaviors, which hindered the 
discovery of integrative solutions (De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 1995).    
4.2.2 Frame Adoption and Overcoming the Loss Frame 
According to frame adoption theory, a loss frame is easily adopted but less readily 
transformed into a gain frame than vice versa. In a series of experiments (De Dreu, 
Carnevale et al. 1994) with preprogrammed offers and messages from a computer acting 
as a buyer, human subjects (―sellers‖) would engage in six rounds of negotiations with 
the computer. The computer used messages that referred to outcomes as gains, profits and 
benefits in the gain frame, while in the loss frame the messages expressed outcomes as 
expenses, costs and losses. In the analysis, the messages sent by the humans were coded 
as communicating either in a gain or loss frame based on the way offers were expressed. 
The results indicated that negotiators operating in the gain frame adopted the use of loss-
framed messages when negotiating with a loss-framed computer. However, those in a 
loss frame did not adopt the use of the gain-framed messages when negotiating with a 
computer in a gain frame.  
 Thus, the loss frame appears to be dominant over the gain frame (i.e., a loss frame 
instigates the counterpart to adopt a loss frame, but the gain frame does not have the same 
effect). In addition, the findings from this experiment showed that the loss frame has the 
potential to negatively impact negotiation by escalating the conflict. Nevertheless, several 
moderating factors have been demonstrated to reduce the influence of framing.  
The framing effect can be diminished by changing the reference point. The notion of 
a static outcome frame, established at the onset of negotiation and remaining constant 
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throughout a negotiation, was challenged by studies that sought to move the reference 
point or introduce an anchor. In these studies positive effect, risk of arbitration, and 
motivational orientations were manipulated and their impact on outcomes was assessed 
(De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 1994; Olekalns 1994; Carnevale 2007; Trötschel and 
Gollwitzer 2007). The introduction of moderating variables on outcome framing 
coincides with the three forces that reduce the impact of a loss frame as suggested by 
Levin and Gaeth (1988):   
 Decrease the threat of loss: A concession implies a larger cost in the loss frame as 
it is judged to be a greater decline in value than in the gain frame. The effect of 
such an impact in the loss frame is assumed to diminish by shifting the value 
function to the right (i.e., by manipulating the reference point). Thus, the 
perception of a concession in the loss frame is seen as equivalent to a concession 
in the gain frame (Carnevale 2007). Figure 11 depicts the shift of the value 
function and the difference in subjective values over similar concessions in the 
gain and loss frames. The shifted function causes concessions values to be 
evaluated similarly for gains and losses (i.e., SG1 is equal to SL1 for the same 
concession for either G1 or L1).  










Figure 11 Shift in value function based on Carnevale (2007) 
 
 Avoid facing adverse possibilities: The heightened concern for outcome is 
considered the main reason that negotiators place greater value on concessions 
made in the loss frame. The risk of suffering a greater loss in deadlock can 
introduce an anchor, which affects the judgment of concessions. The anchor shifts 
the negotiator‘s reference to the value of potential outcomes (Bazerman 1983). In 
an experiment that examines the uncertainty created by an impasse, the loss frame 
negotiators were more cooperative and reached integrative agreements when they 
faced a risky gamble in case of a deadlock than if they were not subjected to such 
uncertainty (Bottom 1998). These results from the experiment also highlighted the 
importance of evaluating all sources of uncertainty faced by negotiators in 
complex business negotiations involving substantial risk.  
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Prior to assessing the effect of a loss frame, the risk incurred by a 
negotiator needs to be determined in order to properly judge his/her behavior and 
the negotiation outcome. Botton (1998, p. 109) stated that:  
―When contracting involves large uncertainties, as it does in most 
significant business transactions, then the greater risk taking associated 
with high reference points leads to more cooperative bargaining and a 
greater chance of agreement. When the only uncertainties concerned those 
of strategic choices or BATNAs (best alternative to negotiated agreement), 
the riskier strategies that threaten non-settlement will appeal primarily to 
those who are negotiating over losses. However, when the payoffs from 
different contractual arrangements are highly uncertain, then these 
strategies have greater appeal to gain-frame negotiators. The direction 
depends on the relative attractiveness of the party‘s BATNA, the 
downside risk stemming from a potential contract, and the negotiator‘s 
reference point. 
Therefore in the assessment of outcome frame effect, the risk of 
impasse must also be considered as an agreement can entail greater 
downside risk than the status quo, such that a high reference point, not a 
low one, influences negotiators to make greater concessions and reach and 
more agreements.‖ 
 Contrast with social motives: From a cognitive perspective, the concession 
aversion shown by negotiators in a loss frame can be lessened by a high concern 
for other‘s outcome in a collaborative setting (De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 1995). 
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The argument is that negotiators modify their resistance to concession-making 
when they must consider the impact of rejecting the opponent‘s demands on the 
joint outcome. However, early experiments analyzing the influence of social 
motives and outcome frames on negotiation have been inconclusive. Olekalns 
(1994) found that collaborative negotiators obtained lower joint outcome in a loss 
frame than in a gain frame, Carnevale and Keenan (1990) reported that 
collaborative negotiators benefited more from a loss frame than a gain frame. In a 
later experiment, dyads negotiating in a loss frame overcame the effect of loss 
aversion when elements of cooperation were introduced in the scenario (Olekalns 
1997). In order to reconcile the discrepancy between these studies, Trötschel and 
Gollwitzer (2007) showed that prosocial motives alone were not enough to 
surpass the high resistance to concession-making in the loss frame. Instead, 
negotiators needed to be given an implementation strategy in the form of 
intentions towards making a fair counteroffer to help them engage in problem-
solving and reach more efficient agreements.  
 
Research in this area has dealt mostly with framing outcomes by means of case 
description given in pre-negotiation. However, there haven‘t been studies investigating 
the effects of framing from a system‘s perspective in negotiations, since most 
experiments involved face-to-face interactions. Negotiation is a dynamic process that can 
change the perceptions of outcomes as evidenced by the forces described by Levin, 
Schneiderb et al. (1998). Electronic negotiations involve technology that is incorporated 
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into the process. The facilitation of decisions and interaction through the ENS may 
provide the potential to frame outcomes throughout the process. 
4.3 Online Framing 
The cognitive heuristics employed in attribute selection describe the people‘s tendency to 
select a reference point or anchor when evaluating offers. They adjust this reference point 
or anchor when situational variables affect their judgment (Tversky and Kahneman 1986; 
Dawes 1988). The perception created by the framing of outcome in the problem 
description has been intensely studied. Research on factors that cause shifts in perception 
during the process of negotiation has not been well developed. This especially the case 
for outcome frames, which are subjected to the dynamics of the interaction between the 
two sides (De Dreu and Carnevale 2003) and, in the case of electronic negotiation, that of 
the user with the system.  
 Evidence of outcome framing is present throughout electronic commerce. 
Vendors use framing to display product characteristics in terms of maximizing gains or 
minimizing losses (Stibel 2005). Figure 12 illustrates two websites that advertise sales 
through the display of prices for goods as either emphasizing gains or costs. The outcome 
frames used on the left side of Figure 12a centers on the gains that a consumer would 
receive from the purchase (e.g., a saving of $170). The right side (Figure 12b) focuses on 
the reduction of cost to the buyer (e.g., the sale price of $495 means that the ring will cost 
the buyer less than if he/she paid the original price of $1000). According to Levin, 
Schneiderb et al. (1998), people evaluate products as being more attractive when 
information is presented from a positive perspective in attribute framing. This means that 
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people are more likely to evaluate an option more favorably when it is described 








Figure 12 Display of sales in positive and negative process frame 
Another example of a website manipulating frames to influence purchasing 
decisions can be found when users purchase music or download a video from yahoo.com. 
The duration of the song is presented in positive values to show the gains achieved from 
buying the song, as reflected by the 1:44 minute display in Figure 13a. Alternatively, in 
Figure 13b, when users are sampling music online, electronic retailers such as last.fm use 
a negative value (a -0:16 minute) to depict the duration of the song. The negative value 
creates a perception of loss that stimulates users to avoid such dispossession and to 
purchase the album. 
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Figure 13 Outcome frames in music downloads 
4.3.1 Interpretation and Limitation of System Framing 
Tversky and Kahnaman (1981) alluded to the use of computational aids to help people 
solve complex problems that required concurrent decisions. However, the introduction of 
decision support may in itself frame information and shift a reference point or an anchor. 
The manipulation of information by online systems has been shown to encourage 
electronic purchases (Stibel 2005).  
System framing is also the choice of the medium used to present information to 
influence the cognitive process of the decision-maker (Silver 2008). It can be 
extrapolated to attribute framing, whereby when an object is described in a positive way 
people offer better evaluation of the object than if it is presented in a negative way. 
Although the effect appears intuitive, the explanation points to cognitive processing that 
evokes complex association of the stimulus to selective information coded in the memory 
(Levin and Gaeth 1988). The positive labeling of an item evokes favorable associations in 
 
a) Positive framing of duration 
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the memory, whereas the negative labeling of the same attribute engenders unfavorable 
associations.  
The exposure of a positive stimulus can create favorable distortions that persist to 
later evaluations of other stimuli (Russo, Medvec et al. 1996). The valence-based 
encoding causes a confirmatory bias involving the same sort of selective attention and 
cognitive search mechanism, which can explain why expectations have such an intense 
effect on judgment (Harris 1991).  The cognitive explanation rests heavy on the 
positively or negatively valence-based knowledge accessed during the impression 
formation process. In psychology, limitations on the framing effect have been shown 
when the object or event involves:  
 Highly personal or ethical issues: Topics that evoke profound reactions are less 
susceptible to framing effects as favorable or unfavorable associations are not 
able to counter the inherent beliefs. Marteau (1989) found that no framing effects 
were present when testing subjects on problems involving abortion decisions. 
 Estimation of one’s own performance: Invariance of framing is also found when 
people are evaluating their own performance, which can be explained by their 
tendency to overestimate their abilities and neglect information that does not 
support their self-worth. 
 Dealing with extreme values: System framing suffers from ceiling and floor effect 
as people have difficulty evaluating extreme levels. Levin and Gaeth (1988) 
showed that evaluations of options were more striking using intermediate than 
extreme levels. 
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4.4 Potential of System Framing 
Literature on the effect of system framing so far has centered on a single decision rather 
than many decisions, which is the case throughout the course of negotiation (Kirchler, 
Maciejovsky et al. 2005). The impact of this effect needs to be studied because ENSs 
influence the process and results through their mediation of communication between 
parties and restructuring of information to support decision-making.  
In Section 3, ENSs were described as performing two major functions: (1) they 
facilitate negotiations by providing a platform for users to communicate and possibly find 
acceptable solutions; and (2) they mediate negotiations through the provision of decision 
support. Both of these tend to manipulate information, which can help users build and 
evaluate offers. The impact of such framing can affect the negotiators‘ preconceived 
representation of the problem (Delaney, Foroughi et al. 1997). More importantly, ENSs 
inevitably influence the process of negotiation by displaying explicit information to help 
people compare alternatives (Delaney, Foroughi et al. 1997).  
ENS framing can enhance or hinder negotiated outcomes depending on the 
variables external to the system. In the third experiment presented by Trötschel and 
Gollwitzer (2007), motivational orientation was manipulated as a variable external to the 
ENS, which presented stocks in gain and loss frames. The study found that collaborators 
benefited more from a loss frame than from a gain frame, because when the system 
framed information as losses, they were more hesitant to make large, disadvantageous 
concessions that would reduce joint gains.  
The decision support component introduces framing through the interface that 
displays the evaluations of offers and counteroffers. In these instances, the information 
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displayed includes the offer rating in either positive or negative values based on different 
reference points. For example, an offer that is characterized as ―meeting 75% of one‘s 
goals‖ (in a gain frame) can be perceived very differently than the same offer being 
described as ―25% away from one‘s objectives‖ (in a loss frame).  
 Studies on DSS interface showed that the presentation of items can affect their 
persuasiveness and preferences by the user (Bettman and Sujan 1987; Payne, Bettman et 
al. 1993). Tversky (1969) alluded to the effects of such framing when he described the 
additive and difference rule in comparing two alternatives displayed. He suggested that 
sequential presentation is more adequate for computing the addition of alternatives, while 
simultaneous display is best for comparing the difference of alternatives. Moreover, 
strategies are affected by the format of information display as reported by Johnson 
(1984).  
 The framing of offers in the negotiation process can also alter people‘s evaluation 
of these and have the potential to decrease resistance to concession making. An example 
of such framing by the context, but not through a system and not in a controlled 
experimental setting, was given by Raiffa (1982). He noted in a classroom exercise that 
students were more likely to accept offers that were framed positively than negatively. 
Wilson (1989) claimed that positive graphs and images can increase the persuasive power 
of a message in terms of attitude and behavioral intention towards the behavior promoted 
by the message. A study of visual display of NSS led Herniter, Carmel et al. (1990) to 
discuss the need to limit the amount of information presented to the user in order to 
reduce confusion and help with problem-solving. In essence, the system must select and 
frame information matching the activities of the negotiator. For example, they proposed 
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using graphs to help users visualize patterns and predict trends, while use of tables was 
recommended for referencing data and comparing few offers. These guidelines were 
based on the comparison survey by Herniter, Carmel et al. (1990), who did not provide 
specific methods for inducing gain or loss frame.  
  ENS framing is a form of outcome framing that integrates the representation of 
gains and losses into the process of negotiation. The individual‘s conceptualization of 
likely negotiated outcomes is not only actualized at the onset of the problem, but also 
reiterated through the information provided by the decision support component of the 
system. This implies that the negotiator‘s perception of gains or losses can be altered by 
representing offer ratings in either a positive or negative format. The examination of such 
framing in electronic negotiations has thus far not been discussed or studied for multi-
issue problems.   
4.5 Summary of Outcome Frame 
Outcome frame is focused on the negotiator‘s conception of the disputed event as 
involving gains or losses. Findings from empirical studies on outcome frame showed that 
when similar outcomes were presented in terms of gains or losses, negotiators operating 
with losses were more demanding, conceded less, arrived at fewer agreements and 
reached less efficient agreements. The reasons rest on people‘s heightened concern for 
outcome and/or risk tolerance. A decrease in the threat of concession-making, the 
avoidance of a greater potential loss in deadlock or the contrast of social motives can 
reduce the effect of a loss frame. So far, research on outcome framing in negotiation has 
focused on different representations of outcomes in face-to-face negotiations (Malhotra 
and Bazerman 2008). As ENSs facilitate decision-making and mediate interactions 
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between both sides, the system inevitably frames outcomes during the process through 
information presentation. 
ENS framing refers to the individual‘s conceptualization of an outcome 
influenced by the information displayed during the process as either being a gain or a 
loss. In simple decisions, positive framing of attributes is more persuasive and leads to 
better evaluation of items (Levin, Schneiderb et al. 1998). Even though system framing 
has been studied in psychology for single shot evaluations of items, it has not been 
explicitly discussed in traditional negotiation research, which focuses mostly on face-to-
face interactions and is not concerned with the display of information by a system. 
Research in DSSs points to the importance of restricting and framing information to help 
users make decisions that are consistent with their goals and tasks.     
Foroughi, Perkins et al. (1995) suggested many ways in which ENSs may help 
negotiators overcome cognitive limitation without specific insight into how a system 
improves the process. By examining the potential of ENS framing on various contextual 
settings with different cognitive biases, a clearer understanding of the impact of 
technology can be achieved. This would help the designers provide systems that would 
encourage or discourage concession making depending on the objectives of the 
interaction.    
   115 
5 Proposed Framework and Hypotheses 
As the growth of internet-based technology engenders greater opportunities for 
organizations to transact online, the promise of ENSs is to provide not only a medium for 
communication, but also a structure for the exchange process by modeling decision-
making and by representation of information. The literature review shows that empirical 
studies on ENS assessment have been concentrated mainly on the relation between the 
costs and benefits of the system, media richness of the communication channel and 
patterns of usage as predictors of system success (see Section 3). Behavioral research on 
conflict and negotiation stresses the importance of motivational orientation and outcome 
framing as antecedents, which influence the dynamics of interaction and, inevitably, the 
negotiated outcomes (see Section 2 and Section 4).   
Early ENS studies followed the assumption that users are competitive, meaning 
that they are only concerned with their own outcomes; thereby the impact of motivational 
orientation on system interaction was mostly disregarded. For example, in Section 3.3, 
only two (Sheffield 1995; Lai, Doong et al. 2006) out of twenty two assessment studies 
looked at motivational orientation.   
The competitive assumption is not necessarily reflective of field experiments or 
marketplaces where negotiators are free to pursue other goals, which may not be based 
solely on maximizing one‘s own utility. Using the bicycle parts case from the Inspire 
system, Lai, Doong et al. (2006) first asked participants to report their concern for selves 
and that for the counterparts, and then plotted their responses along the dual concern 
axes, from which two clusters emerged:  collaborators and non-collaborators. Based on 
these clusters, Lai, Doong et al. (2006) found that each group had different patterns of 
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usage (i.e., collaborators tended to send more messages with offers, while non-
collaborators focused more on offers with solely numeric information) that affected their 
likelihood of reaching an agreement and achieving outcome satisfaction. In another 
study, where collaborative and competitive orientations were clearly distinguished 
through the use of different incentive structures, Sheffield (1995) showed that technology 
(in terms of media richness) and visual presence of the counterparties played different 
roles in moderating the outcome. Collaborators obtained high joint outcome in visual 
treatment with text communication as opposed to competitors who fared better using 
audio communication without visual presence.  
These studies highlighted the need to examine ENSs under different motivational 
contexts, because systems could be designed to help market participants with different 
orientations; more specifically, one of competitive, ―I care only to maximize my gains‖, 
or other of collaborative orientation, ―I need to maximize your and my gains as our 
welfare depends on each other‖. The studies also emphasized the importance of providing 
different types of system features that match the motivational orientations of the 
negotiators.  
Behavioral researchers have long noted the significance of information framing 
on conflicts and negotiations (Bazerman 1986). Depending on the negotiators‘ perception 
of outcomes in terms of gains or losses, the likelihood of resisting concession-making or 
settling easily is different between the two frames (De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 1995).  
Thus far, behavioral researchers have used similar negotiation cases, but 
presented the possible outcomes in each case as either gains or losses to create these two 
frames (Neale and Bazerman 1985). Using ENSs, we can take this approach further by 
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framing the negotiation process in accordance with the framing of outcomes, whereby the 
information technology artifact frames the interaction between negotiators.  
In the review of ENS studies (Section 3.3), the systems with decision aids have 
only presented information in a gain frame (whereby all offers are considered positive 
when compared to the worst possible offer), and therefore the possibility of using a loss 
frame (whereby offers are framed negatively when compared to the best possible offer) 
has not been explored. Although the loss frame has been criticized to escalate conflict 
(Bazerman, Magliozzi et al. 1985), it has the potential to prevent negotiators from making 
unfavorable concessions and easily settling on poor offers (De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 
1995). As non-zero sum negotiations require parties to discover the others‘ preferences 
and resist succumbing to the first satisficing solution (Lax and Sebenius 1986), the loss 
frame may interact with motivational orientation to enhance such negotiations.    
 In Section 5.1, a framework is presented that integrates behavioral and ENS 
design research. It describes the impact of motivational orientations and ENS framing at 
the dyadic and individual levels. Section 5.2 states hypotheses on the combined effect of 
motivational orientations and ENS framing on the negotiation process and outcome, in 
both objective as well as subjective terms.  
5.1 Proposed Framework Description 
The research framework, shown in Figure 14, depicts the impact of different motivational 
orientations interacting with ENS frames on the process and outcome from an objective, 
dyadic level and subjective, individual level. The elements characterizing the research 
framework are divided into independent and dependent variables. The independent 
variables are: (1) motivational orientation in terms of collaboratively or competitively 
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oriented dyads, and (2) ENS framing of offers as either gains or losses. The dependent 
variables describe the effect of the independent variables on the process and outcome. At 
the dyadic level, the dependent variables for the process include number of offers and 
cooperativeness, and those for the outcome include joint outcome as well as contract 
balance. At the individual level, they include cognitive effort and discussion climate for 






















Figure 14 Research framework 
5.1.1 Independent Variables 
Motivational orientation refers to the individual‘s preference for a particular 
distribution of substantive outcome between oneself and the opponent (McClintock 
1977). Although a variety of motivational orientations can arise from these two 
orthogonal perspectives of self and others (Pruitt and Rubin 1986), the competitive and 
collaborative orientations are most prevalent in economic transactions (Sheffield 1995; 
Shell 2001). They are also the underlying premises for two extreme market structures 
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(Soh and Markus 2002; Markus and Christiaanse 2003): purely competitive spot markets 
and long-term collaborative supply chain networks (Malone, Yates et al. 1987; Powell 
1990; Montazemi, Siam et al. 2008). 
On the one hand, traditional economic theories of bargaining assume that 
individuals adopt a competitive orientation, which is to say that individuals are only 
concerned with maximizing their own outcomes. Accordingly, any apparent collaborative 
behavior is speared by underlying egoistic motives, where personal gains, achieved by a 
settlement, can only result from providing the counterpart with an acceptable outcome 
(Sebenius 1992). Since agreements are reached when negotiators jointly discover 
beneficial solutions, the economic theories place little concern on social motives and 
explain failures to reach efficient solutions as cognitive limitations or biases resulting 
from poor judgment (Schelling 1960; Bazerman, Curhan et al. 2000).  
Social psychology, on the other hand, considers motivational orientation to be  
paramount in explaining and predicting behaviors and outcomes (Thompson 1990). 
Social psychologists have claimed that competitively oriented individuals become 
distrusting, hostile and have negative interpersonal perceptions. However, the 
collaborative orientation (i.e., those, who are interested in maximizing their and the 
opponent‘s welfare) assumes a more trusting and positive attitude towards the other side, 
which can lead to constructive information exchange and integrative solutions (Kramer 
and Carnevale 2001). In their meta-analysis, De Dreu, Weingart et al. (2000) described 
motivational orientation as an important antecedent leading to differences in perceptions, 
attitudes, behaviors and negotiated outcomes. Compared to competitive dyads, 
collaborative ones engaged in more accurate exchange of preferences and priorities, 
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which allowed for more agreements. However, competitive dyads were able to push each 
other towards more efficient solutions.  
The introduction of collaborative and competitive orientations broadens the 
context under which ENSs have been examined, meaning beyond the often assumed 
competitive realm to include social awareness (Sheffield 1995; Lai, Doong et al. 2006). 
Although different motivational orientations have been attributed to certain behaviors and 
outcomes, they do not provide an absolute prognostication of negotiation (De Dreu, 
Carnevale et al. 1995). The dynamic and complex exchanges are also governed by the 
manner in which information is framed (Bazerman, Curhan et al. 2000).  
ENS framing examines the manipulation of information by information 
technology artifact to help users evaluate offers. Framing is derived from prospect theory, 
where individuals make choices based on their cognitive representation of potential 
outcomes associated with gains or losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). More 
specifically, ENS framing is defined here as the evaluation of offers based on either a 
gain frame, whereby offers are compared to the worst possible solution, or a loss frame, 
whereby offers are measured against the best possible solution. The framing of offers in 
these positive or negative terms influences decision-making differently. Studies 
examining the framing of outcomes as gains and losses demonstrated that people dread 
losses more than they seek rewards (Kahneman and Tversky 1995).  
In behavioral research, different outcome frames have been presented in pre-
negotiation with the assumption that the frames are static and remain firm throughout the 
exchange in face-to-face negotiations. (Neale and Bazerman 1991). For example; in the 
gain frame, negotiators were given potential outcomes in positive values (profits), while 
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in the loss frame, they were presented with outcomes in negative values (expenses). 
When outcomes were framed as gains, the participants demanded less, conceded more, 
and settled easier than in the loss frame (De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 1994). One reason is 
that these decision-makers judged offers based on their intuition and heuristics, which 
introduced biases, especially in complex decision-making tasks with multiple issues and 
options (Dawes 1980; Raiffa 1982; Malhotra and Bazerman 2008). In essence, people are 
willing to give up more in the gain frame because they perceive that the same amount is 
worth less than in the loss frame (Bazerman, Magliozzi et al. 1985; Bottom 1998). 
The cognitive difficulties produced by the loss frame may be surpassed with 
negotiators who have a collaborative orientation (De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 1995). The 
conjecture is that the loss frame could impinge upon the collaborator‘s desire to make 
large concessions, and thus help to reduce unfavorable outcomes. The experimental 
findings showed mixed support for this theory in face-to-face studies (Carnevale, De 
Dreu et al. 1994; Olekalns 1994; Olekalns 1997). The implementation of framing 
throughout negotiations is important to uphold the bias created because the exchange 
process requires continuous decision-making and judgment, rather than a simple one-shot 
choice. Therefore, ENSs‘ mediating role creates the potential to extend framing over the 
course of interaction. 
In Section 4.2, the discussion on outcome frame described how people make 
decisions based on their perceptions of outcomes, but as new information emerges they 
make adjustments to their cognitive representations (Kahneman and Tversky 1995). The 
information provided by decision support systems may also bias users as the system 
displays information that they employ for decision-making. In order to reduce cognitive 
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efforts, information, which requires inference, integration and transformation, is often 
mentally discounted or ignored in decision-making (Payne, Bettman et al. 1993). ENSs 
can structure, summarize, and present information (such as graphs and tables) to ease 
decision-making. A system that records, compiles and displays data inevitably frames 
this data. The manner in which the system guides negotiators has important implications 
on the process and outcome. ENS framing not only involves the display of potential 
outcomes prior to negotiations, but also the presentation of concessions made by the 
negotiator and the opponent during the exchange (Delaney, Foroughi et al. 1997).  
An example of gain frame is presented in Figure 15, where offers are represented 
in positive values in comparison to the worst possible solution with a value of ―0‖. Figure 
16 depicts a loss frame, where offers are shown in negative values in comparison to the 
best possible solution with a value of ―0‖. These mock screenshots depict graphs, tables 
and offer rating features important to supporting decision-making. 
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Figure 15 ENS framing of offers as gains 
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Figure 16 ENS framing of offers as losses 
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5.1.2 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in the research framework describe the process and outcomes 
resulting from the interaction of motivational orientation and ENS framing. For the 
process, the number of offers and cooperativeness assess the interaction of the dyad, 
while discussion climate and cognitive effort provide a subjective view of this 
interaction. For the outcome, the joint outcome and contract balance describe the 
objective achievements of dyadic, whereas outcome satisfaction and relationship point to 
the individual‘s assessment of the negotiated results. 
Negotiation Process 
At the dyadic level, the exchange of offers over the course of negotiations demonstrates 
the manner in which parties work with or against each other to arrive at an outcome. The 
number of offers characterizes the quantity of decisions taken by the dyad toward an 
agreement. It has been used mostly by researchers in ENSs (e.g., Delaney, Foroughi et al. 
1997; Rangaswamy and Shell 1997). ENS studies considered the number of offers 
indicative of the effort required by the users interacting with each other in order to reach 
an agreement. Based on the usage assessment studies presented in Section 3.3.3, the 
number of offers affects the results of the negotiation and the perceptions of the ENS.  
 According to Sheffield (1995), cooperativeness is a variable that summarizes 
offer pattern in the negotiation process. This variable describes the quality of decisions 
that the dyads make over the course of negotiation. Cooperativeness captures the actions 
taken by the negotiators as a ratio of moves towards an agreement. These moves may 
create mutual value (integrative offers) or claim sole value (distributive offers) (Sebenius 
(1992).  Olekalns and Smith (1999; 2003a; 2003b) espoused that the quality of exchange, 
   125 
in terms of integrative and distributive activities, is important in characterizing the 
process (see Section 2.3.2 for further explanations). The coopertiveness represents the 
number of integrative offers over the total number of offers.  
 At the individual level, negotiation can be seen as a dialogue aimed at enabling 
mutual understanding and a forum for effective discussion. The assessment of the process 
is based on the individual‘s perception of the dialogue. Discussion climate points to the 
willingness of the counterpart to reveal relevant information that helps the negotiators 
seek a settlement (Delaney, Foroughi et al. 1997). This variable is highlighted in studies 
examining ENS, whereby users perceived the system as a facilitator to greater exchange 
of information (see Section 3.3). Another perception is the cognitive effort required by 
the individual to manage the negotiation using the system. Cognitive effort is defined as 
the degree to which negotiating with the technology would require little effort to 
exchange transactional signals. Cognitive effort, based on the concept of effort 
expectancy by Kohne, Schoop et al. (2005) and perceived effort by Vetchera, Kersten et 
al. (2004), has been used to ascertain the success of decision support in market exchanges 
(Chen, Vahidov et al. 2009). 
Negotiation Outcome 
In economics, negotiation is a mechanism that allocates resources to individuals. The 
assessment of such a mechanism embedded in a system is based on the economic 
performance of the dyad. The economic perspective deems that individuals‘ actions are 
the interaction of communicative signals sent, received and perceived, and that 
performance is not simply the result of actions, but rather a comparison of the result to 
standards of efficiency (Raiffa 1982). When performance is measured against set 
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parameters (i.e., the profit structure given to negotiators), it can simply be assessed by 
joint outcome, which describes the value achieved by both parties in a settlement.  This is 
the primary standard for contrasting treatments in face-to-face and ENS studies, as shown 
in summary tables presented in Sections 2.3 and 4.3.  
 The equity of outcomes among the negotiating parties can be measured by the 
contract balance, which is a variable that determines the division of wealth generated by 
the agreement (Foroughi, Perkins et al. 1995; Delaney, Foroughi et al. 1997; Croson 
1999). In ENS research, systems have been evaluated based on their ability to help users 
find efficient and equitable solutions. In framing experiments, Trötschel and Gollwitzer 
(2007) used this variable to assess whether subjects negotiating in a gain frame received a 
greater share of profits than their counterparts negotiating in a loss frame.  
 The instrumental perspective refers to negotiation as a means for reaching an 
agreement. The assessment of ENS is focused on the extent to which the substantive 
goals of the user are met by negotiating using the system. Outcome satisfaction relates to 
the difference between the results of the negotiation in comparison to the user‘s 
expectations (Suh 1999), whereas the transformation perspective considers negotiation as 
a way for individuals to create a new social reality, relationship, or situation 
(Loewenstein, Thompson et al. 1989). Negotiation outcome cab be measured by the 
relationship (i.e., positive rapport) derived from the impressions of the bond with other 
party as a result of the interaction (Curhan, Elfenbein et al. 2005). Relationship is built on 
attributions that the negotiator has of the opponent‘s behaviour and a sense of shared 
understanding of the situation and outcome (Bazerman, Curhan et al. 2000).  
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5.2 Development of Hypotheses 
For the objective variables at the dyadic level, the hypotheses were developed based on 
the counteraction of gain and loss framing with the shortcomings of collaborative and 
competitive orientations (Carnevale and Pruitt 1992; De Dreu, Weingart et al. 2000). 
Collaborative dyads were expected to perform better in the loss frame than the gain 
frame, whereas the opposite was expected for competitive dyads. Based on the research 
framework, Figure 17 depicts the research model at the dyadic level. The hypotheses 
related to the benefits of ENS framing for dyads of different motivational orientations are 
represented by H1a to H4a for collaborative dyads and H1b to H4b for competitive dyads 
(further described in Section 5.2.1). The hypotheses that compare the effects of different 
dyadic orientations within a given ENS frame are described by H5a to H8a for the gain 
frame and by H5b to H8b for the loss frame (detailed in Section 5.2.2).  
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Although objective variables are hypothesized to be impacted by framing and motivation, 
the hypotheses regarding individual perceptions pointed to a gap between objective and 
subjective assessments. This implies that system can affect outcomes, without the effects 
of the system being perceived by the user. Figure 18 shows the hypotheses that relate 







Figure 18 Research model at the individual level 
 
5.2.1 Benefits of Framing for Different Dyads 
Behavioral researchers have prescribed a collaborative-competitive approach for 
motivational orientations (Lax and Sebenius 1986). They have suggested that competitive 
individuals achieve better results when they consider the interest of the counterparts, as 
collaborators would do. Collaborators, on the other hand, who want to maximize joint 
outcomes, should not easily concede, but rather hold firmly to their positions, as 
competitors would do. In essence, competitive negotiators benefit from adopting some 
collaborative behaviors and vice versa. As negotiations require balancing competition 
and collaboration, the prescriptive advice is that each orientation (e.g., collaborative) 
needs to adopt behaviors from the other orientation (e.g., competitive) to compensate for 
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In prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) described the difference in 
people‘s evaluation of alternatives in either a gain versus a loss frame. They argued that 
losses loom greater than forgone gains, based on which Bazerman, Magliozzi et al. 
(1985) used the loss/gain differences to suggest that negotiators operating in a loss frame 
are more resistant to concession-making than those in the gain frame.   
This study looks at whether the deficiencies of collaborators and competitors 
could be offset by the use of framing. ENS framing of offers encourages consensus 
building in the gain frame for competitors and discourages unfavorable settlement in the 
loss frame for collaborators. The expectation is that competitors would perform better 
under a gain frame, while collaborators would profit from a loss frame. By examining 
ENS framing of offers, this study tested the effects of gain and loss framing on the 
process and outcome.  
 The first set of hypotheses, presented below, concentrate on ENS framing, 
especially on accentuating the benefits of a gain frame for competitive dyads and a loss 
frame for collaborative ones. The dual concern model argues that favorable joint 
outcomes can be derived from: (1) collaborators who have a high level of resistance to 
concession making (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt 1984; Ben-Yoav and Pruitt 1984), or (2) 
competitors who cooperate by incorporating both sides‘ preferences (Rubin 1991; De 
Dreu, Weingart et al. 2000). The first and second hypotheses, regarding dyadic outcomes, 
deal with the effects of framing by the ENS within each orientation. 
H1a: Collaborative dyads negotiating in the ENS loss frame achieve 
better joint outcomes than those negotiating in the ENS gain frame.  
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H1b: Competitive dyads negotiating in the ENS gain frame obtain better 
joint outcomes than those negotiating in the ENS loss frame.  
H2a: Collaborative dyads negotiating in the ENS loss frame achieve 
greater contract balance than those negotiating in the ENS gain frame.  
H2b: Competitive dyads negotiating in the ENS gain frame obtain 
greater contract balance than those negotiating in the ENS loss frame.  
Most studies on framing have examined only outcome variables involving face-
to-face interactions, which can be difficult to characterize through oral communication 
with many non-descriptive clues (Trötschel and Gollwitzer 2007). However, studies on 
ENSs have been concerned with the process as it is mediated by the system (Keersten and 
Lai 2007). Findings from three experiments, which examined the negotiation process 
(Olekalns 1994; Olekalns 1997; Trötschel and Gollwitzer 2007) suggest that competitors 
in the gain frame, who expressed their preferences to their counterpart, made more 
integrative offers and achieved higher joint outcomes than those in the loss frame. In the 
loss frame, collaborative dyads were able to create value in the later half of negotiations 
by increasing efforts for expressing their preferences. Furthermore, ENS studies have 
shown that (1) an increase in the numbers of offers leads to higher joint outcomes and 
better contract balance (Delaney, Foroughi et al. 1997); and (2) an increased 
cooperativeness encourages greater joint outcomes (Sheffield 1995). Therefore, the 
following hypotheses were proposed for the dyadic processes:  
H3a: Collaborative dyads make more offers in the ENS loss frame than 
in the ENS gain frame.  
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H3b: Competitive dyads propose more offers in the ENS gain frame than 
in the ENS loss frame.  
H4a: Collaborative dyads act more cooperatively (i.e., propose more 
integrative offers) in the ENS loss frame than in the ENS gain frame  
H4b: Competitive dyads propose more cooperatively in the ENS gain 
frame than in the ENS loss frame.   
5.2.2 Contrasting Motivational Orientations for Each Frame  
Although research has highlighted the benefits of one type of framing over another 
(Bazerman, Magliozzi et al. 1985) and the success of competitive dyads over 
collaborative ones in the gain frame ( De Dreu, Weingart et al. 2000), little is known 
about the difference between the two orientations in the loss frame. Adhering again to the 
collaborative-competitive approach (Lax and Sebenius 1986), the loss frame is believed 
to favor collaborators over competitors because it can help collaborators resist settling 
easily and push them to more advantageous solutions. However, the loss frame has also 
been found detrimental to competitors, because it discouraged consensus and increased 
contention (De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 1995). Therefore, the following hypotheses were 
formulated: 
H5a: In the ENS gain frame, competitive dyads obtain higher joint 
outcome than collaborative dyads. 
H5b: In the ENS loss frame, collaborative dyads achieve higher joint 
outcome than competitive dyads.  
H6a: In the ENS gain frame, competitive dyads reach better contract 
balance than collaborative dyads. 
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H6b: In the ENS loss frame, collaborative dyads achieve greater 
contract balance than competitive dyads. 
 Since the dyadic interactions were mediated by the system, the process variables 
were stipulated to be influenced by framing. As ENS studies have been mainly conducted 
in the gain frame, competitive dyads were found to make more offers and exhibit greater 
cooperativeness than collaborative ones (Sheffield 1995). Basically, competitors worked 
on many small, incremental offers that allowed for the discovery of mutual benefits, 
while collaborators simply made large concession in hopes of pleasing the other side.  
 The loss frame has only been hypothesized to benefit collaborative over 
competitive dyads through the reduction of concession-making (De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 
1995). In the loss frame, collaborators are believed to make more incremental 
concessions, but competitors are believed to be biased against any concessions or actions 
that take away their profits.    
H7a: In the ENS gain frame, competitive dyads make more offers than 
collaborative dyads. 
H7b: In the ENS loss frame, collaborative dyads make more offers than 
competitive dyads. 
H8a: In the ENS gain frame, competitive dyads act more cooperatively 
(i.e., propose more integrative offers) than collaborative dyads. 
H8b: In the ENS loss frame, collaborative dyads act more cooperatively 
than competitive dyads. 
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5.2.3 Framing Effects on Perception of Process 
The perception variables, measured at the individual level, are theorized to diverge from 
objective outcomes due to a gap between reality and perceptions. As ENS framing 
pertains to the information presented by the decision support feature in the process of 
offer exchange, the difference in framing is conjectured to influence only perceptions of 
the process.  Although framing was hypothesized to impact objective outcomes, these 
effects may not necessarily be perceived by the users (Lim and Yang 2008). Works on 
DSS showed a gap between reality and perception, even in repeated measure experiments 
where users participated in both the control (no DSS) and the treatment (DSS) settings 
(Lilien, Rangaswamy et al. 2004).  
 Despite the differences between reality and perception, individual assessment of 
the process and outcome are important to ascertain the success of IS (Delone and McLean 
1992). Researchers in ENS have also stressed the importance of individual perception 
pertaining to the improvements allowed by the system (Foroughi, Perkins et al. 1995; 
Keersten and Lai 2007). Variables relating to the perception of the process are more 
influenced by ENS use than those relating to the perception of the outcomes (Chen, 
Vahidov et al. 2009).  
Regarding the process, De Dreu, Carnevale et al. (1995) suggested that the loss 
frame requires more cognitive effort than the gain frame and it reduces consensus 
building. This implies that the gain frame provides an easier process for users, while the 
loss frame is more burdensome for them. Jain and Solomon (2000) argued that the 
perceptions of process are more distinguishable among different systems than perceptions 
of outcomes, meaning that the perceptions of outcomes are not differentiable between 
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frames even if actual outcomes are.  The following hypotheses postulate that negotiators 
would provide a more favorable evaluation of the process in a gain frame than in a loss 
frame, but they would not perceive a difference in outcomes. 
H9a: The ENS gain frame is perceived to require less cognitive effort 
than the ENS loss frame.  
H9b: The ENS gain frame is perceived to provide better discussion 
climate than the ENS loss frame.  
H10a: The ENS gain frame has no differential effect on the perception of 
outcome satisfaction compared to the ENS loss frame. 
H10b: The ENS gain frame has no differential effect on the perception of 
relationship compared to the ENS loss frame. 
The hypotheses were developed to contrast ENS framing effects between and 
within dyads. Table 6 summarizes the hypotheses relating to the dyadic composition. 
They (1) examine the effects of ENS framing for the two dyadic compositions, and (2) 
highlight the differences of framing between competitive and collaborative dyads. The 
last set of hypotheses, shown in Table 7, aims to test the impact of framing on 
perceptions of the process and outcome at the individual level.   
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Table 6 Summary of hypotheses at the dyadic level 
Treatment Dependent variable Hypothesis 
Comparing frames within each motivational orientation 
a. Collaborative Joint outcome H1a: Loss > Gain 
Contract balance H2a: Loss > Gain 
Number of offers H3a: Loss > Gain 
Cooperativeness H4a: Loss > Gain 
b. Competitive Joint outcome H1b: Gain > Loss 
Contract balance H2b: Gain > Loss 
Number of offers H3b: Gain > Loss 
Cooperativeness H4b: Gain > Loss 
Comparing motivational orientations within each frame 
a. Gain frame Joint outcome H5a: Competitive > Collaborative 
Contract balance H6a: Competitive > Collaborative 
Number of offers H7a: Competitive > Collaborative 
Cooperativeness H8a: Competitive > Collaborative 
b. Loss frame Joint outcome H5b: Collaborative > Competitive 
Contract balance H6b: Collaborative > Competitive 
Number of offers H7b: Collaborative > Competitive 
Cooperativeness H8b: Collaborative > Competitive 
 
 
Table 7 Summary of hypotheses at the individual level 
Treatment Dependent variable Hypothesis 
Comparing frames for process 
Both orientations Cognitive effort H9a: Gain > Loss 
 Discussion climate H9b: Gain > Loss 
Comparing frames for outcome  
Both orientations Outcome satisfaction H10a: Gain = Loss 
 Relationship H10b: Gain = Loss 
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6 Methodology 
The primary goal of this study is to provide insights into the effects of both social 
motivation and ENS framing on the process and outcomes of negotiations. The nature of 
ENSs as an emerging facilitator of online transactions and the formulation of 
motivationally distinct dyadic compositions required an experimental approach to 
investigate the hypotheses proposed. In order to investigate framing and motivational 
impacts on negotiations, a controlled laboratory experiment was first conducted to ensure 
internal validity of results, followed by a quasi-field experiment to demonstrate external 
validity of findings. The combination of a laboratory and field study approaches provide 
a form of triangulation that not only strengthens the results, but also sets precedence for 
using such a methodology to test theories in IS, especially those pertaining to web 
technologies. 
 Section 6.1 introduces past experiments on manipulating the independent 
variables discussed in literature. Section 6.2 describes the treatment of dependent 
variables to measure the negotiation process and outcome from the dyadic and individual 
levels. Section 6.3 examines the experimental design employed to test the hypotheses. 
Finally, Section 6.4 discusses three pretests, including: (1) the manipulation of 
motivational orientation with 70 participants online, (2) an internal trial of the 
experimental workflow with experts in the laboratory, and (3) an external trial of the 
experimental workflow with sample participants in the laboratory. 
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6.1 Operationalization of Independent Variables 
In the past, the operationalization of both independent variables (motivational orientation 
and framing of outcomes) was mostly performed by manipulating the context of the 
negotiation task. In motivational experiments, either the objectives of the task were 
changed to reflect the collaborative and competitive orientations, or the predisposition of 
subjects (i.e., individual differences) was assessed through a decomposed game and then 
subjects were matched to create desired dyadic composition. In frame experiments, the 
profit schedule of negotiated issues was presented either in terms of gains or losses to 
create different treatments. This section reviews these manipulations of the independent 
variables in past studies and describes the approach taken in this work.   
6.1.1 Capturing Motivational Orientation 
Based on the literature review in Section 2.2, the antecedents affecting orientations are 
contextual dimensions and individual differences. The operationalization of motivational 
orientations has been derived from either manipulating these antecedents through  
extrinsic means (e.g., influencing the context through instruction) or by measuring 
individual differences (i.e., measuring inherent dispositions towards an orientation by 
decomposed games or survey instruments). The decomposed games were first introduced 
by Messick and McClintock (1968) and refined by Kuhlman and Marshello (1975); while 
the survey instruments were devised by Kilmann and Thomas (1977) and Rahim (1983) 
to construct profiles on negotiators. From a meta-analysis of twenty eight studies, De 
Dreu, Weingart et al. (2000) claimed that both approaches of operationalization are valid 
in producing/capturing particular orientations for experimentation.  
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The literature review in Section 2.3 describes studies assessing individual 
differences (Olekalns and Smith 2003b,  Montoya-Weiss et al 2001, Oleklans and Smith 
1999, Jain and Solomon 1999, De Dreu and Boles 1998, Olekalns et al. 1996, De Dreu 
and Van Lange 1995); or manipulating substantive, relational and divergent contextual 
dimensions to produce or measure collaborative and competitive orientations for 
negotiators (Trötschel and Gollwitzer 2007, Schei et al. 2006, De Dreu et al. 2006, 
Olekalns and Smith 2005, Beersma and De Dreu 2005, Olekalns and Smith 2003a, Schei 
and Rognes 2003, Beersma and De Dreu 2002, Oleklans 1997, 1994, Weingart et al. 
1993).  
Table 8 summarizes how these studies have addressed the treatment of social 
motives in negotiations. In addition, the table reviews the reinforcement of social motives 
through a reward structure and the success of the treatment by manipulation checks, both 
of which Thompson (1991) considered essential. 
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Each of the three methods of operationalizing motivational orientations has 
advantages and disadvantages. The use of instructions allowed for easy matching of 
negotiators, instead of having to measure orientations first followed by a matching 
process to formulate different dyadic compositions.  Studies that employed instructions 
also utilized manipulation checks after negotiations to verify if the goals instructed were 
internalized by the participants. However, use of manipulation checks that measured 
perceived behavior (e.g., Olekalns 1994, 1997, De Dreu et al. 2006, Olekalns and Smith 
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2005) was not necessarily a proper verification of goal internalization as behavior is 
subject to the moderators and dynamics of the negotiations. Instead, the questions relating 
to primary goals (e.g., Schei et al. 2006) or social motives (e.g., Beersma and De Dreu 
2005) provided a better means of evaluation.  
Manipulation checks were generally not performed with decomposed games or 
survey instruments, because it was assumed that the inherent disposition of the 
participant was properly selected for and remained stable during negotiations. Some have 
challenged this assumption and pointed to the strength of context in changing people‘s 
social motives (Carnevale and Probst 1997). Since an objective of this work is to examine 
individuals in competitive and collaborative environments, methods that focused on 
inherent dispositions may have been at odds with realistic business scenarios, whereby 
the negotiator is an agent who must represent the goals and interests of the firm.  
Reward theories suggest the importance of aligning incentives to the goals 
promoted by the study, which requires instructions be combined with incentives to direct 
participants on a course aimed at achieving their goals (Beersma and De Dreu 2002). 
Moreover, De Dreu, Weingart et al. (2000) showed that performance-based experiments 
(e.g., rewarding students with course credits or money) were more effective at generating 
differences between motivational orientations than those conducted in class exercises, 
where students were simply ―going through the motions‖ of negotiation scenarios. 
After analyzing the various experimental designs suggested in past studies, the 
operationalization of motivational orientation most suitable for this project consisted of 
instructions (e.g., those employed by Schei and Rognes 2003), matched with a reward 
structure of either course credits or monetary awards (e.g., Beersma and De Dreu 2002), 
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and followed by a manipulation check of goal instructions and strategic behaviors (e.g., 
Schei and Rognes 2003; Schei, Rognes et al. 2006). In addition, the participants‘ inherent 
dispositions were measured as a possible confounding variable to verify any influences 
on dependent variables. 
6.1.2 Developing Outcome Frames 
In the realm of negotiation research, the operationalization of outcome frames has 
remained mostly true to the method of problem framing originated by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). This method consists of presenting a similar problem (with identical 
outcomes) in either a gain frame or a loss frame to two groups of subjects, and showing 
the difference of choice based on the subjects‘ relative evaluation of outcomes. Consider 
the following example from Tversky and Kahneman (1981, p.454):  
Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions. First examine both decisions, 
and then indicate the options you prefer: 
Decision (i) Choose between: 
A. a sure gain of $240  
B. 25% chance to gain $1000 and 75% chance to gain nothing 
Decision (ii) Choose between: 
A. a sure loss of $750  
B. 75% chance to lose $1000 and 25% chance to lose nothing 
When group 1 was presented with the gain frame in (i), 84% selected choice A, the less 
risky option, but when group 2 was given the loss frame in (ii), 87% chose B, the higher 
risk option. These results demonstrated the manner in which the framing of outcomes in 
the problem alters people‘s behavior, in this particular case, their attitude towards risk.  
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 The decision problem, or more specifically the negotiation case, as a means of 
operationalizing outcome framing started with Bazerman, Magliozzi et al. (1985). The 
researchers gave participants, similar cases with different profit schedules in a laboratory 
experiment. For the gain frame, the profit schedule was presented in positive net profits, 
while the loss frame showed each outcome as an expense that must be deducted from a 
gross profit. The net profit for both frames was the same. Table 9 is an adaptation of the 
profit schedules employed by Bazerman, Magliozzi et al. (1985). It illustrates the 
manipulation of outcome frames in negotiations.  
Framing through the use of profit schedules differs from risk choices presented by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981). Profit schedules address the presentation of information, 
rather than the decisions regarding actual wins or losses in a certain vs. a risky situation. 
Hence, attribute framing is achieved through wording of potential outcomes as described 
in Section 4.1.1. 
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Table 9 Sample profit schedule 
a) Net profit schedule in gain frame 
 Delivery Time ($) Discount terms ($) Financial terms ($) 
Options     A 1600 2400 4000 
B 1400 2100 3500 
C 1200 1800 3000 
D 1000 1500 2500 
E 800 1200 2000 
F 600 900 1500 
G 400 600 1000 
H 200 300 500 
I 000 000 000 
b) Expense schedule in loss frame (gross profit = $8000) 
 Delivery Time ($) Discount terms ($) Financial terms ($) 
Options     A -000 -000 -000 
B -200 -300 -500 
C -400 -600 -1000 
D -600 -900 -1500 
E -800 -1200 -2000 
F -1000 -1500 -2500 
G -1200 -1800 -3000 
H -1400 -2100 -3500 
I -1600 -2400 -4000 
 
  Bazerman, Magliozzi et al. (1985) also instructed participants to either 
―maximize net profit‖ or ―minimize expenses‖ depending on whether they were using a 
net profit or expense schedule. This standard of manipulating outcome frames and even 
the exact negotiation case have been used by other researchers (e.g., Neale and Bazerman 
1985; De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 1994; Carnevale 2007)  seeking to recreate the framing 
effect. However, several confounding factors and concerns have emerged as a result of 
using such buyer-seller case with different profit schedules.  
The first confounding effect concerns the different roles played by the subjects, 
whereby buyers generally earned significantly higher gains than sellers. Bazerman, 
Magliozzi et al. (1985) hypothesized that as buyers had to part with their money to 
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acquire a good, they were inevitably placed in a loss frame with respect to their monetary 
wealth, while sellers were expected to receive money (gain frame). In order to 
circumvent the problem, subjects negotiated on one side only, while the other side was 
represented either by a confederate (Neale and Bazerman 1985) or a computer program 
(De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 1994) that behaved following a set strategy (e.g., tit-for-tat 
from game theory). Although the approach did resolve the role bias, it created the 
problem of generalizability, so that the findings were limited to the set of strategies 
employed. A second solution involved changing the case to a contract negotiation that is 
not associated with the roles of a buyer and a seller (Olekalns 1994; Olekalns 1997). For 
example, subjects acted as commodity traders and discussed issues that did not consist of 
the term ―price‖ (i.e., price can be fixated with the perception of handing money from one 
party to another).  
Another unintended bias was the format of the profit schedule. When profits were 
shown in descending order, negotiators reached higher gains compared to when profits 
were presented in ascending order (Ritov 1996). For example, Table 9 ranks options in a 
descending order in relation to net profits or expenses. The results obtained from profit 
schedule formatting differences challenged the relative buyer‘s advantage characterized 
by Bazerman, Magliozzi et al. (1985). Ritov (1996) stipulated that the directionality of 
options negates the importance of the role, as buyers, and sellers performed equally poor 
in the ascending order of options.  
To eliminate the biases related to profit schedule formatting, the endowment 
effect has been employed to create gain and loss frames. The endowment effect starts by 
giving one party the object of contention or all the favorable conditions, and he/she must 
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then negotiate with the other party on the distribution of the endowment. If no agreement 
is reached, then the parties either gain nothing or walk away with a substantially less 
arbitrary distribution. The assumption is that the party with the endowment perceives any 
proposals to share as a loss of his/her initial wealth, and thus a loss frame is created on 
one side. Consequently, the other party, who starts off with nothing, perceives all 
proposals to share as possibilities for gains, and thus, the other party is placed in a gain 
frame. For example, in their first two experiments, Trötschel and Gollwitzer (2007) gave 
one side all the territories and asked him/her to negotiate the distribution of these 
territories with the other side. Upon the deadline, any unresolved territories would be lost 
for both parties. The manipulation checks on the endowment technique showed that each 
group exhibited different beliefs regarding their objectives (Trötschel and Gollwitzer 
2007). The subjects in the gain-frame treatment reported that they believed their goal to 
be one of maximizing gains, while those in the loss-frame treatment believed it to be one 
of minimizing losses.  
One major problem with the endowment effect is that only mixed- frame (i.e., one 
side starts with the initial endowment gain, in a loss frame, and the other side must 
negotiate for it, in a gain frame) studies are possible. As a solution, Bottom (1998) asked 
subjects to discuss the claim of numbers from 1 to 100 for a chance of winning ten 
dollars.  Once subjects reached an agreement over the share of numbers, a draw was 
made to determine the winning number. If no agreement was reached, regarding the 
distribution of numbers, then each party received $3.50. The loss frame was induced by 
initially placing the ten dollar bill with one of the parties. This manipulation could be 
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performed on either sides or none of them (i.e., to induce a gain frame). However, no 
check was carried out to test the success of such operationalization of outcome frames. 
To surpass confounding biases caused by the role played in the case or format of 
profit schedules, one study involved an ENS to frame the outcomes. Kirchler, 
Maciejovsky et al. (2005) provided participants with a similar case on both sides. The 
participants acted as bond brokers rather than buyers or sellers, and an ENS framed 
dividends in either gains or losses. A comparison of offers with the worst possible 
alternative provided a positive value that induced the perception of gain. Nevertheless, 
Kirchler, Maciejovsky et al. (2005) did not verify the results of frame manipulation by 
the system through manipulation checks.  
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Table 10 summarizes the studies mentioned in this section and mentions the use of course 
requirements (as discussed in the previous section), cash prizes or both employed to 
incentivize quality participation. This simply means that the subjects were motivated by a 
reward for following the objective stated by a researcher. Although the manipulation 
checks on outcome framing verified whether the subjects understood the objectives of the 
frame, these checks are less crucial to the success of the treatment than those for 
motivational orientation. As social motives need to be internalized by the subjects to 
effectively create different orientations, outcome framing is external to the individuals.  
This study used an ENS to frame potential outcomes. The system utilized in the 
experiments displayed either a positive net profit schedule or an expense schedule with 
matching instructions (i.e., to maximize net profit or minimize expense). The system also 
guided the process by presenting offers as profits or expenses throughout the negotiation.  
   151 










Gain Positive net profit schedule for 





―When negotiating a 
transaction, how did 
you think about your 




Loss Expense schedule, when deduced 
from gross profit is equal to 




Gain Settlement points for a contract 
between management (participant) 
and union (confederate) is 





Loss Settlement points for a contract 
between management (participant) 
and union (confederate) is 





Gain Positive net profit schedule for 
negotiation between buyer 










$15 and $25  
Ask participants to 
what extent they 
were trying to 
minimize expense  
(1= not at all; 
6=very hard) 
Loss Expense schedule, when deduced 
from gross profit is equal to 
positive net profit schedule 
Olekalns 
(1994) 
Gain Positive net profit schedule for 




with tickets for 




Loss Expense schedule, when deduced 
from gross profit is equal to 
positive net profit schedule 
Small cash 
prize lottery 










Gain Positive net profit schedule for 






Loss Expense schedule, when deduced 
from gross profit is equal to 















Gain Positive net profit schedule for 




with tickets for 
profits earned  
 




that they were 




profit than gain 
frame  
Loss Expense schedule, when deduced 
from gross profit is equal to 
positive net profit schedule 
Small cash 
prize lottery 









Gain Exp 1:No money given before 
negotiation ($0 is the reference 
point), but if no agreement is 
reached then $3.50 is awarded  
Exp2: Negotiate a risk position in 3 
different markets. Success is 
framed in gaining all points and 










Loss Exp1: Initially given a $10 bill to 
establish a reference point 
Exp2: Negotiate a risk position in 3 
different markets. Success is 
framed in losing 0 points and 





Gain The system gives subjects 
positively framed dividend 
information  
points = tickets 





Loss The system gives subjects 





Gain Positive net profit schedule for 
negotiation between buyer  
(participant) and seller (computer) 
Corse 
requirement + 
cash prize of 












Loss Expense schedule, when deduced 
from gross profit is equal to 






Gain Exp1 & 2: Positive value point for 
gains in different regions of an 
island 
Exp 3: Positive value point for 




cash prize of 




Ask participants to 
indicate the outcome 
focus (either to 
maximize gains or  
minimize losses)  
Loss Exp1 & 2: Negative value point for 
losses  
Exp 3: Negative value point for 
losses in shares in 6 companies. 
 
   153 
6.2 Operationalization of Dependent Variables 
6.2.1 Dependent Variables at the Dyadic Level 
At the dyadic level, the dependent variables reflect the dynamics of interactions between 
the two sides as well as the outcomes of such interactions. The dependent variables were 
measured based on joint actions of the dyad to determine the effects of the treatments. 
The number of offers and cooperativeness captured the objective process, while joint 
outcome and contract balance referred to the objective results achieved by the dyad. 
The number of offers is a variable mostly used in ENS to show the utilization of 
the system. It not only reflects the negotiators‘ interactions with the opponent, but also 
the number of decisions that they made based on information collected through 
communication exchanges (Lim and Benbasat 1993). This variable was employed by 
Carnevale (2007), as a quantitative measure, to show the process involving different 
outcome frames and affect experienced. The number of offers was calculated based on 
the sum of all offers exchanged by the dyad. 
Cooperativeness is a variable used to assess the quality of the process. It 
determines the process pattern by which negotiators reach an agreement. The interaction 
between negotiators has been analyzed by modeling their concessions in outcome 
framing (Carnevale 2007; Trötschel and Gollwitzer 2007) and motivational orientation 
studies (Olekalns, Smith et al. 1996; Olekalns and Smith 1999). In order to determine the 
quality of interactions, Sheffield (1995) proposed that the cooperativeness of the dyad, 
which he called relative cooperativeness, be measured as a ratio of integrative offers over 
the total number of offers. Integrative offers are those that create mutual gains for both 
parties.  
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The variable of joint outcome has been often used in negotiation studies. It has 
been used in motivational orientation, outcome frame and ENS research to assess and 
compare results among different treatments. For example, Weingart, Bennett et al. (1993) 
justified the superiority of collaborative dyads over competitive ones by contrasting joint 
outcomes. Jones and Jelassi (1990) compared joint outcomes between integrative and 
distributive tasks using decision support to show the benefits of such a feature in 
integrative conflicts. Moreover, Olekalns (1994) demonstrated the importance of framing 
and motivational orientation in face-to-face negotiations by contrasting joint outcome of 
the dyads. 
In order to use joint outcome as a measure for comparing the interaction of 
motivational orientation and outcome framing, this study provided negotiators with a task 
that has assigned values for each possible solution to the conflict. This limited the 
parameters (i.e., everyone had set values for all possible solutions) and allowed the joint 
outcomes from agreements to be compared (Bazerman, Magliozzi et al. 1985; Foroughi, 
Perkins et al. 1995). The joint outcome was calculated by summing the values obtained 
for the agreement by each negotiator in the dyad.  
The contract balance is an examination of the distribution of wealth generated by 
an agreement and indication of equity (Trötschel and Gollwitzer 2007). Contract balance 
has been used in the three areas of interest in this thesis and was measured by computing 
the absolute difference between values achieved by the two parties from the settlement. 
ENS studies have long argued that electronic negotiation and specifically decision aid can 
increase contract balance (Foroughi, Perkins et al. 1995; Delaney, Foroughi et al. 1997; 
Croson 1999; Foroughi, Perkins et al. 2001). 
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6.2.2 Dependent Variables at the Individual Level 
At the individual level, the subjective assessment of the process and outcome has 
traditionally been employed in psychology and management literature. The variables 
were obtained by having the participants rate their negotiation experience, in terms of the 
cognitive effort required and discussion climate between the pair in the process, as well 
as the outcome satisfaction and relationship established as a result of negotiations. These 
latent variables that were not directly observed are hypothetical constructs that were 
measured using questions called items. Based on previous studies, the original items are 
found in Appendix G, which also describes the adaptation process used to produce the 
items for this study. 
The construct of cognitive effort has mostly been examined in ENS studies. It 
seeks to demonstrate whether a system (or feature of a system) improves the process 
through the reduction of the cognitive load placed by the procedures implemented. 
Cognitive effort was measured with four items on a 7-point Likert scale, taken from 
Chen, Vahidov et al. (2009), who adapted them from Kohn, Schoop et al. (2005) and 
Vetchera, Kersten et al. (2004). The construct reflects the effort required to meet the 
objective of the case, negotiate via the system, make decisions, and evaluate the decision 
of the other. The items are found in Appendix G.  
The discussion climate is used in motivational orientation (Beersma and De Dreu 
2002) and ENS (Jones and Jelassi 1990; Foroughi, Perkins et al. 1995; Delaney, Foroughi 
et al. 1997; Foroughi, Perkins et al. 2001; Lai, Doong et al. 2006; Pesendorfer and 
Koeszegi 2006) studies. It was assessed based on four items adapted from Beersma and 
De Dreu (2002) as well as Foroughi, Perkins et al. (1995) on a 7-point Likert scale. This 
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variable is concerned with the interaction between negotiators, i.e. it targets such aspects 
of the process as whether the communication was friendly, whether parties felt 
comfortable and if the discussions were open to problem-solving. The items are found in 
Appendix G. 
The variable of outcome satisfaction generally serves to determine the success of 
an ENS (Jones and Jelassi 1990; Foroughi, Perkins et al. 1995; Delaney, Foroughi et al. 
1997; Rangaswamy and Shell 1997; Kersten and Noronha 1999; Suh 1999; Lim 2000; 
Purdy, Nye et al. 2000; Foroughi, Perkins et al. 2001; Yuan, Head et al. 2003; Vetschera, 
Kersten et al. 2004; Lai, Doong et al. 2006; Pesendorfer and Koeszegi 2006; Galin, Gross 
et al. 2007). Outcome satisfaction was measured from four items adapted from Suh 
(1999) and Vetchera, Kersten et al. (2004) on a 7-point Likert scale. This construct points 
to the negotiator‘s attitude toward the outcome of the conflict in respect to their 
expectation and the other party‘s achievement. The items are found in Appendix G. 
Curhan, Elfenbien et al. (2005) stressed that relationship is an important variable, 
which represents the consequence of the negotiation process that is not reflected in pure 
substantive assessments. They stated that outcome satisfaction and relationship are the 
main dependent variables that negotiations studies should measure at the individual level. 
This variable was evaluated from four items adapted from Curhan, Elfenbien et al. 
(2005), Beersma and De Dreu (2002) and Jones and Jelassi (1990) on a 7-point Likert 
scale. It refers to the rapport established with the counterpart and the impression that the 
other side imparted. The items are found in Appendix G. 
Table 11 summarizes the dependent variables in terms of the level of analysis, 
studies that employed them and their operationalization in this research. 
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Table 11 Studies referencing dependent variables 
Level of 
analysis 
Variable Study Operationalization 
Dyadic Number of 
offers 
ENS (Foroughi, Perkins et al. 1995; Delaney, 
Foroughi et al. 1997; Kersten and Noronha 
1999; Foroughi, Perkins et al. 2001; Koeszegi, 
Vetchera et al. 2004; Vetschera, Kersten et al. 
2004; Weber, Kersten et al. 2005; Lai, Doong 
et al. 2006) 
 
Outcome frame (Carnevale 2007) 




ENS (Sheffield 1995; Pesendorfer and 
Koeszegi 2007) 
 
Outcome frame (Carnevale 2007; Trötschel and 
Gollwitzer 2007) 
Ratio of integrative offers 
over distributive offers, 
where integrative offers 
(I) represent proposal that 
engage in logrolling and 
distributive offers (D)  
represent increase in 
utility for one side. 
Ratio is computed by: 




Motivational orientation (Beersma and De 
Dreu 2002; Olekalns and Smith 2003; Olekalns 
and Smith 2003; Schei and Rognes 2003; 
Beersma and De Dreu 2005; Schei, Rognes et 
al. 2006; Trötschel and Gollwitzer 2007) 
 
ENS (Jones and Jelassi 1990; Foroughi, 
Perkins et al. 1995; Sheffield 1995; Delaney, 
Foroughi et al. 1997; Croson 1999; Lim 2000; 
Purdy, Nye et al. 2000; Foroughi, Perkins et al. 
2001) 
 
Outcome frame (Bazerman, Magliozzi et al. 
1985; Neale and Bazerman 1985; De Dreu, 
Carnevale et al. 1994; Olekalns 1994; Ritov 
1996; Olekalns 1997; Bottom 1998; Trötschel 
and Gollwitzer 2007) 
Sum of values achieve by 




Motivational orientation (Trötschel and 
Gollwitzer 2007) 
 
ENS (Foroughi, Perkins et al. 1995; Delaney, 
Foroughi et al. 1997; Croson 1999; Foroughi, 
Perkins et al. 2001) 
 
Outcome frame (Trötschel and Gollwitzer 
2007) 
Difference of values for 
the agreement between 




Variable Study Operationalization 
Individual Cognitive 
effort 
ENS (Koeszegi, Vetchera et al. 2004; 
Vetschera, Kersten et al. 2004; Kohne, Schoop 
4 items taken from Chen, 
Vahidov et al. (2009) on a 
   158 
et al. 2005; Chen, Vahidov et al. 2009) 7-point Likert scale. 
Individual Discussion 
climate 
Motivational orientation (Beersma and De 
Dreu 2002) 
 
ENS (Jones and Jelassi 1990; Foroughi, 
Perkins et al. 1995; Delaney, Foroughi et al. 
1997; Foroughi, Perkins et al. 2001; Lai, 
Doong et al. 2006; Pesendorfer and Koeszegi 
2006) 
5 items adapted from 
Beersma and De Dreu 
(2002) as well as 
Foroughi et al. (1995) on 
a 7-point Likert scale. 
Individual Outcome 
satisfaction 
Motivational orientation (Jain and Solomon 
2000; Schei, Rognes et al. 2006) 
 
ENS (Jones and Jelassi 1990; Foroughi, 
Perkins et al. 1995; Delaney, Foroughi et al. 
1997; Rangaswamy and Shell 1997; Kersten 
and Noronha 1999; Suh 1999; Lim 2000; 
Purdy, Nye et al. 2000; Foroughi, Perkins et al. 
2001; Yuan, Head et al. 2003; Vetschera, 
Kersten et al. 2004; Lai, Doong et al. 2006; 
Pesendorfer and Koeszegi 2006; Galin, Gross 
et al. 2007) 
4 items adapted from Suh 
(1999), Vetschera, 
Kersten et al. 2004 on a 7-
point Likert scale. 
Individual Relationship Motivational orientation (Olekalns and Smith 
2005) 
 
ENS (Kersten and Noronha 1999; Purdy, Nye 
et al. 2000) 
  
Subjective values in negotiation (Curhan, 
Elfenbein et al. 2005) 
4 items adapted from 
Curhan, Elfenbein et al. 
(2005), Jones and Jelassi 
(1990) and Beersma and 
De Dreu (2002)  on a 7-
point Likert scale. 
 
6.3 Experimental Design 
An experimental approach that combined laboratory and quasi-field settings served to test 
the research hypotheses stated in Section 5.2. The advantage of conducting a laboratory 
experiment is that causality may be better established by manipulating the independent 
variables in order to observe the impact on the dependent variables (Carnevale and De 
Dreu 2005). The benefits of a quasi-field experiment (i.e., the subjects are assigned to the 
treatments rather than being uncovered in a natural state) are in increasing the external 
validity of the study and strengthening the findings (Kerlinger and Lee 2000).  
 The experiments were conducted to test: (1) the benefits (in terms of increased 
joint outcome and contract balance) of ENS framing for different motivational 
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orientations, and the process involved (i.e., number of offers and cooperativeness); (2) the 
dissimilarities between gain and loss frames for collaborative and competitive dyads; and 
(3) the effect of the independent variables on individuals‘ assessment of process (i.e., 
cognitive effort and discussion climate) and outcome (outcome satisfaction and 
relationship).  
 The design consisted of a 2X2 factor comparison of ENS frames with 
motivational orientation. Table 12 explains the four groups needed for the research 
design. 
Table 12 Experimental design 
 Gain frame Loss frame 
Collaborative dyad Group1 Group3 
Competitive dyad Group2 Group4 
 
6.3.1 Case 
Bazerman, Magiozzi et al. (1985) developed a buyer-seller case based on three issues to 
illustrate the framing of outcome in a bargaining scenario, where two parties make 
tradeoffs over issues to achieve mutual benefits. This simple, well-documented case is 
easy to understand, but it requires much effort (in terms of cooperation and competition 
over the distribution of resources) to find combinations of efficient solutions. In the case, 
the two sides are given different values for each issue and option, and each side is only 
aware of its own values. Two of the issues are asymmetric, which implies that negotiators 
can concede on an issue of lesser value for one that is of a higher value. The third issue is 
symmetric (i.e., a loss on one side is a gain for the other).  
For this study, the case was loosely adapted from Bazerman, Magliozzi et al 
(1985) with changes to the roles in order to avoid buyer and seller prejudices (Olekalns 
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1994; Olekalns 1997). But the most important change was the enforcement of framing by 
the system (i.e., in the gain frame, all displays of offers were positive, but they were 
negative in the loss frame). See Appendix A for the case, where delivery time and 
financial terms are integrative and discount terms is distributive.  
6.3.2 Participants  
The subjects consisted of university students recruited for the study. Since they did not 
have prior knowledge of ENSs (or the system, Inspire), they were relevant to studying 
ENS framing (i.e., the experiment would not be affected by different experience levels). 
Furthermore, ENSs are systems that may serve people of different demographics, thus the 
findings from a single laboratory experiment are often not generalizable, independent of 
whether student or non-student subjects are used (Lynch 1999).   
 An incentive structure was employed to ensure that the students took the 
experience seriously. It had two parts: (1) a general participation portion encouraged 
students to present themselves for the experiment (1% of course grade), and (2) a 
performance portion was given to induce thoughtful engagement in the experimental 
activities (maximum of 1% of course grade, based on the z-score of joint outcome for 
each session). The negotiator‘s objective was dependent on the orientation and framing. 
For example, in the gain frame, X is the set of all possible contracts. Let V (x), where x is 
an offer (xX) be the profit function.    
 The competitive negotiators were encouraged to maximize their profit, that is: 
max selfV (x).  
The collaborative negotiators were encouraged to maximize joint profit, that is: 
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max { selfV (x) + otherV (x)}.  
 As with any experiment involving human subjects, ethical considerations were 
addressed to prevent possible harm to the subjects. The experimental process did not 
involve deceit or misguidance. The subjects were informed of all activities and required 
to give their consent before the experiment. The consent form can be found in Appendix 
K. 
6.3.3 Procedure  
The recruitment was based on a class assignment for undergraduate students taking an 
introductory course to Management Information Systems. The recruitment process is 
presented in Appendix C. When the participants signed up for the experiment, they 
answered a background questionnaire to determine if any of the demographic variables 
might confound the findings. The participants further selected a session that was 
convenient for them. They were then sent an email two days before the session date and 
they were telephoned the evening before experiments to ensure participation.  
 Prior to entering the laboratory, the subjects were given the consent form and a 
number, which prevented the facilitator from associating their names with their 
performance. The subjects were randomly assigned to one of two laboratories (a room for 
each side of the negotiation). In the laboratory, they were placed in front of a computer 
logged onto the ENS. 
During the two hour experiment, the subjects were guided by facilitators (one for 
each laboratory), who controlled the flow of activities and answered general questions 
about the ENS features and instructions. The facilitator‘s manual can be found in 
Appendix H. The students answered two questionnaires in the experiment. Before the 
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case was presented, a questionnaire on their predisposition was given to the students to 
measure their inherent orientation. This assessment of motivational orientation (AMO) 
was adapted from a decomposed game developed by Van Lange, Otten et al. (1997); see 
Appendix D. Participants were given the negotiation case (Appendix A) followed by a 
quiz (Appendix E) to measure their understanding of the case and the objectives. A 
system guide was provided to familiarize the subjects with its features (Appendix I). An 
explanation of the experimental rules was provided before subjects started negotiations 
(Appendix F). In ex-post, a questionnaire served to measure their subjective variables 
(Appendix G). The order of these activities is presented in Table 13. 
Table 13 Experimental activities 
 Activity Reference 
1 Sign up and answer demographic questions Appendix J 
2 Sign consent form Appendix K 
3 Randomly assign to two different laboratories (one for each side of the 
case) 
Carnevale and De 
Dreu (2005) 
4 Answer questions on their orientation (AMO) Appendix D 
5 Receive instruction on the negotiation Appendix F 
6 Read the case Appendix A 
7 Answer a quiz on the case Appendix E 
8 Receive explanation on the system guide Appendix I 
9 Negotiate for 45minutes Pretest 2 
10  Answer post-questionnaire Appendix G 
 
 The quasi-field experiment proceeded with similar activities, except that subjects 
were not assigned to different laboratories. Instead they were given personalized login 
information and seven days to negotiate online in their natural settings. 
6.3.4 Statistical Power 
The statistical power is closely related to sample size. It represents the probability of 
correctly assessing whether the independent (or treatment) variables significantly affect 
the dependent variables (Kerlinger and Lee 2000). Therefore, the higher the statistical 
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power, the more likely false positive and negative results are avoided. The statistical 
power hinges on the alpha level chosen for the test (i.e., reduce Type II error, false 
negative), beta level chosen for the test (i.e., reduce Type I error, false positive), sample 
size, and number of treatments in the case of ANOVA tests.  
 For behavioral studies, a power of 0.80 (1 - beta), an alpha of 0.05 and an effect 
size of 0.28 are recommended to capture the effects between independent and dependent 
variables (Cohen 1988). The sample size was calculated as a function of the number of 
treatments, effect size, alpha, and power, using the R
7
 statistical software. Based on the 
four treatment groups required by the research design, a sample size of 30 dyads was 
needed to achieve statistical power. 
6.3.5 Confounding Variables 
Confounding variables can affect the results of the experiment by adding undesired 
variance to the study. Several strategies were put in place to prevent the main 
confounding variables from influencing the experimental findings. Table 14 describes 
these strategies used for laboratory and quasi-field experiments. 
                                                 
7
 http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/pwr/pwr.pdf 
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Table 14 Confounding variables 
Confounding variables Laboratory experiment Quasi-field 
experiment 
Having a predisposition 
different from the motivational 
orientation manipulated 
The predispositions of the subjects were 
assessed before they were given the case. See 
Appendix D. 
Same as laboratory 
experiment 
Being bias towards the role 
played in the case 
The role was check against the dependent 
variables for each treatment group. 
Same as laboratory 
experiment 
Having negotiation experience  Their experience with negotiation was asked at 
registration and checked against the dependent 
variables for each treatment group. See 
Appendix J. 
Same as laboratory 
experiment 
Having demographic biases 
(e.g., gender and age) 
The demographic data was captured at 
registration and checked against the dependent 
variables for each treatment group. See 
Appendix J. 
Same as laboratory 
experiment 
Inadvertently discovering the 
profit schedule of the 
counterpart  
The participants were separated into two rooms, 
one for each side of the negotiation. 
Personalized login 
information 
Not being serious about the 
experiment 
Participants were rewarded with course marks Same as laboratory 
experiment 
Not understanding the case A quiz served to enforce the key points of the 
case. See Appendix E. 
Same as laboratory 
experiment 
Not understanding the features 
of the system 
A system guide was provided to explain the 
main features. See Appendix I. A facilitator was 
present during the experiment to explain 
features. 




A facilitation manual ensured that similar 




6.3.6 Experimental Settings 
Research in social sciences has long been driven by two paradigms: (1) studying novel 
phenomena by establishing causes and effects while reducing confounding influences; 
and (2) relating the findings, as much as possible, to the real-life environment (Pruitt 
2005). This thesis hopes to attain these two objectives by using two experimental settings 
(laboratory and quasi-field) to enhance rigor and generality of findings in this research.  
 The laboratory setting is beneficial for observing the phenomenon of motivational 
orientation interacting with ENS framing, because variables may be isolated, and the 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables may be magnified to test 
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hypotheses. However, the creation of this artificial environment can produce atypical 
processes that lead to outcomes, which are dissimilar from those in the real-life setting 
(Pruitt 2005).  
 The quasi-field experiment was intended to replicate the negotiation environment 
in electronic commerce, where participants are not bound to a laboratory, 45 minute 
exchange, standardized browser, and pace set by the facilitator. Nevertheless, the case, 
sample demographics, ENS, documentation (e.g., system guide, instructions, etc), and 
sequence of experimental activities (i.e., from 4 to 10 in Table 13) were the same as in 
the laboratory experiment in order to retain the premise of the experimental design.  
Internet-based studies have been criticized for moderating treatment effects and 
lacking control, but they may increase self-disclosure by distancing the experimenter 
from the participants (Siah 2005). In this study, the treatment effects were expected to be 
somewhat reduced because of: (1) the different technologies employed by the participants 
(e.g., browser and connection speed), and (2) participants being more skeptical of the 
experimental activities as a result of not seeing other participants or the experimenter 
(i.e., there are less peer- or authoritative pressures to pursue the experimental activities). 
The natural setting may lead to an increase of random error from participants, who may 
not understand the task or do not have the patience for a seven day experiment, thus 
submitting random responses, which would be difficult to identify. In order to minimize 
these undesirable effects, pretesting and an increase of the sample size were necessary 
(Siah 2005). 
As internet-based studies do not require facilitators or physical interaction with the 
experimenter, the contact between the experimenter and the participants was diminished 
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in such an environment, and it was expected to enable more truthful behaviors and 
responses. The external validity of results was increased in the quasi-field setting such 
that the findings can be more generalizability (Pruitt 2005). 
Furthermore, the comparison between both settings strengthened the causal effects 
obtained in the laboratory. In essence, strong effects were presented in both settings, but 
weaker ones only appeared in the laboratory.  
6.4 Pretests 
Before the experiment, three pre-tests were conducted to (1) verify that the appropriate 
motivational orientations could be induced (Pretest 1), (2) refine the instrument for 
measuring subjective variables (Pretest 1), and (3) test the workflow of the experiment 
(Pretest 2 and Pretest 3).   
The first pretest consisted of a quasi-field experiment that was similar to the 
actual one conducted in the project. It assigned participants to two groups: collaborators 
and competitors. The 70 participants negotiated in a gain frame using the case described 
in Appendix A. The results showed that collaborating and competing behaviors were 
successfully induced through the instructions given in the case even though the subjects 
may have had inherently different orientations (see Appendix D for the assessment of 
motivation orientation) than the one that they were assigned.  
The second and third pretest served to inspect the experimental procedures, 
identify possible confounding variables and find improvements to increase the validity of 
the experiments. They involved a mock conduct of the experiment followed by 
interviews to spot problems with experimental activities. The pretests determined that the 
case required 45 minutes for participants to communicate and learn each other‘s 
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preferences. They also revealed necessary updates to the documentation, which enhanced 
the understanding of the tasks as depicted in Appendix B. 
6.4.1 Pretest 1: Quasi-field Test of Motivational Orientation 
Pretest 1 sought to determine if collaborative and competitive negotiators could be 
induced by manipulating the objectives of the case, and to substantiate the dependent 
variables.  The test was conducted as a quasi-field test in a gain frame, whereby 
undergraduate students were assigned to either collaborative or competitive treatments. In 
most cases, the subjects participated with some or no incentives (2-3% bonus grade in 
their course). They were given five days to negotiate the case. A total of 70 students 
volunteered for the test of which 34 were placed in the collaborative treatment and 36 
were in the competitive treatment. 
 The subjective variables of cognitive effort, outcome satisfaction and relationship 
and discussion climate were examined. The analysis mainly consisted of verifying the 
loadings for the four subjective variables. Appendix G describes the original and adapted 
items for the questionnaire. Cognitive effort (items found in Table 15, part c) was based 
on Chen, Vahidov et al. (2009), and was performed in the context of auctions and 
negotiations, rather than that of general IS. Discussion climate (items found in Table 15, 
part d) was adapted from Foroughi, Perkins et al. (1995) and Beersma and De Dreu 
(2002). Outcome satisfaction (items found in Table 15, part a) was derived from Suh 
(1999) and Vetchera, Kersten et al. (2004). Relationship (items found in Table 15, part b) 
was adapted from Curhan, Elfenbein et al. (2005), Jones and Jelassi (1990), and Beersma 
and De Dreu (2002). Table 15 details (1) the instructions from the questionnaire used to 
capture the variables and (2) the items.  
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Table 15 Questionnaire measuring dependent variables 
Based on your experience in this negotiation, please answer the following questions as 
accurately as possible. 








































































































1.    the achieved outcome? (Suh 1999)        
2. the results compared to your expectations? 
(Vetchera, Kersten et al. 2006) 
       
3. the outcome when looking at what you originally 
wanted? (Suh 1999) 
       























































































5. my counterpart listened to my concerns. . (Curhan, 
Elfenbein et al. 2005) 
       
6. a good foundation was set for future relationships 
with my counterpart. (Curhan, Elfenbein et al. 
2005) 
       
7. my counterpart acted in good faith. (Jones and 
Jelassi 1990) 
       
8. my counterpart was honest. (Beersma and De Dreu 
2002) 
       
 
 













































































9. acting in my role was…(Chen, Vahidov et al. 2009)        
10. meeting the objectives of the case was…(Chen, 
Vahidov et al. 2009) 
       
11. making decisions was…(Chen, Vahidov et al. 2009)        
12. interacting in the business scenario was…(Chen, 
Vahidov et al. 2009) 
       




The objective variables (i.e., number of offers, cooperativeness, joint outcome and 
contract balance) were recorded by the ENS.  
  The data was first analyzed to determine if the manipulation of orientations was 
successful. An ANOVA test on the instructions showed a significant difference between 
collaborators and competitors when they responded to items in Table 15, part e). On 
average, the p-value was less than 0.001 for the collaborators and competitors regarding 
the items used in the manipulation check. The collaborators agreed strongly with items 
Based on your experience in this negotiation, please answer the following questions as 



























































































13. the atmosphere was agreeable.  (Beersma and 
De Dreu 2002) 
       
14. I felt comfortable. (Beersma and De Dreu 2002)        
15. my counterpart listened to me. (Beersma and De 
Dreu 2002)  
       
16. the interaction was sociable. (Beersma and De 
Dreu 2002) 
       
17. I could openly discuss disagreements.  
(Foroughi, Perkins et al. 1995) 
       
 
e) In the case… 
 
       
18. I was instructed to try to achieve the best for me 
only. 
       
19. I was instructed to try to achieve the best for me 
and my counterpart. 
       
In negotiation, …        
20. Always gave others the benefit of the doubt.        
21. Your loss is my gain.        
22. Take a problem solving approach.        
23. The best defense is a good offense.        
24. Negotiate fair.        
25. Winner takes all.        
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that aimed to maximize joint benefits, while competitors agreed with those that 
maximized profits for themselves only.  
Another manipulation check was performed to make sure that the small bonus 
grades did not influence the manipulation of motivational orientation and joint outcome. 
The results show no significant effect with a p-value of 0.32 for motivational orientation 
and 0.48 for joint outcome.   
Table 16 Total variance explained 
              Item Initial Eigenvalue 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 4.921 30.754 30.754 
2 3.636 22.727 53.482 
3 2.813 17.584 71.066 
4 1.655 10.344 81.410 
5 .724 4.528 85.938 
6 .418 2.612 88.550 
7 .371 2.321 90.871 
8 .331 2.067 92.938 
9 .290 1.813 94.751 
10 .197 1.234 95.985 
11 .157 .983 96.968 
12 .135 .845 97.813 
13 .118 .735 98.548 
14 .115 .718 99.266 
15 .068 .427 99.693 
16 .049 .307 100.000 
 
Out of the 70 participants, only 28 competitors and 24 collaborators reached an 
agreement. The results of the factor analysis of the subjective variables showed that with 
an eigenvalue >1, four distinct factors could be identified with items loadings above 0.4, 
as indicated in Table 16. Table 17 illustrates the rotated loading for each factor and the 
Cronbach‘s alpha measuring reliability above 0.7. All of the values fall into acceptable 
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ranges (Kerlinger and Lee 2000). Therefore, four distinct, valid constructs were reliably 
assessed based on the items from the questionnaire.  
Table 17 Rotated factor matrix 
 
  
Factor loading  
Outcome 
Satisfaction 




DC1 -.134 -.046 .892 -.006 .922 
DC2 .028 -.028 .904 -.081 
DC3 -.016 -.182 .898 -.160 
DC4 .004 -.049 .891 .012 
DC5 .010 -.039 .901 -.002 
CE1 .019 .917 -.027 .025 .943 
CE2 .059 .898 -.130 .000 
CE3 .020 .945 -.099 .094 
CE4 .001 .920 -.039 -.014 
OS1 .923 .066 .025 .200 .959 
OS2 .916 .023 -.010 .228 
OS3 .918 .097 -.037 .171 
OS4 .929 -.088 -.111 .176 
Rel1 .368 .028 .013 .523 .820 
Rel2 .123 -.067 -.045 .859 
Rel3 .134 -.001 -.077 .886 
Rel4 .277 .175 -.112 .782 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 The descriptive statistics in Table 18 show that competitive dyads, on average, 
reached a joint outcome of $116,964, while competitive dyads got $104,479. The same 
table describes that contract balance was higher for the collaborative dyads (mean = 
$16,562), than for the competitive ones (mean = $13,214). Regarding the process, 
competitive dyads sent about 7 offers on average, and these offers were more cooperative 
(mean = 29.6%) than those sent by collaborative dyads (average number of offers = 4 and 
cooperativeness =12%). 
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Table 18 Descriptive statistics of dependent variables 




Competitive 28 116.9643 10.47168 1.97896 
Collaborative 24 104.4792 8.82281 1.80095 




Competitive 28 13.2143 13.04119 2.46455 
Collaborative 24 16.5625 20.55034 4.19482 
Total 52 14.7596 16.83258 2.33426 
Number of offers 
  
  
Competitive 34 6.7059 3.88883 .66693 
Collaborative 34 4.2059 3.38248 .58009 




Competitive 28 29.6286 21.41704 4.04744 
Collaborative 24 12.7750 13.79434 2.81576 
Total 52 21.8500 20.01561 2.77567 
 
A MANOVA was conducted to examine the impact of motivational orientation 
and possible confounding effects from AMO (representing inherent orientation) and role 
(played in the case) on dependent variables. The analysis of the objective variables 
demonstrated that the confounding variables did not affect the dependent variables (p-
values greater than 0.05). Furthermore, the induced motivational orientation significantly 
affected joint outcome (p-value < 0.001) and contract balance (p-value = 0.039) as shown 
in Table 19 and Table 20. 
 The MANOVA also modeled the process variables (i.e., number of offers and 
cooperativeness). The results showed that motivational orientation affects both the 
number of offers and competitiveness. In essence, competitive dyads exchanged 
significantly more offers (p-value = 0.023) and these offers were more cooperative (p-
value = 0.001). 
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Table 19 Multivariate tests 





Pillai's Trace .970 359.340 4.000 45.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .030 359.340 4.000 45.000 .000 
Hotelling's Trace 31.941 359.340 4.000 45.000 .000 





Pillai's Trace .114 1.444 4.000 45.000 .235 
Wilks' Lambda .886 1.444 4.000 45.000 .235 
Hotelling's Trace .128 1.444 4.000 45.000 .235 





Pillai's Trace .006 .063 4.000 45.000 .992 
Wilks' Lambda .994 .063 4.000 45.000 .992 
Hotelling's Trace .006 .063 4.000 45.000 .992 






Pillai's Trace .411 7.840 4.000 45.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .589 7.840 4.000 45.000 .000 
Hotelling's Trace .697 7.840 4.000 45.000 .000 
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Table 20 Tests of between-subject effects 





Number of offers 25.337(a) 3 2.527 .068 
Joint outcome 2345.422(b) 3 8.490 .000 
Contract balance 1283.021(c) 3 2.996 .040 





Number of offers 17.691 1 5.293 .026 
Joint outcome 32851.468 1 356.751 .000 
Contract balance 672.048 1 2.255 .140 





Number of offers 9.189 1 2.749 .104 
Joint outcome 143.100 1 .480 .492 
Contract balance .002 1 .000 .998 





Number of offers .308 1 .092 .763 
Joint outcome .000 1 .000 1.000 
Contract balance .000 1 .000 1.000 





Number of offers 18.343 1 5.488 .023 
Joint outcome 2169.542 1 23.560 .000 
Contract balance 639.682 1 4.481 .039 
  Cooperativeness 4192.720 1 13.419 .001 
a  R Squared = .136 (Adjusted R Squared = .082) 
b  R Squared = .347 (Adjusted R Squared = .306) 
c  R Squared = .158 (Adjusted R Squared = .105) 
d  R Squared = .266 (Adjusted R Squared = .220) 
 
 Pretest 1 confirmed that motivational orientation could be manipulated through 
the objective of the case, and that the subjects‘ inherent disposition did not affect the 
manipulation. It also verified the reliability and validity or the subjective variables. The 
results appear to support the expectation that competitive dyads perform better in the gain 
frame, i.e. they tend to make larger number of offers, and their offers are of higher 
quality.  
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6.4.2 Pretest 2: Internal Test of Workflow for Experiment 
An internal pretest was conducted on February 26
th
, 2009 with six members of the 
Interneg research team: three developers of the system; two Ph.D. students (who are 
familiar with experiments and the Inspire system); one visiting fellow (who had 
conducted experiments with similar negotiation activities using the Inspire ENS, and is 
knowledgeable about decision support and important confounding variables that can 
affect the experiment); and one administrative staff (who has managed many experiments 
at the InterNeg
8
 research centre).  
 Before the internal test, the participants were told that they would be collaborators 
negotiating a business contract. They were asked to give their opinions on the various 
activities in the experiments and the documentation used to guide them through the test. 
From the 77 minute pre-test, four important changes were suggested based on comments 
from the participants.  
(1) The AMO instrument is difficult to understand. It needs to be clarified by giving 
readers an example, by re-phasing the distribution of points in the game, and by 
consolidating terms that mean the same (e.g., choice, option and decision). 
(2) The private information must be given on paper to allow subjects to quickly refer 
to the case. In a short experiment, the case needs to stress the objectives in terms 
of the student‘s incentives (i.e., collaborators are judged based on joint gains and 
competitors on individual gains). 
(3) The post-settlement feature is not needed in the experimental design, and it is 
difficult to understand for students unfamiliar with this type of decision support. 
                                                 
8
 http://interneg.concordia.ca 
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The feature may be a crutch that students could lean on instead of working with 
the counterpart to find an efficient agreement. 
(4) The negotiation time should be prolonged to either 40 or 45 minutes as students 
must have the time to familiarize themselves with the system and use the system 
features. 
Other comments were also recorded and stated in Table 21. These involved small 
changes to the documentation used in the experiment, along with system updates.  
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Table 21 Treatment: Collaborators with gain frame 
Phases Activities Comments Min. 
Setup lab  Turn on computers (6) 
 Adjust browser 
 Display sign in page 





 Welcome participants to 
experiment 
 Read consent form and ask them 
to it 
 Ask participants to log in  
 Update consent form  7 
 Outline experiment from 
welcome page  
 Read the AMO  
 Read public instructions 
 Read private information 
 Pass to quiz 
 Explain system  
 No need to explain too much of the outline, just list the 
activities 
 The AMO is too confusing. Need to make it simpler and give 
an example 
 Update public instructions, explain better End negotiation 
activity 
 Update private information, stress the objectives and 
participants should be given a copy 
 Consensus on ―No need for post-settlement activity‖, remove 




 Given subjects 30 minutes to 
negotiate 
 Subjects should be given 45 minutes 
 The graph takes a long time to load 
 Ask lab maintenance staff (CIT) to update computers in the lab 




 Ask participants to answer 
questionnaire 
 Consider removing some questions to balance prolong 
negotiation time 
  20 







6.4.3 Pretest 3: External Test of Workflow for Experiment 
An internal pre-test was conducted on March 10
th
, 2009 with six students that would be 
representative of the subjects in the target treatment groups.  This pretest served to verify 
the students‘ understanding of the experimental procedures and documentation. These 
subjects were novices, who had not participated in electronic negotiation experiments 
before. They were incentivized to participate with a flat fee of $24 for three hours of 
work. They were told that no special skills were required. After the experiment, they 
were asked to give their opinions on the various activities in the experiments and the 
documentation used to guide them through the test. From the 90 minute pre-test, three 
important changes were suggested.  
(1) The students need 10-15 minutes to arrive to the laboratory.  
(2) The facilitator must seat the subjects following the sequence of login numbers, or 
else matching is problematic.  
(3) An emphasis should be placed on coordinating the experimental activities 
between the two negotiation rooms.  
Other recorded comments are shown in Table 22. 
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Table 22 Treatment: Competitors with gain frame 
Phases Activities Comments Min. 
Setup lab  Turn on computers  
 Adjust browser 
 Display sign in page 
 Sign in 
 Place number and handouts next 
to computers 
 This process took longer than expected (15minutes to setup)  
Greet 
participants 
 Welcome participants to 
experiment 
  
 Participants do not arrive on time and they need time to get to the 
laboratories.  
10 
 Outline experiment from 
welcome page  
 Read the AMO  
 Read public instructions 
 Read private information 
 Pass to quiz 
 Explain system  
 No need to explain too much of the outline, just list the activities 




 Given subjects 30 minutes to 
negotiate 
 45 minutes work well for the subjects to understand the case and 
system features for negotiation 




 Ask participants to answer 
questionnaire 
 All the questions were answered in time allocated 15 
   90 
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7 Results 
A total of 276 students participated in the laboratory experiment (out of which 274 
reached agreements and were used for the study), and 490 in the quasi-field experiment 
(out of which only 350 reached agreements). The settings differed in negotiation time and 
experimental controls. The participants in the laboratory experiment were given two 
hours to complete the experiment, while those in the quasi-field setting had seven days. 
In the laboratory environment, a facilitator guided the students through the experimental 
protocol and ensured that they completed each stage of activities using Mozilla‘s Firefox 
browser version 3.5. The quasi-field experiment allowed the participants to negotiate 
from any place and at any time, at their convenience, without the aid of a facilitator, and 
with any browser technology. The results were analyzed independently for laboratory 
(Section 7.1) and quasi-field (Section 7.2) experiments following the same procedures.  
 The first step of the analysis consisted of verifying and describing the findings. 
Section 7.1.1 and Section 7.2.1 describe the validation of subjective constructs with 
Principal Component Analysis. Section 7.1.2 and Section 7.2.2 characterize the 
dependent and confounding variables with descriptive statistics, a general MANOVA 
results and Pearson correlation coefficients. Section 7.1.3 and Section 7.2.3 examine the 
results of the manipulation checks on motivational orientations. 
 The next step involved testing the hypotheses. Section 7.1.4 and Section 7.2.4 
illustrate the framing effect within each orientation at the dyadic level. Section 7.1.5 and 
Section 7.2.5 describe the differences between collaborative and competitive dyads 
within each frame. Section 7.1.6 and Section 7.2.6 examine the impact of framing at the 
individual level. 
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 Once the results were analyzed for each setting, they were compared to highlight 
the different framing effects, which are presented in Section 7.3. Finally, Section 7.4 
summarizes the findings in Tables 46 and 47.   
7.1 Laboratory Experiment 
The laboratory environment allowed the isolation and manipulation of motivational 
orientation and ENS framing to verify their interaction under restricted conditions. Before 
hypotheses tseting, three important validations were needed: (1) checking that subjective 
constructs were properly measured with the items in the post-questionnaire; (2) ensuring 
that confounding variables such as age, gender, role, negotiation experience, English 
proficiency and AMO did not influence the relationship among the independent and 
dependent variables; and (3) verifying that independent variables were appropriately 
specified (e.g., checking for multicollinearity and accuracy of the induced motivational 
orientations). Once these validations had been performed, the hypotheses were examined 
at the dyadic and individual levels using analyses of variance to detect significant impacts 
of treatments on the dependent variables.  
7.1.1 Validation of the Subjective Constructs  
The first step in examining the subjective constructs, assessing process (i.e., cognitive 
effort and discussion climate) and outcomes (i.e., relationship and outcome satisfaction), 
was to determine the adequacy of the multi-item measurement instrument. Principal 
Component Analysis, with Varimax and normalization rotation, was performed to extract 
the intended constructs. The measures consisted of seventeen items determining outcome 
satisfaction, relationship, cognitive effort and discussion climate.  
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Table 23 shows that four factors with an eigenvalue above 1, representing the 
subjective variables, explained 79.6% of the variance. The first four eigenvalues imply 
that the seventeen items (i.e., responses to the questions) can be summarized by four 
factors.  
Table 23 Total variance explained for all measures 
Item Initial Eigenvalue 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 8.246 48.507 48.507 
2 2.613 15.370 63.877 
3 1.666 9.800 73.677 
4 1.002 5.896 79.574 
5 .552 3.246 82.820 
6 .484 2.845 85.665 
7 .330 1.941 87.606 
8 .315 1.853 89.460 
9 .291 1.712 91.172 
10 .273 1.605 92.777 
11 .229 1.347 94.124 
12 .207 1.220 95.344 
13 .193 1.135 96.479 
14 .181 1.063 97.542 
15 .144 .846 98.387 
16 .142 .836 99.223 
17 .132 .777 100.000 
  
Table 24 depicts the loadings for each item employed to measure the constructs. 
Items measuring the same construct were heavily loaded (i.e., above 0.4 as recommended 
by Boudreau, Gefen et al. 2001) by one factor. One item measuring discussion climate 
(DC3: question 7 of the questionnaire in Appendix G, ―In the negotiation, my counterpart 
acted in good faith.‖) also loaded above 0.4 on the relationship factor. With high loadings 
on two factors, DC3 was dropped as a measure of discussion climate, and principal 
component analysis was repeated using all other items. 
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Table 24 Rotated factor matrix for all measures  
Item Factor loading 




OS1 .198 .290 .819 .215 
OS2 .187 .289 .822 .192 
OS3 .141 .151 .863 .195 
OS4 .157 .289 .821 .244 
REL1 .318 .818 .262 .105 
REL2 .349 .763 .274 .067 
REL3 .299 .839 .280 .102 
REL4 .263 .831 .248 .104 
CE1 .106 .184 .257 .772 
CE2 .086 .153 .302 .812 
CE3 .041 -.008 .157 .877 
CE4 .183 .029 .045 .872 
DC1   .764 .346 .229 .110 
DC2 .766 .175 .250 .164 
DC3 .686 .524 .138 .115 
DC4 .864 .252 .075 .058 
DC5 .795 .193 .092 .101 
 
Table 25 Total variance explained for revised measurement 
Item Initial Eigenvalue 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 7.684 48.025 48.025 
2 2.493 15.584 63.609 
3 1.611 10.068 73.677 
4 1.002 6.263 79.940 
5 .541 3.381 83.321 
6 .475 2.971 86.293 
7 .318 1.985 88.277 
8 .291 1.820 90.097 
9 .286 1.787 91.885 
10 .251 1.568 93.453 
11 .219 1.369 94.821 
12 .204 1.273 96.095 
13 .193 1.205 97.300 
14 .158 .986 98.286 
15 .142 .888 99.175 
16 .132 .825 100.000 
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Table 25 describes the factors extracted after DC3 was removed from analysis. 
The four factors explained 79.9% of the total variance for the sixteen rather than 
seventeen items. The elimination of DC3 provided a more adequate measurement model, 
while maintaining an eigenvalue greater than 1 for the extracted factors. In Table 26, the 
rotated factor matrix indicates convergent and discriminant validities for the four factors; 
where loadings range from 0.752 to 0.877 on designated factors, and from -0.012 to 
0.361 on other factors.  
With respect to the measurement instruments regarding perceptions of outcome, 
the four items assessing outcome satisfaction (OS1, OS2, OS3 and OS4) loaded between 
0.817 and 0.864, and the four items for relationship (REL1, REL2, REL3 and REL4) 
weighed between 0.776 and 0.843. The instruments related to perceptions of process 
comprised of four items measuring cognitive effort (CE1, CE2, CE3 and CE4), which 
loaded between 0.772 and 0.877, and the four items assessing discussion climate (DC1, 
DC2, DC4 and DC5), which weighed between 0.752 and 0.863.  
 Table 26 also reports the reliabilities of the factors determined by the Cronbach 
alphas, which are between 0.889 and 0.936. All reliability values are above the 0.70 
threshold (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). Therefore, the items are internally consistent at 
determining the constructs. 
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Table 26 Rotated factor matrix for revised measurement 
Items Factor loadings Reliability 
Outcome 
satisfaction 




OS1 .817 .298 .215 .194 0.932 
OS2 .822 .295 .192 .179 
OS3 .864 .155 .195 .134 
OS4 .821 .293 .245 .148 
REL1 .263 .823 .106 .294 0.936 
REL2 .265 .776 .068 .344 
REL3 .276 .848 .103 .283 
REL4 .243 .839 .106 .249 
CE1 .249 .191 .772 .113 0.889 
CE2 .300 .155 .812 .084 
CE3 .163 -.012 .877 .031 
CE4 .048 .030 .872 .178 
DC1 .230 .361 .112 .752 0.896 
DC2 .241 .198 .166 .775 
DC4 .071 .273 .059 .863 
DC5 .090 .211 .103 .793 
 
7.1.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The means and standard deviations for confounding, objective and subjective variables 
are presented in Table 27. The table shows the descriptive statistics for the overall data 
set and for the each treatment.  
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Age 1.88(0.80) 1.77 (0.76) 1.85 (0.80) 1.81(0.88) 2.04(0.76) 
Gender 0.50(0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 0.38(0.49) 0.57(0.50) 
Role 0.50(0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.50(0.50) 0.50(0.50) 
Negotiation 
experience 
2.59(1.52) 2.89 (1.63) 2.39 (1.47) 2.47(1.32) 2.69(1.60) 
English 
proficiency 
5.92(1.12) 6.13(1.06) 5.88 (1.14) 5.61(1.18) 6.03(1.05) 
AMO 1.15(0.54) 1.10(0.52) 1.15 (0.49) 1.27(0.61) 1.09(0.57) 
Objective 
Joint outcome 113.11(11.18) 116.72(10.14) 112.53 (9.48) 106.82(13.00) 116.32(9.95) 
Contract balance 15.21(18.48) 14.48(14.26) 19.74 (24.81) 14.12(17.97) 10.93(9.33) 
Number of offers 12.02(7.00) 14.48(8.24) 11.45 (6.97) 8.37(5.16) 13.88(5.84) 




1.34(1.00) 1.50(1.06) 1.35 (1.01) 1.43(1.00) 1.39(0.94) 
Relationship 1.20(1.00) 1.40(1.13) 1.21(0.96) 1.27(1.08) 1.31(0.88) 
Cognitive effort 1.52(1.00) 1.61(1.02) 1.54 (0.97) 1.67(1.01) 1.68(1.00) 
Discussion 
climate 
1.10(1.00) 1.13(0.97) 1.04(1.10) 1.06(0.97) 1.14(0.99) 
  
 For the confounding variables, the overall descriptive statistics from Table 27 
indicate that the 274 participants were in each of the three age groups: the first age group 
of 20 years old or less (coded as ―1‖); the second age group of 21 to 25 years old (coded 
as ―2‖), with more emphasis on the latter (a mean of 1.88); or the third age group of 25 
years old and greater (coded as ―3‖). The ratio of men (coded as ―1‖) and women (coded 
as ―0‖) was equal. The role describes the side they represented in the negotiation: the 
producer was coded as ―1‖ and the retailer was coded as ―0‖. The negotiation experience 
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was a self-reported measure, by which participants viewed themselves (with an average 
of 2.59) as being closer to a novice (coded as ―1‖) than to an expert (coded as ―7‖) in 
negotiations.  
Although all participants were undergraduates enrolled at an English-language 
business school, English proficiency was assessed as a confounding variable because 
some non-native English speaking students might have had difficulties understanding the 
case. In Table 27, the overall average of 5.92 for English proficiency implies that the 
students considered their English skills to be near excellent, where excellent was coded as 
―7‖ and poor as ―1‖.  AMO was based on a decomposed game shown in Appendix D to 
determine the inherent motivational orientation of subjects. As the collaborators were 
classified with a ―2‖, competitors with a ―1‖, and the remaining with ―1.5‖ (those that 
could not be classified as they had not chosen six or more options in either orientation of 
the decomposed game), the overall average of 1.15 from Table 27 means that most 
participants were inherently competitive. Specifically, 68% of participants considered 
themselves competitive (out of which 19% were extremely competitive), 23% were 
collaborative, and 9% were undecided.  
 Due to the restricted number of computers in the laboratories, the data was 
gathered over sixteen sessions, four sessions per treatment. 146 students were assigned to 
the competitive orientation, out of which 58 were subjected to the gain and 88 to the loss 
frame. 128 students were assigned to the collaborative orientation, with 60 in the gain and 
68 in the loss frame. The number of participants per treatment was uneven because: (1) 
the students could select the sessions that were most convenient for them, and (2) some 
students did not show up for their registered session.   
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By large, the dyads achieved a joint outcome of $113,110, which was better than 
an evenly split outcome of $100,000, implying that they had worked on finding mutual 
gains. The highest mean joint outcome ($116,720) was obtained by the competitive dyads 
in the gain frame, and the lowest one was raeched by collaborative dyads ($106,820) in 



















Figure 19 Boxplot of joint outcomes for all treatments in the laboratory 
 
The mean disparity between negotiators of the same dyad, measured in terms of contract 
balance, was highest for competitive dyads in the loss frame ($19,740) and lowest for 
collaborative dyads in the same frame ($10,930). The treatments had an overall contract 
balance of $15,210.  
In terms of the process, the dyads produced 12 offers on average, Subjects in 
competitive dyads in the gain frame proposed the highest number of offers (14 offers), 
while those in collaborative ones in the same frame sent the least number (8 offers). The 
quality of offers was measured by the cooperativeness (i.e., percentage of integrative 
offers proposed over total offers). Collaborative dyads in the loss frame were the most 


















cooperative (16.56% of all offers were cooperative), but competitive ones in the same 
frame were the least with 10.81% cooperativeness.  
 At an individual level, the subjective variables were measured using items on a 
seven point Likert-type scale, whereby the highest rating was coded with a ―3‖ and the 
lowest was with a ―-3‖. Competitors in the gain frame rated outcome satisfaction the 
highest, with an average rating of 1.50, but competitors in the loss frame gave this 
variable the lowest average rating of 1.35. Following the same pattern, the relationship 
was rated highest by competitors in the gain frame (an average rating of 1.40) and lowest 
by those in the loss frame (an average rating of 1.21).  
 Regarding the subjective assessment of the process, the loss frame created the 
most divergence between collaborators and competitors. The competitors perceived that 
the loss frame required the most amount of effort (an average rating of 1.54 for cognitive 
effort, whereby the higher was the number the less effort was required) and contributed to 
the worst (an average rating of 1.04) discussion climate. On the flip side, collaborators 
reported that the loss frame entailed the least amount of effort (an average rating of 1.68) 
and allowed for the best discussion climate (an average rating of 1.14). 
In order to determine possible effects of confounding variables on the interaction 
of independent variables, MANOVA testing was employed to test the covariance. A 
general MANOVA was performed on the independent (motivational orientation and ENS 
framing) and dependent variables (joint outcome, contract balance, number of offers, 
cooperativeness, outcome satisfaction, relationship, cognitive effort and discussion 
climate) with the confounding variables used as covariates (age, gender, role, negotiation 
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= μ + motivational orientation + ENS framing + motivational orientation 
* ENS framing + Age1  + Gender2  + Role3  + 4 Negotiation 
experience + 5 English proficiency + 6 AMO 
 
Based on the significant values reported in Table 28 for the general model, it 
could be concluded that the confounding variables did not significantly affect the 
covariance of the independent variables (all p-values are above 0.05); except for English 
proficiency (p-value is equal to 0.05). The general MANOVA also found that 
motivational orientation was significantly influential with a p-value of 0.001, while ENS 
framing alone was not significant. Most importantly, the interaction of the independent 
variables significantly impacted the dependent variables (p-value < 0.001), which 
provided a good starting point for hypotheses testing regarding the dynamics of framing 
on motivational orientation.  
 Although the MANOVA showed some differences between the means of 
dependent variables among the treatments, the hypotheses testing was performed by 
comparing specific treatments, rather than a general analysis of variance. The results of 
the testing are found in Sections 7.1.4 and 7.1.5.  
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Table 28 General MANOVA model 





Pillai's Trace .839 152.705 8.000 234.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .161 152.705 8.000 234.000 .000 
Hotelling's Trace 5.221 152.705 8.000 234.000 .000 





Pillai's Trace .029 .860 8.000 234.000 .551 
Wilks' Lambda .971 .860 8.000 234.000 .551 
Hotelling's Trace .029 .860 8.000 234.000 .551 





Pillai's Trace .046 1.413 8.000 234.000 .192 
Wilks' Lambda .954 1.413 8.000 234.000 .192 
Hotelling's Trace .048 1.413 8.000 234.000 .192 





Pillai's Trace .026 .785 8.000 234.000 .616 
Wilks' Lambda .974 .785 8.000 234.000 .616 
Hotelling's Trace .027 .785 8.000 234.000 .616 





Pillai's Trace .046 1.399 8.000 234.000 .198 
Wilks' Lambda .954 1.399 8.000 234.000 .198 
Hotelling's Trace .048 1.399 8.000 234.000 .198 






Pillai's Trace .025 .755 8.000 234.000 .643 
Wilks' Lambda .975 .755 8.000 234.000 .643 
Hotelling's Trace .026 .755 8.000 234.000 .643 






Pillai's Trace .063 1.981 8.000 234.000 .050 
Wilks' Lambda .937 1.981 8.000 234.000 .050 
Hotelling's Trace .068 1.981 8.000 234.000 .050 






Pillai's Trace .110 3.616 8.000 234.000 .001 
Wilks' Lambda .890 3.616 8.000 234.000 .001 
Hotelling's Trace .124 3.616 8.000 234.000 .001 





Pillai's Trace .057 1.780 8.000 234.000 .082 
Wilks' Lambda .943 1.780 8.000 234.000 .082 
Hotelling's Trace .061 1.780 8.000 234.000 .082 





Pillai's Trace .231 8.786 8.000 234.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .769 8.786 8.000 234.000 .000 
Hotelling's Trace .300 8.786 8.000 234.000 .000 
Roy's Largest Root .300 8.786 8.000 234.000 .000 
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The correlations between variables are presented in Table 29 and Table 30. The 
Pearson correlation coefficients were used to detect multicollinearity (i.e., correlations 
between independent variables can indicate poor model specification and measurement 
related problems), and possible correlations among confounding variables and dependent 
variables. Multicollinearity is an issue for multi-regression models such as MANOVAs 
but not for single regression models such as ANOVAs (Kerlinger and Lee 2000).  
Table 29 shows the correlations involving the independent and dependent 
variables. As it can be seen, there was no significant relationship between motivational 
orientation and ENS framing (correlation coefficient of 0.072). Table 30 gives the inter-
correlations between the confounding and dependent variables. The analysis of the 
correlations coefficients showed that most values (in Table 30) are not large enough to 
cause concern, except for the correlations between gender and cognitive effort 
(correlation coefficient of 0.173) as well as that between English proficiency and 
cognitive effort (correlation coefficient of 0.221).  
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Table 29 Correlations between independent and dependent variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Motivational orientation 1 
         
2.  ENS framing .072 1  
       
3.  Joint outcome -.104 -.111 1 
       





      
5. Number of offers -.097 -.081 .062 -.116 1 
     





    
7. Outcome satisfaction .062 -.034 .243 
(**) 
-.116 -.098 .294 
(**) 
1 
   

































*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 30 Correlations between confounding and dependent variables 




Role 1      
AMO -.060 1     
Age -.053 .016 1    
Gender .045 .048 .033 1   
Negotiation 
experience 
.037 -.052 .055 .209(**) 1 
 
English proficiency .135(*) -.030 -.168(**) .117 .009 1 
Joint outcome .000 -.077 -.050 .088 .007 .098 
Contract balance .000 -.017 -.026 -.131(*) -.042 -.018 
Number of offers .000 -.114 -.062 -.053 -.039 .069 
Cooperativeness .000 .029 .004 .082 .071 .102 
Outcome satisfaction .042 .043 .068 .131(*) .091 .068 
Relationship .083 .103 .077 .033 .065 -.035 
Cognitive effort .146(*) .054 .006 .173(**) .124 .221(**) 
Discussion climate .111 -.034 .046 .087 .083 -.046 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 The correlation between English proficiency and cognitive effort was high. This 
suggested inclusion of English proficiency as a covariate in testing of hypothesis 
concerning cognitive effort. 
7.1.3 Manipulation Check 
Since motivational orientation was induced to create four treatment groups, manipulation 
checks were necessary to confirm that each orientation was internalized by the subjects. 
In the ex-post analysis, the checks consisted of questions on the participant‘s assigned 
objectives (in Appendix G, questions 18 and 19) and strategies (in Appendix G, questions 
20 to 25 related to their orientation). These checks had been adopted from De Dreu and 
Boles (1998). The responses ranged from strongly agree (coded as ―3‖) to strongly 
disagree (coded as ―-3‖). The feedbacks collected on these questions were analyzed with 
one-way ANOVAs to verify if the manipulations were successful in generating 
collaborative and competitive orientations. Table 31 describes the results of the 
manipulations check by comparing the means from the two questions on motivational 
instructions. Each question asked about the extent to which the negotiators knew the 
objective of the negotiation. For example, the participants needed to state the extent to 
which they agreed with the statement: ―In the case, I was instructed to care only about my 
gains‖. Table 31 shows that individuals assigned to a collaborative orientation agreed 
more with the collaborative instruction (a mean rating of 1.35) than the competitive 
instructions (a mean rating of -0.25), while individuals assigned to a competitive 
orientation answered the reverse (a mean rating of 0.63 for the collaborative instructions 
and 0.81 for the competitive instructions). These questions were answered differently for 
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the two orientations with significant p-values of 0.002 for collaborators and 0.045 for 
competitors. 
 Although the participants‘ responses were in accordance with their instructed 
objectives, another manipulation check was performed to verify whether the strategy they 
employed in the negotiation corresponded more to one of collaborative or competitive 
nature (in Appendix G, questions 20, 22 and 24 were for the collaborative orientation, 
and questions 21, 23 and 25 were for the competitive one). Three questions were asked 
with the same scale (i.e., a coding of ―3‖ for strongly agree and ―-3‖ for strongly 
disagree) on each orientation. The Principal Component Analysis found that two distinct 
factors could be extracted from the items with an eigenvalue of 1.607, explaining 62.8% 
of variance. An ANOVA was performed for each factor. Table 31 indicates that 
competitors responded positively to competitive strategies (with a mean of 0.22, p-value 
= 0.003) and negatively to collaborative strategies (with a mean of -0.17, p-value = 
0.001). Collaborators responded in the reverse fashion, with a 0.17 rating (p-value = 
0.001) for collaborative strategies and a -0.20 rating (p-value = 0.003) for competitive 
strategies. 
 
Table 31 ANOVA of manipulation on orientation 









Collaborative instructions  -.25(2.35) 1.35(2.07) 49.175 1 49.175 9.960 .002 
Competitive instructions .81(2.19) .63 (2.11) 18.560 1 18.560 4.066 .045 
Collaborative strategies -0.17 (1.15) 0.17 (1.02) 10.164 1 10.164 10.536 .001 
Competitive strategies 0.22 (0.73) -0.20(0.94) 8.782 1 8.782 9.053 .003 
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7.1.4 Framing Comparison at the Dyadic Level 
The framing effects on dyads were tested by contrasting the gain and loss frames within 
the collaborative and competitive treatments. Based on the experimental design shown in 
Table 12, the collaborative dyads in the gain frame (Group 1) were compared with those 
in the loss frame (Group 3), and the competitive dyads in the gain frame (Group 2) with 
those in the loss frame (Group 4). The results of the comparisons are found in Table 32, 
which indicates that the joint outcome, number of offers, and cooperativeness were 
affected by framing.  







F Sig. Estimated 
β 
% difference 
from gain to 
loss frame 
Hypothesis 
a) collaborative dyads  
Joint outcome 2875.828 1 21.830 .000 9.499 8.89 H1a 
Contract balance 324.602 1 1.643 .202 ns ns H2a 
Number of offers 969.727 1 31.679 .000 5.516 65.9 H3a 
Cooperativeness 1056.450 1 3.908 .050 5.757 53.2 H4a 
b) competitive dyads 
Joint outcome 614.916 1 6.474 .012 -4.194 -3.59 H1b 
Contract balance 967.168 1 2.138 .146 ns ns H2b 
Number of offers 320.576 1 5.702 .018 -3.028 -20.9 H3b 
Cooperativeness 261.210 1 2.600 .109 ns ns H4b 
The gain frame was coded as “0”, and the loss frame as “1”. 
 
The joint outcome was hypothesized to be higher for collaborative dyads in the 
loss frame (H1a) and competitive ones in the gain frame (H1b). Indeed, collaborative 
dyads achieved higher joint outcomes in the loss frame, by an average of $9,499 or 
8.89% increase (p-value < 0.001), than in the gain frame. Conversely, competitive dyads 
obtained an average of $4,194 or 3.59% higher joint outcomes in the gain frame as 
compared to the loss frame (p-value = 0.012).  
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 The contract balances were not significantly different between frames, meaning 
the H2a for collaborative dyads and H2b for competitive ones were not supported. Table 
32 shows p-values above 0.05 concerning these hypotheses.  
 The number of offers was expected to be larger for collaborative dyads in the loss 
frame than for those in the game frame (H3a). For competitive dyads the expectation was 
the reverse (H3b). Not surprisingly, collaborative dyads did propose an estimated 5.516 
or 65.9% more offers in the loss frame than in gain frame (p-value < 0.001). Competitive 
dyads submitted an estimated 3.028 or 20.9% more offers in the gain frame as opposed to 
the loss frame (p-value = 0.018).  
 The quality of offers exchanged, measured in terms of cooperativeness, was 
higher by 5.75% or a factor of 0.532 when collaborative dyads negotiated in the loss 
rather than in the gain frame. Thus, H4a was supported with a p-value of 0.05. However, 
cooperativeness was no different between the two frames for competitive dyads (p-value 
above 0.05), meaning that H4b was not supported.   
7.1.5 Motivational Orientation Comparison at the Dyadic Level 
This section aims to compare collaborative dyads with competitive dyads in the gain 
frame (i.e., contrasting Group 1 and Group 2 of the experimental design shown in Table 
12) as well as in the loss frame (i.e., contrasting Group 3 and Group 4 in Table 12). The 
results of these comparisons are shown in Table 33. 
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a) gain frame  
Joint outcome 2888.954 1 21.169 .000 9.897 9.27 H5a 
Contract balance 3.811 1 .014 .905 ns ns H6a 
Number of offers 1103.177 1 23.505 .000 6.116 73.1 H7a 
Cooperativeness 437.209 1 1.805 .182 ns ns H8a 
b) loss frame 
Joint outcome 552.482 1 5.889 .016 -3.795 -3.37 H5b 
Contract balance 2977.608 1 7.723 .006 8.810 80.6 H6b 
Number of offers 226.097 1 5.349 .022 -2.428 -17.5 H7b 
Cooperativeness 825.927 1 6.224 .014 -4.640 -28.0 H8b 
The collaborative orientation was coded as “0”, and the competitive orientation as “1”. 
 
In the gain frame, competitive dyads achieved higher joint outcomes, by an 
average of $9,827 or 9.27% more than collaborative ones. Table 33 also shows that, in 
the gain frame, competitive dyads produced, on average an estimated 6.116 or 73.1% 
more offers than the collaborative ones. Thus, H5a regarding the joint outcome and H7a 
for the number of offers were supported with p-values less than 0.001. Contract balance 
(H6a) and cooperativeness (H8a) were not significantly different between collaborative 
and competitive dyads (i.e., the p-values were above 0.05).  
On the contrary, the loss frame favored collaborative dyads over competitive ones 
in terms of joint outcome, contract balance, number of offers and cooperativeness. The 
hypotheses concerning the loss frame were all supported (i.e., H5b for joint outcome, 
H6b for contract balance, H7b for number of offers and H8b for cooperativeness). In the 
loss frame, the joint outcome for collaborative dyads was, on average, an estimated 
$3,795 or 3.37% greater than that for competitive dyads (p-value = 0.016). The 
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agreements were significantly more balanced between collaborative than competitive 
negotiators with a p-value of 0.006. In fact, the disparity of profits between the two sides 
was an estimated $8,810 or 80% higher for competitive pairs than for the collaborative 
ones. Compared to competitive dyads, the loss frame allowed collaborative dyads to 
propose an estimated 2.428 or 17.5% more offers (p-value = 0.022) and these offers were 
4.64% or 0.280 folds more cooperative (p-value = 0.014).  
The results of hypotheses testing at the dyadic level suggest that each frame 
favored a different orientation. Most hypotheses concerning contract balance were found 
not to be statistically significant, except those comparing collaborative and competitive 
dyads in the loss frame. For the process variables, competitive dyads proposed more 
offers in the gain frame, whereas collaborative dyads proposed more offers and exhibited 
greater cooperativeness in the loss frame. Overall, ENS framing interacted with 
motivational orientations to affect the process and outcome at the dyadic level. 
7.1.6 Framing Effects at the Individual Level 
In addition to examining the framing effect for dyads, individual perceptions were 
measured to determine the effects of the independent variables. As both general 
MANOVA model (Table 28) and the Pearson correlation coefficients (Table 30) 
suggested that English proficiency may influence cognitive effort, Analysis of 
covariances (ANACOVA) was performed on both orientations according to the following 
model: 
 
Subjective dependent variable 
= μ + ENS framing + 1 English proficiency  
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Outcome satisfaction 1.931(a) 2 .966 .900 .409 
Relationship 1.756(b) 2 .878 .830 .438 
Cognitive effort 6.065(c) 2 3.033 3.216 .043 





Outcome satisfaction .974 1 .974 .908 .342 
Relationship .007 1 .007 .007 .935 
Cognitive effort 5.692 1 5.692 6.036 .015 






Outcome satisfaction .667 1 .667 .621 .432 
Relationship .023 1 .023 .021 .884 
Cognitive effort 5.282 1 5.282 5.600 .019 





Outcome satisfaction 1.446 1 1.446 1.348 .248 
Relationship 1.675 1 1.675 1.583 .210 
Cognitive effort 1.247 1 1.247 1.322 .252 
Discussion climate  .079 1 .079 .077 .782 
a  R Squared = .013 (Adjusted R Squared = -.001); b  R Squared = .012 (Adjusted R Squared = -.002); c  R 
Squared = .044 (Adjusted R Squared = .030); d  R Squared = .001 (Adjusted R Squared = -.013) 
 












Outcome satisfaction 1.612(a) 2 .806 .896 .411 
Relationship .300(b) 2 .150 .179 .836 
Cognitive effort 8.875(c) 2 4.437 4.588 .012 





Outcome satisfaction .759 1 .759 .843 .360 
Relationship .316 1 .316 .377 .541 
Cognitive effort 6.233 1 6.233 6.444 .013 






Outcome satisfaction 1.229 1 1.229 1.366 .245 
Relationship .064 1 .064 .076 .784 
Cognitive effort 6.607 1 6.607 6.831 .010 





Outcome satisfaction .719 1 .719 .799 .374 
Relationship .175 1 .175 .209 .648 
Cognitive effort .815 1 .815 .842 .361 
Discussion climate  .363 1 .363 .355 .553 
a  R Squared = .017 (Adjusted R Squared = -.002); b  R Squared = .003 (Adjusted R Squared = -.015) 
c  R Squared = .080 (Adjusted R Squared = .062); d  R Squared = .008 (Adjusted R Squared = -.011) 
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 The results, from the ANACOVA for competitors (Table 34) and collaborators 
(Table 35), indicate that negotiators, independently of their induced motivational 
orientation, perceived no difference in framing. All p-values for process and outcome 
variables were above 0.05 as shown in Tables 34 and 35. The only effect on subjective 
variables was from the covariate English proficiency on cognitive effort (p-value of 0.019 
for competitors and 0.010 for collaborators), where an increase of self-reported 
proficiency positively affected cognitive effort by an estimated factor of 0.174 for 
competitors and 0.222 for collaborators.  
 These findings did not support H9a and H9b concerning the impact of ENS 
framing on the perception of the process. However, the hypotheses regarding the 
outcomes (H10a for outcome satisfaction and H10b for relationship) were supported. In 
general, the laboratory experiment showed that the interaction between motivational 
orientation and ENS framing affected objective variables, but had no impact on 
individual perceptions (i.e., subjective variables).  
7.2 Quasi-field Experiment 
As the laboratory experiment was used to establish causality among independent and 
dependent variables, external validity was tested by running the same experimental 
conditions with a similar pool of participants, over seven days (instead of two hours). The 
participants could negotiate anywhere, at any time within the seven days, and using any 
browser technology they chose. The objective here was to simulate the field settings of 
electronic commerce.  
 The data was analyzed following the same procedures set forth by the laboratory 
experiment.  Firstly, the subjective constructs underwent measurement analyses (Section 
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7.2.1). Secondly, the confounding variables were checked for possible influences on 
hypotheses testing (Section 7.2.2). Thirdly, independent variable specification was 
verified to ensure that the experiment was appropriately realized (Section 7.2.3).  
 The results of hypotheses testing comparing frames within each orientation are 
described in Section 7.2.4. Section 7.2.5 describes the results of testing of hypotheses 
contrasting collaborative and competitive dyads within each frame. Finally, Section 7.2.6 
examines the hypotheses dealing with subjective variables. 
7.2.1 Validation of the Subjective Constructs  
The subjective constructs for process (i.e., cognitive effort and discussion climate) and 
outcomes variables (i.e., relationship and outcome satisfaction) were validated with 
Principal Component Analysis. Using Varimax and normalization rotation, four factors 
were extracted from seventeen items. From Table 36 it can be seen that the four factors 
with eigenvalues above 1 explained 80.7% of variance.  
The item loadings are depicted in Table 37. It can be seen that related items 
converged to one construct with loadings above 0.760 (i.e., convergent validity) and 
diverged from others with loadings below 0.398 (i.e., discriminant validity). The items 
had a minimum Cronbach alpha of 0.907, meaning that they had been reliably measured.   
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Table 36 Total variance explained for quasi-field 
Item Initial Eigenvalue 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 8.657 50.925 50.925 
2 2.391 14.065 64.991 
3 1.640 9.649 74.639 
4 1.032 6.068 80.707 
5 .578 3.399 84.106 
6 .452 2.658 86.764 
7 .335 1.968 88.732 
8 .326 1.919 90.651 
9 .276 1.624 92.275 
10 .228 1.339 93.614 
11 .215 1.263 94.876 
12 .186 1.091 95.968 
13 .165 .974 96.941 
14 .157 .924 97.865 
15 .142 .835 98.700 
16 .129 .757 99.457 
17 .092 .543 100.000 
 
 
Table 37 Rotation matrix of measures for quasi-field 
Item Factor loading Reliability 
Outcome 
satisfaction 




OS1 .834 .250 .270 .193 0.940 
OS2 .832 .265 .243 .154 
OS3 .817 .256 .216 .193 
OS4 .852 .236 .236 .168 
REL1 .284 .768 .143 .313 0.936 
REL2 .280 .782 .146 .319 
REL3 .250 .847 .149 .290 
REL4 .269 .811 .137 .314 
CE1 .217 .147 .834 .122 0.907 
CE2 .265 .108 .827 .189 
CE3 .135 .092 .893 .092 
CE4 .217 .131 .798 .173 
DC1 .206 .194 .155 .832 0.916 
DC2 .244 .146 .201 .810 
DC3 .162 .398 .115 .760 
DC4 .064 .319 .065 .838 
DC5 .107 .225 .163 .772 
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7.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Although 998 undergraduate business students signed up for the quasi-field experiment, 
only 490 of them completed negotiations. Out of the 245 negotiations, 25 were removed 
because the history graphs were not generated by the system to help negotiators follow 
the progress of offer exchange. Furthermore, 45 observations were discarded because 
both parties made no effort in the negotiations (i.e., all negotiations where each party 
made fewer than two attempts to communicate with the other side were taken out). The 
resulting sample included 350 participants, out of which 190 were induced as 
collaborators and 160 as competitors. For collaborators, 86 negotiated in the gain frame, 
while 74 negotiated in the loss frame. For competitors, 64 negotiated in the gain frame 
and 126 in the loss frame.  
 The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 38. Overall, the participants were 
divided into two age groups: the first age group of 20 years old or less (coded with ―1‖); 
and the second age group of 21 to 25 years old (coded with ―2‖). The mean age was 1.77 
indicating that most participants belonged to the second group. Gender was evenly 
distributed with an average of 0.50, whereby men were coded as ―1‖ and women as ―0‖. 
As for negotiation experience, the more participants considered themselves to be more 
novices (coded with ―1‖) than experts (coded with ―7‖) with a mean rating of 2.55. They 
judged their English proficiency to be near excellent (coded with ―7‖), rather than poor 
(coded with ―1‖) with a mean of 6.00.  
 In terms of inherent orientation, 67% of the participants were classified as 
competitive (out of which 33.0% were extremely competitive), 19% collaborative, and 
the rest (24%) could not be classified. These inherent orientations were reflected by a 
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mean value of 1.10 for AMO, whereby competitive orientation was coded with ―1‖, 
collaborative one with ―2‖, and the remaining with ―1.5‖.   






















Age 1.70(0.88) 2.13 (1.00) 1.82 (0.81) 1.83(0.89) 1.28(0.63) 
Gender 0.51(0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.68 (0.47) 0.42(0.50) 0.46(0.50) 
Role 0.50(0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.50(0.50) 0.50(0.50) 
Negotiation 
experience 
2.55 (1.53) 2.29 (1.54) 2.64 (1.67) 2.75(1.53) 2.56(1.42) 
English 
proficiency 
6.00(1.12) 5.87(1.13) 5.97 (1.19) 6.05(1.14) 6.07(1.06) 
AMO 1.10(0.58) 1.05(0.61) 1.08 (0.57) 1.13(0.60) 1.13(0.54) 
Objective 
Joint outcome 106.40(9.46) 107.27(10.70) 105.75 (7.48) 103.22(9.02) 107.80(9.52) 
Contract balance 24.06(20.95) 28.64(23.35) 22.35(21.04) 25.00(17.72) 21.49(20.35) 
Number of offers 5.44(3.34) 5.49(3.94) 6.92 (4.12) 3.88(1.67) 5.32(2.57) 




1.01(1.00) 0.93(1.09) 1.01(0.78) 1.21(0.89) 1.05(1.10) 
Relationship 0.90(1.00) 0.79(1.05) 0.87(1.07) 0.85(1.08) 1.05(0.88) 
Cognitive effort 1.22(1.00) 1.19(1.10) 1.30(0.87) 1.25(1.05) 1.15(0.95) 
Discussion 
climate 
0.98(1.00) 1.06(0.99) 1.10 (0.90) 0.94(1.04) 0.86(1.04) 
 
 For the objective outcomes, the mean joint outcome was $106,400 for all 
treatments. The collaborative dyads in the loss frame performed the best with a mean 
joint outcome of $107,800. However, these dyads performed worst with a mean joint 
outcome of $103,220, in the gain frame. The highest contract balance was achieved by 
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collaborative dyads in the loss frame with an average difference of $21,490 between the 
two parties, and the lowest one was reached by competitive dyads in the gain frame with 
a mean difference of $28,640. Competitive dyads produced the highest number of offers, 
with an average of 6.92 offers in the loss and 5.49 in the gain frame. Collaborative dyads 
produced 5.32 offers in the loss and 3.88 offers in the gain frame. The measure of 
cooperativeness was highest for collaborative dyads with the mean value of 10.58% in 
the loss frame. It was the lowest for competitive dyads with the mean value of 4.95%, in 
the same frame.  
 The individual evaluation of the process and outcome were measured with items 
on a seven point Likert-type scale with the highest value of ―3‖ (e.g., strongly agree) and 
the lowest of ―-3‖ (e.g., strongly disagree).  The Principal Component Analysis (from 
Section 7.2.1) demonstrated that the seventeen items could be reduced to four constructs. 
Outcome satisfaction was rated highest by collaborators in the gain frame (an average 
rating of 1.21) and lowest by competitors in the same frame (an average rating of 0.93). 
Relationship was rated highest by collaborators in the loss frame (an average rating of 
1.05), while competitors in the gain frame gave it the lowest rating (an average rating of 
0.79). The mean rating for cognitive effort was lowest for collaborators in the loss frame 
(an average rating of 1.15), but highest for competitors in the same frame (an average 
rating of 1.30). Discussion climate was rated highest by competitors in the loss frame (an 
average rating of 1.10) and lowest by collaborators in the same frame (an average rating 
of 0.86). 
 A general MANOVA was executed to explore the links among independent, 
confounding and dependent variables. The significant values for motivational orientation, 
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ENS framing and the interaction of the two are shown in Table 39. The table indicates 
that there were no significant confounding effects by role, AMO, age, gender, negotiation 
experience and English proficiency. Only motivational orientation (p-value < 0.001), 
ENS framing (p-value < 0.001) and the interaction between the two (p-value < 0.036) 
influenced the dependent variables.  
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Table 39 General MANOVA for quasi-field 





Pillai's Trace .776 286.676 4.000 331.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .224 286.676 4.000 331.000 .000 
Hotelling's Trace 3.464 286.676 4.000 331.000 .000 





Pillai's Trace .000 .012 4.000 331.000 1.000 
Wilks' Lambda 1.000 .012 4.000 331.000 1.000 
Hotelling's Trace .000 .012 4.000 331.000 1.000 





Pillai's Trace .005 .387 4.000 331.000 .818 
Wilks' Lambda .995 .387 4.000 331.000 .818 
Hotelling's Trace .005 .387 4.000 331.000 .818 





Pillai's Trace .005 .455 4.000 331.000 .769 
Wilks' Lambda .995 .455 4.000 331.000 .769 
Hotelling's Trace .005 .455 4.000 331.000 .769 





Pillai's Trace .024 1.998 4.000 331.000 .094 
Wilks' Lambda .976 1.998 4.000 331.000 .094 
Hotelling's Trace .024 1.998 4.000 331.000 .094 






Pillai's Trace .008 .632 4.000 331.000 .640 
Wilks' Lambda .992 .632 4.000 331.000 .640 
Hotelling's Trace .008 .632 4.000 331.000 .640 






Pillai's Trace .004 .309 4.000 331.000 .872 
Wilks' Lambda .996 .309 4.000 331.000 .872 
Hotelling's Trace .004 .309 4.000 331.000 .872 






Pillai's Trace .060 5.309 4.000 331.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .940 5.309 4.000 331.000 .000 
Hotelling's Trace .064 5.309 4.000 331.000 .000 





Pillai's Trace .081 7.283 4.000 331.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .919 7.283 4.000 331.000 .000 
Hotelling's Trace .088 7.283 4.000 331.000 .000 





Pillai's Trace .030 2.594 4.000 331.000 .036 
Wilks' Lambda .970 2.594 4.000 331.000 .036 
Hotelling's Trace .031 2.594 4.000 331.000 .036 
Roy's Largest Root .031 2.594 4.000 331.000 .036 
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The Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in Table 40. The insignificant 
coefficient between motivational orientation and ENS framing implies that 
multicollinearity was not a concern in the quasi-field experiment.  
Table 41 shows that most confounding variables did not significantly correlate 
with the dependent variables. This finding is in accordance with the insignificant values 
reported by the MANOVA test (Table 39).  
Table 40 Correlation of independent and dependent variables for quasi-field 




         
2.  ENS framing -.102 1 
        
3.  Joint outcome -.017 -.079 1 








      











     





    
7.  Discussion 
climate 
-.092 .028 .013 .110 -.036 .007 1 
   
8.  Outcome 
satisfaction 
.043 .038 .033 .014 -.006 .047 .000 1 
  
9.  Relationship .073 -.082 .032 -.043 -.074 .023 .000 .000 1 
 
10. Cognitive effort -.023 -.005 -.123 
(*) 
.059 .009 -.058 .001 -.002 -.001 1 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 41 Correlation among confounding and dependent variables for quasi-field 





Role 1      
Age -.040 1     
Gender .043 .066 1    
Negotiation 
experience 
.066 .070 .289(**) 1   
English proficiency .091 -.161(**) .070 .025 1  
AMO .034 -.069 .022 .067 .009 1 
Joint outcome .000 .020 .062 .054 .014 -.004 
Contract balance .000 .052 -.036 .030 .062 -.049 
Number of offers .000 .035 .035 -.101 -.029 .006 
Cooperativeness .000 -.017 .006 -.051 .011 .027 
Discussion climate -.066 .004 -.019 .036 -.012 -.010 
Outcome satisfaction .055 -.017 .061 .098 .076 .122(*) 
Relationship -.021 -.108 .029 .043 -.045 .039 
Cognitive effort .011 .032 .180(**) .065 .042 -.064 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
7.2.3 Manipulation Check 
The manipulation checks on motivational orientation consisted of: (1) verifying the 
participants‘ understanding of the motivational objectives given in the case (in Appendix 
G, questions 18 and 19), and (2) examining the motives underlying the strategies used by 
the participants (in Appendix G, questions 20 to 25). The results from the manipulations 
checks are shown in Table 42. Regarding the motivational instructions, participants who 
were provided with competitive objectives answered positively to the question relating to 
competitive orientation (mean values of 1.86 for questions 19 in Appendix G), but 
negatively to the question relating to collaborative instructions (mean value of -0.58 for 
question 18 in Appendix G). Participants with induced collaborative attitude gave the 
reverse answers: a mean value of 2.06 for collaborative instructions and one of -0.12 for 
competitive instructions.  
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 When asked about their strategy, participants in the competitive treatments 
reported an inclination towards competitive strategies (mean value of 0.21 for questions 
21, 23 and 25 in Appendix G) rather than collaborative strategies (mean value of -0.28 
for questions 20, 22 and 24 in Appendix G). Again, the collaborative treatments had the 
reverse results with the mean value of 0.21 for collaborative strategies and -0.19 for 
competitive ones. The p-values for all checks were significant (p-value < 0.001). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that collaborative and competitive orientations were 
successfully induced.  
Table 42 Manipulation checks for quasi-field 





















-0.28(1.20) 0.21(0.71) 14.563 1 14.563 15.247 .000 
Competitive 
strategies 
0.21(0.92) -0.19(1.04) 11.955 1 11.955 12.405 .000 
 
7.2.4 Framing Comparison at the Dyadic Level 
Following the same experimental design as shown in Table 12, the gain and loss frames 
were compared within each orientation.  Within collaborative dyads, the gain frame 
(Group 1) was contrasted with the loss frame (Group 3), and the same comparison was 
made within competitive dyads (Group 2 with Group 4). The findings are presented in 
Table 43. As it can be seen, the joint outcome and number of offers were affected by 
framing for collaborative dyads, while for competitive ones only the number of offers 
was influenced by framing.  
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 Table 43 describes the ANOVAs, which compared the differences between a gain 
and loss frames. The collaborative dyads in the loss frame achieved a significantly better 
joint outcome by an estimated $4.579 or an increase of 4.44% as compared to the gain 
frame (p-value = 0.002). They also made an estimated 1.442 or 37.2% more offers in the 
loss frame than in the gain frame (p-value < 0.001). Contract balance and cooperativeness 
were not significantly different between the two frames for collaborative dyads. Thus, 
H1a for joint outcome and H3a for number of offers were supported, while H2a for 
contract balance and H4a for cooperativeness were not supported. 





df F Sig. Estimated 
β 
% difference 
from gain to 
loss frame 
Hypothesis 
a) collaborative dyads  
Joint outcome 889.843 1 10.167 .002 4.579 4.44 H1a 
Contract balance 523.459 1 1.375 .242 ns ns H2a 
Number of offers 88.309 1 16.564 .000 1.442 37.2 H3a 
Cooperativeness 22.740 1 .067 .796 ns ns H4a 
b) competitive dyads 
Joint outcome 89.044 1 1.015 .315 ns ns H1b 
Contract balance 1482.820 1 2.969 .087 ns ns H2b 
Number of offers 75.363 1 4.655 .032 1.376 25.1 H3b 
Cooperativeness 625.259 1 2.322 .130 ns ns H4b 
The gain frame was coded as “0”, and the loss frame as “1”. 
 
For competitive dyads, there was no significant difference between the gain and 
loss frames, except that they produced 3.028 or 25.1% more offers in the loss frame than 
in the gain frame (p-value = 0.032), which contradicted H3a. The hypotheses that relate 
to outcomes (i.e., H1b for joint outcome and H2b for contract balance) as well as those 
for the process (i.e., H3b for number of offers and H4b for cooperativeness) were not 
supported. 
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7.2.5 Motivational Orientation Comparison at the Dyadic Level 
The comparison of motivational orientations within frames highlighted whether ENS 
framing favors one orientation over another. According to the experimental design shown 
in Table 12, collaborative dyads were compared with competitive ones in the gain frame 
by contrasting Group 1 with Group 2, while in the loss frame the comparison was made 
between Group 3 and Group 4. Table 44 explains the results of comparing motivational 
orientations (i.e. competitive vs. collaborative) within the same frame.  
The gain frame allowed competitive dyads to reach significantly better joint 
outcomes by an estimated $4.055 or 3.93% more than collaborative ones. H5a for joint 
outcomes was supported with a p-value of 0.015. The gain frame also induced 
competitive dyads to produce an estimated 1.613 or 41.6% more offers compared to 
collaborative ones, supporting H7a with a p-value of 0.003. The contract balance and 
cooperativeness were not significantly different between competitive and collaborative 
dyads in the gain frame, and hence H6a and H8a were not supported.  















a) gain frame  
Joint outcome 603.202 1 6.009 .015 4.055 3.93 H5a 
Contract balance 486.048 1 1.088 .299 ns ns H6a 
Number of offers 95.512 1 9.446 .003 1.613 41.6 H7a 
Cooperativeness 28.367 1 .069 .794 ns ns H8a 
b) loss frame 
Joint outcome 190.340 1 2.437 .120 ns ns H5b 
Contract balance 50.977 1 .120 .730 ns ns H6b 
Number of offers 111.630 1 10.709 .001 1.547 29.1 H7b 
Cooperativeness 1449.530 1 6.314 .013 -5.576 -52.7 H8b 
The collaborative orientation was coded as “0”, and the competitive orientation as “1”. 
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In the loss frame, the only difference was in the process where competitive dyads 
made an estimated 1.547 or 29.1% more offers (p-value = 0.001), but they exhibited 
5.576% less cooperativeness (p-value = 0.013) than collaborative ones. Therefore, only 
H8b was supported, while H7a, which stated an expectation that collaborative dyads 
would make more offers than competitive ones in the loss frame, was not supported. The 
hypotheses concerning outcomes were not supported for joint outcome (H5b) and for 
contract balance (H6b). 
7.2.6 Framing Effects at the Individual Level 
Perceptions on framing were determined by seventeen items asked in the post-
questionnaire. The ANOVAs on outcome satisfaction, relationship, cognitive effort and 
discussion climate demonstrated no significant effect for collaborative, as well as 
competitive individuals (all p-values are above 0.05). These findings indicate that ENS 
framing did not affect perception of the process (cognitive effort and discussion climate) 
or that of outcome (outcome satisfaction and relationship). The non-significant 
differences in Table 45 imply that H10a and H10b regarding the outcome were 
supported, while H9a and H9b related to the process were not.  
Table 45 ANOVA on subjective variables for quasi-field 
Dependent Variable Sum of 
Squares 
df F Sig. Estimated β 
Collaborative individuals 
Outcome satisfaction 2.536 1 2.442 .120 ns 
Relationship 1.565 1 1.776 .185 ns 
Cognitive effort .259 1 .262 .610 ns 
Discussion climate .250 1 .231 .632 ns 
Competitive individuals 
Outcome satisfaction .234 1 .244 .622 ns 
Relationship .202 1 .179 .673 ns 
Cognitive effort .581 1 .568 .452 ns 
Discussion climate .054 1 .059 .808 ns 
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7.3 Contrasting Laboratory and Quasi-field Results 
The comparison between laboratory and quasi-field experiments showed that the 
laboratory setting supported more of the hypotheses related to objective processes and 
outcomes. There was less control over the quasi-field experiments. Subtle relationships 
could not be identified at significant level, perhaps due to other confounding factors 
and/or influences. 
The comparison of joint outcomes in Figure 20 demonstrates that the effects 
found in the laboratory setting were diminished in the quasi-field experiment. When 
comparing frames within each orientation, the difference from gain to loss frame was 
significant for collaborative dyads in both settings, but this was not the case for the 
competitive ones. In the laboratory, the profits for collaborative dyads were higher by 
8.89% when negotiating in the loss rather than in the gain frame. The difference was only 
4.44% in the quasi-field settings for them. In the laboratory, competitive dyads in the loss 
frame made 3.59% less profits when compared to the gain frame. This effect was not 
significant in the quasi-field settings.  
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Figure 20 Joint outcomes between frames within orientations 
 
Therefore, strong effects in the laboratory, such as those observed for 
collaborative dyads, were reproduced in the quasi-field, but weaker ones, such as those 
observed for competitive dyads, were not seen in the quasi-field. 
The other significant difference between the laboratory and quasi-field 
experiments was the number of offers made by each orientation, as shown in Figure 21. 
Collaborative dyads in the laboratory setting produced more offers as compared to quasi-
field one. In the laboratory, they proposed 65.9% more offers in the loss as compared to 
the gain frame. This percentage was decreased in the quasi-field to 37.2%. For the 
competitive dyads, the results from quasi-field experiment actually conflicted with the 
results from the laboratory one. The competitive dyads made more offers in the loss 
frame (25.1% more offers) than they did in the gain frame. This finding challenges the 
observations in the laboratory that competitive dyads produce more offers in the gain 


























































































Figure 21 Number of offers between frames within orientations 
 
When the joint outcomes were compared within frames for both settings, the same 
pattern emerged as with the comparison of frames within orientations. The difference 




























































Figure 22 depicts the difference between competitive and collaborative dyads. In 
the laboratory, the gain frame allowed competitive dyads to make 9.27% more profit than 
collaborative ones. In the quasi-field, this difference was lessened to 3.93%.  The loss 
frame had no impact in the quasi-field (i.e., collaborative dyads obtained 3.37% higher 



























































Figure 23 Number of offers between orientations within frames 
 
In Figure 23, the difference between the number of offers for collaborative and 
competitive dyads is depicted. In terms of comparing different orientations in the gain 
frame, the difference between the two orientations was less in the quasi-field setting than 
in the laboratory (i.e., from 73.1% difference in the laboratory to 41.6% difference in the 
quasi-field). However, the results were even reversed in the loss frame.  Instead of the 
collaborative dyads proposing more offers in the loss frame, it was the competitive dyads 
who produced 29.1% more offers.  
 219 
In terms of the cooperativeness, the two settings produced similar results in both 
frames, as shown in Figure 24. In the gain frame, cooperativeness was not significant in 
both settings, while in the loss frame it was significantly higher for collaborative than 
competitive dyads (i.e., 28.0% higher in the laboratory and 52.7% in the quasi-field).  
 
Figure 24 Cooperativeness between orientations within frames 
 
7.4 Summary of Results 
Before the hypotheses were tested, validations were performed on: (1) confirming the 
items used to measure the subjective variables, (2) verifying the effect of confounding 
variables, and (3) checking that the proper motivational orientation was induced in the 
treatments. These verifications showed that the laboratory and quasi-field experiments 
were appropriately implemented in terms of establishing subjective constructs, limiting 
confounding effects and inducing the motivational orientation needed for each treatment. 
 The laboratory experiment captured data that was mostly supportive of the 




















































outcomes in the loss frame, while competitive dyads reached greater joint outcome in the 
gain frame. For the process, collaborative dyads proposed more offers and exhibited 
greater cooperativeness in the loss frame. The competitive dyads only proposed more 
offers in the gain frame. The framing effect was strongest for collaborative dyads. 
However, the participants in collaborative and competitive treatments did not perceive 
any difference in outcome and process (outcome satisfaction, relationship, cognitive 
effort and discussion climate). This means that the perceptions of the negotiators did not 
match the objective effects measured. 
 The quasi-field experiment only supported some of the findings demonstrated in 
the laboratory setting. When comparing frames, the joint outcome was higher for 
collaborative dyads in the loss than in the gain frame in both settings. For competitive 
dyads, the gain frame was only better than the loss frame in the laboratory setting. The 
comparisons of competitive dyads in the loss frame with the gain frame and with 
collaborative dyads in the loss frame were not significant. Again, the effect of framing 
was strongest for collaborative dyads. For the process in the quasi-field setting, 
competitive dyads produced more offers in the loss than they did in the gain frame 
(contrary to the result from laboratory).   
A summary of the hypotheses testing is shown in Table 46 for the dyadic level 
and Table 47 for the individual level. The transcripts from two sample negotiations are 
shown in Appendix L. 
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Comparing frames within each motivational orientation 
a. Collaborative Joint outcome H1a: Loss >Gain Supported Supported 
Contract balance H2a: Loss >Gain ns ns 
Number of offers H3a: Loss >Gain Supported Supported 
Cooperativeness H4a: Loss >Gain Supported ns 
b. Competitive Joint outcome H1b: Gain >Loss Supported ns 
Contract balance H2b: Gain >Loss ns ns 
Number of offers H3b: Gain >Loss Supported ns 
Cooperativeness H4b: Gain >Loss ns ns 
Comparing motivational orientations within each frame 
a. Gain frame Joint outcome H5a: Competitive > Collaborative Supported Supported 
Contract balance H6a: Competitive > Collaborative ns ns 
Number of offers H7a: Competitive > Collaborative Supported Supported 
Cooperativeness H8a: Competitive > Collaborative ns ns 
b. Loss frame Joint outcome H5b: Collaborative > Competitive Supported ns 
Contract balance H6b: Collaborative > Competitive Supported ns 
Number of offers H7b: Collaborative > Competitive Supported ns 
Cooperativeness H8b: Collaborative > Competitive Supported Supported 
 
 
Table 47 Summary of hypotheses at the individual level 
Treatment Dependent variable Hypothesis Laboratory Quasi-field 
Comparing frames for the process 
Both orientations Cognitive effort H9a: Gain > Loss ns ns 
 Discussion climate H9b: Gain > Loss ns ns 
Comparing frames for the outcome 
Both orientations Outcome satisfaction H10a: Gain = Loss Supported Supported 
 Relationship H10b: Gain = Loss Supported Supported 
 222 
8 Discussion 
ENSs facilitate decision-making and mediate interactions among negotiators. In the 
process, the system presents information to a negotiator that inadvertently frames the 
interaction with the other negotiator. Thus far, the assessment of ENSs has focused 
mostly on a cost benefit framework, media richness theory and IS success without much 
investigation into framing or motivation theories. The thesis examines impact of ENS 
framing on negotiation process and outcome for dyads with different motivational 
orientations. Experiments were conducted in both a laboratory and quasi-field settings to 
integrate framing and motivational research at the dyadic and individual levels.  
Section 8.1 discusses the results of framing at the dyadic level by looking at the 
difference: (1) between gain and loss frame within collaborative and competitive 
orientation, and (2) between the two orientations within each frame. Section 8.2 examines 
the reality and perception gap at the individual level by describing the non-significant 
effects on the subjective variables. Finally, Section 8.3 reflects on the manipulation of 
motivational orientation on a contextual dimension, and English proficiency as a 
confounding variable.  
8.1 Framing Effect on Collaborative and Competitive Dyads 
This study began with the fundamental conjecture that different motivational orientations 
benefit from different framings of potential outcomes. More specifically, the expectation 
was that collaborative dyads benefit from a loss frame as it prevents them from making 
large unfavorable concessions, while competitive dyads profit from a gain frame, which 
promotes concession-making and reduces conflict escalation.  
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The theory underlying these differences was formulated by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), who showed for one-shot decision-problems that when outcomes are 
framed differently, people make different choices. This is especially prevalent for 
negotiators who make more concessions and accept more offers in the gain as opposed to 
the loss frame (Bazerman, Magliozzi et al. 1985).  Although De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 
(1995) advocated that potential outcomes should be presented in the gain frame to 
encourage consensus building, they also alluded to the disadvantage of heightened 
concession-making for collaborators. The loss frame could discourage large concessions 
and benefit collaborators (Trötschel and Gollwitzer 2007) .  
This study empirically tested the interaction of framing and motivational 
orientation by using an ENS. The system not only displayed outcomes in either a positive 
net profit schedule (gain frame) or an expense schedule (loss frame), but also guided the 
process by presenting offers as profits or expenses throughout the negotiation. The results 
from the laboratory and quasi-field experiments suggest that:    
(1) The collaborative dyads proposed more offers and achieved higher joint 
outcome in the loss as opposed to the gain frame, but the reverse framing 
effect is not necessarily true for competitive dyads; 
(2) The collaborative dyads were more susceptible to framing than 
competitive ones; 
(3) The gain frame clearly favored competitive dyads over collaborative ones; 
(4) The gain frame caused greater disparity between collaborative and 
competitive dyads;  
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(5) The loss frame allowed collaborative dyads to propose more cooperative 
offers; 
(6) Contract balance was mostly not affected by the interaction of framing and 
motivational orientation; and  
(7) There exists a gap between the objective and subjective variables 
regarding the process and outcome. 
8.1.1 Framing within Collaborative and Competitive Dyads  
In a series of experiments, Trötschel and Gollwitzer (2007) showed that social motives 
interact with framing, which led the collaborative dyads to easily settle on unfavorable 
solutions in the gain frame as opposed to the loss frame. The results from this laboratory 
study support the claim that there is interaction between ENS framing and motivational 
orientation. Collaborative dyads were found to achieve better joint outcomes in the loss 
frame than in the gain frame, in both laboratory and quasi-field settings.  
On the other hand, competitive dyads obtained higher joint outcomes in the gain 
frame as opposed to the loss frame only in the laboratory and not in the quasi-field 
setting. The findings obtained from the laboratory experiment support the conclusions 
drawn by Bazerman, Magliozzi et al. (1985), who had incentivized all participants to 
behave competitively and observed that they achieved better joint outcomes in the gain 
frame. This framing effect within competitive dyads was also present in the laboratory 
setting of Olekalns (1997) and Schei, Rognes et al. (2006), but not for Olekalns (1994), 
who used a very small sample size that may have prevented the establishment of a 
framing effect. The quasi-field experiment showed no significant framing effect within 
competitive dyads because (1) external influences from the natural setting diminished the 
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relationship between independent and dependent variables (Siah 2005), and (2) 
competitive dyads were less sensitive to framing than collaborative ones (De Dreu, 
Carnevale et al. 1995). The laboratory experiments were conducted in artificial 
environments that served mostly to isolate the effects of the confounding or extraneous 
variables. When this environment was challenged in more realistic settings, weak effects, 
such as those relating to competitive dyads, were found to be not significant.  
 In the laboratory, collaborative dyads produced more offers and these were of 
better quality (i.e., greater measure of cooperativeness) in the loss frame than in the gain 
frame. Competitive dyads produced more offers in the gain as opposed to the loss frame. 
The dissimilarity between both orientations is due to the gain frame promoting 
concession-making as suggested by Carnevale and Pruitt (1992). Therefore in the gain 
frame, competitors were encouraged to make more offers and smaller concessions, while 
collaborators made less offers and large concessions, which later limited the possibility of 
exploring each other‘s preferences (i.e., through further concessions). 
 In the quasi-field, collaborative dyads also proposed more offers in the loss than 
gain frame, but to a lesser extent than in the laboratory. Surprisingly, competitive dyads 
also proposed more offers in the loss than gain frame, which did not lead them to better 
outcomes. The increased number of offers in the natural setting suggests that the 
contention, from negotiating in a loss frame, caused competitive dyads to maintain their 
position with more offers when they were given more time to do so.  
These findings could explain the discrepancy of results between ENS studies that 
related usage of system to negotiation outcomes. For example, Foroughi, Perkins et al. 
(1995) found that more agreements and higher joint outcome were reached with decision 
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support, but there were no significant difference between the numbers of offers for 
different ENS (with and without decision support). Lai, Doong et al. (2006) showed that 
collaborative negotiators, who sent more offers, reached more agreements. The difference 
between Foroughi, Perkins et al. (1995) and Lai, Doong et al. (2006) was the 
motivational orientation behind the negotiations. Foroughi, Perkins et al. (1995) induced 
all participants to be competitive, whereas Lai, Doong et al. (2006) used a field 
experiment that encouraged participants to exhibit their inherent orientations, which were 
later measured and clustered into collaborative and non-collaborative orientations. From 
this study, it is suggested that usage (in terms of number of offers) played a more 
important role towards collaborative dyads reaching better negotiation outcomes as 
claimed by Lai, Doong et al. (2006) than it did for competitive ones as found by 
Foroughi, Perkins et al. (1995).   
8.1.2 Comparing Motivational Orientations within Frames 
When outcome and process results were compared within the same frame in the 
laboratory, it was found that the gain frame engendered competitive dyads to achieve 
higher joint outcome and propose more offers, while the loss frame allowed collaborative 
dyads to reach higher joint outcome and better contract balance, make more offers, and 
exhibit greater cooperativeness. The results concerning the outcome variables are in 
accordance with those found in Trötschel and Gollwitzer‘s experiments (2007). In the 
quasi-field experiment, the effects of the gain frame were replicated but to a lesser extent 
(see Figure 20 and Figure 21 for the gain frame). The loss frame produced only greater 
cooperativeness for collaborative dyads, and the number of offers was found to be greater 
for competitive rather than collaborative dyads in the loss frame.  
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Both experimental settings demonstrated that, in the gain frame, competitive 
dyads achieved higher joint outcome and proposed more offers than collaborative ones. 
The findings confirm those from the motivational studies (Olekalns, Smith et al 1996; 
Olekalns 1997; Schei and Rognes 2003; Schei, Rognes et al. 2006), which have mostly 
been conducted in the gain frame. Again, the explanation rests with the impact of the gain 
frame to encourage concession-making, which helps competitive dyads but harms 
collaborative ones.  
Although, in the laboratory, the loss frame affected all outcome and process 
variables, these effects on the joint outcome and number of offers were less than those 
seen in the gain frame (refer to Table 33). By implementing the loss frame in the quasi-
field, the joint outcome was not significantly different between orientations, and the 
number of offers was actually higher for competitive instead of collaborative dyads. 
However, cooperativeness was significantly higher for collaborative than competitive 
dyads in both experiments. Once more, the results suggest that the loss frame helped 
collaborators to resist making large concessions, so that they were able to explore 
possibilities for mutual benefits. This coincides with the findings of Trötschel and 
Gollwitzer (2007), who demonstrated that collaborative dyads used integrative strategies 
(i.e., increased mutual value) (1) more frequently in the loss than in the gain frame, and 
(2) more than competitive dyads in the loss frame. Even though the number of offers was 
greater in the quasi-field for competitive dyads than collaborative dyads, the extended 
time in this setting may have allowed competitors to make more offers, but not 
necessarily the cooperative ones.    
 228 
Compared to the gain frame, the less significant (in the laboratory) and  non-
significant (in the quasi-field) effects of the loss frame on outcome variables suggest that, 
if a general frame is to be employed then, the loss frame would not favor one type of 
orientation over another.  Therefore, the general premise advocating the gain frame in 
negotiation (Bazerman, Magliozzi et al. 1985; Bazerman 1986; De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 
1994; Olekalns 1994; De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 1995; De Dreu and McCusker 1997; 
O'Connor and Carnevale 1997; Bazerman, Curhan et al. 2000; Trötschel and Gollwitzer 
2007) is questionable This thesis argues that the best scenario would be to know the 
motivational orientation of the negotiators beforehand and then implement the 
appropriate framing.  
In regards to contract balance, this variable mostly was not insignificantly 
affected by the treatments, except when comparing collaborative and competitive dyads 
in the laboratory. The results in the laboratory showed that, when compared with 
collaborative dyads, competitive ones in the loss frame arrived at unbalanced solutions.  
8.2 Gap between Reality and Perceptions 
Thompson and Hastie (1990) and Bazerman, Curhan et al. (2000) suggested that 
economic outcomes are not necessarily reflected by individual perceptions. This study, 
however, hypothesized that the increased effort and decreased cooperation attributed to 
the loss frame (De Dreu, Carnevale et al. 1995; Trötschel and Gollwitzer 2007) would 
impact the participants‘ evaluation of the process. The results for both the laboratory and 
quasi-field experiments indicated that ENS framing does not affect perceptions of 
cognitive effort, discussion climate, relationship and outcome satisfaction. Such a gap 
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between perception and reality was also observed by Lim and Yang (2008) when they 
assessed the effects of multilingual ENS. 
 The indifference to framing (i.e., the lack of perceived differences between 
frames) would allow an ENS to be implemented in either frame without affecting 
subjective evaluations. This means that the system owner could employ whichever frame 
without the users perceiving a difference in the process and/or outcome.  
8.3  Manipulation of Orientation and Confounding Variables 
Motivational orientations have been shown to be governed by two antecedents 
(contextual effects and inherent individual differences), which have been equally 
successful at generating different dyadic compositions for experimentation (De Dreu and 
Weingart et al. 2000). Most often, researches used the context (through incentives and 
instructions) to induce the different orientations and a manipulation check would be 
performed ex-post to verify the operationalization (e.g., Olekalns, 1994). However, some 
researchers preferred to measure the participants‘ inherent orientation and then paired 
them into desired dyadic compositions (e.g., De Dreu and Van Lange, 1995).  
 This study, in the laboratory and quasi-field experiments, combined both methods 
(i.e., AMO was first assessed and then instruction were given to induce the collaborative 
and competitive orientations). The manipulation checks showed that collaborators and 
competitors responded correctly to questions regarding their motivational instructions. 
Collaborators and competitors also selected corresponding strategies that were indicative 
of their induced orientation as specified by De Dreu, Beersma et al. (2006). Although 
most participants were inherently competitive (68% in the laboratory and 66% in the 
quasi-field), they followed their instructions and applied matching strategies. 
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Furthermore, AMO was tested as a confounding variable on the dependent variables, and 
no effects were found (see Table 28 and Table 39), whereas the induced motivational 
orientations influenced the objective variables. The contextual manipulation of 
orientation appeared to trump the participants‘ inherent orientation. This puts into 
question the findings from studies that employed AMO to create different dyadic 
composition, but rewarded participants for their individual performances (competitive 
manipulation), such as the work by Olekalns and Smith (1999).  
 Regarding other confounding variables, English proficiency was shown to affect 
perceptions on cognitive effort in the laboratory (see Table 34 and Table 35). As 
globalization has increased trade, universities have headed towards a more diverse 
student population. This study took into account this trend and included English 
proficiency as a possible confounding factor. The results indicate that cognitive effort 
was affected by English proficiency in the laboratory. The quasi-field setting was not 
influenced by this confounding variable because participants were not required to take 
part or be punished for abandoning the process (i.e., they were incentivized with bonus 
marks). Those who found the case or the process difficult (e.g., based on their English 
proficiency) and quit the experiment were not counted in the results. However, the 
students from the laboratory were required to participate in the negotiations as part of 
their assignment.  In each setting, they were rewarded with a maximum of 2% toward 
their final grade for trying to follow the objectives of their treatment group.  
 In sum, the two settings and manipulation checks expanded the conclusions drawn 
on ENS framing for different motivational orientation and even explained the 
discrepancies in the literature.  
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9 Conclusion 
The reviews in Section 2 and Section 4 showed that most behavioral studies were 
conducted with face-to-face negotiations, while ENS studies, described in Section 3, 
generally examined competitive negotiations in the gain frame.  As technology plays a 
more active role in negotiations, the contributions of the study not only serve negotiation 
and IS researchers by integrating decision theory, motivational theory and design 
research, but also ENS designers. This work showcases the relationship between people 
and technology as well as that between people interacting with each other through 
technology. 
 Motivational theory classifies negotiators into two main orientations 
(collaborators and competitors) based either on their predisposition or the objective of the 
negotiation task. A review of motivational orientation studies demonstrates that the 
dyadic composition is the most influential factor in predicting outcomes, and that 
technology, protocol and outcome framing can moderate the negotiation process. 
However, very few studies have examined the impact of technology on motivational 
orientation, and likewise little is known about framing effects on the process.  
The goal of ENSs is to facilitate learning (of the problem, solutions and 
counterpart) and communications by helping users reach agreements that are favourable 
both for the individuals and dyads. Over the years, the emphasis on decision support has 
grown considerably, especially for complex negotiations that involve multiple issues and 
parties. The assessment of ENS studies shows that most research focuses on a cost 
benefit framework, media richness theory and IS models of success without much 
consideration of cognitive theories of negotiation. If decision support tool is to structure, 
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transform and summarize information, then the implications of such support needs to be 
understood, especially as they relate to the manipulation of outcome information. So far, 
outcome framing has been examined in face-to-face negotiations using different profit 
schedules. As ENSs facilitate decision-making and moderate interactions between both 
sides, they inevitably frame outcomes throughout the process by the information 
presented. Depending on which frame is presented, negotiators behave differently.  
This study showed that, in the laboratory, collaborative dyads proposed more 
offers and achieved higher joint outcomes in the loss rather than in the gain frame, but 
competitive ones had the reverse results from the framing effect. Moreover, the 
parameters of the laboratory experiment (e.g., case, incentive structure and ENS) were 
applied to a quasi-field setting, whereby, similar participants were given seven days to 
negotiate without the help of a facilitator and using any browser technology at their 
convenience. The quasi-field setting had not been used in framing experiments and it 
contributed to expanding the validity of the findings.     
In general, the advantage of laboratory experiments is that the effects of 
independent variables on dependent ones can be amplified through the manipulation of 
the environment (Kerlinger and Lee 2000). Conversely, the quasi-field setting relaxed the 
requirements of the laboratory controls (e.g., negotiators were not limited to 45 minutes 
of exchange as in the laboratory). The more natural setting showed that the joint 
outcomes of collaborative dyads were affected by framing and that there was an 
interaction between orientations and frames. These differences reflect the need for 
laboratory settings to incorporate important elements in the natural environment. For 
example, ENS facilitates asynchronous interactions by letting users logon and logoff over 
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long periods of time. Such circumstance would be difficult to reproduce in a laboratory 
setting and would play an important role in the study of ENSs. Therefore, the quasi-field 
setting is more ideal for mimicking negotiations over many days with confounding 
effects that cannot be controlled in the laboratory.   
The comparison of experimental settings indicate that: (1) the collaborative dyads 
are more susceptible to framing than competitive ones, (2) the gain frame encourages 
concession-making, which favors competitive dyads over collaborative ones, (3) the 
disparities between the two orientations, in terms of joint outcomes and number of offers, 
are greater in the gain frame, and (4) the loss frame promotes cooperativeness for 
collaborative dyads as compared to competitive ones.  
9.1 Implications for Research 
For negotiation researchers, these results highlight the significance of context in 
negotiation experiments. Any experiment that uses incentives, instructions and an ENS 
must take into account the biases that these introduce to the participants. Especially for 
collaborative negotiators who are more affected by framing. Studies on mixed dyads in 
the different frames would provide more insight on the dynamics of motivational 
orientation and ENS framing interactions.  
For the ENS designers, the implications of these findings are that, before framing 
outcomes to users, it is important to first ascertain the motivational orientation of the 
dyad. Then, according to the orientation of the dyad, the proper framing can lead to more 
offers being made and higher mutual gains. If orientation cannot be determined in 
advance or a ubiquitous frame must be implemented (e.g., the system is hard-coded to 
show all offers as gains), then the loss frame should be employed, since it allows for less 
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disparity between collaborative and competitive dyads. The subjective variables show 
that framing was not perceived by the negotiators, suggesting that the ENS can be 
implemented in any frame without causing adverse perceptions. System owners can 
influence joint outcomes by displaying information in either the gain or loss frame. 
For IS researchers, the contributions at the methodological level include the 
following: (1) multi-level studies can provide different results (e.g., if this study was only 
conducted at the individual level, using only perceptions, no significant effects would be 
found); (2) the context can be more important than individual differences when 
examining system usage; (3) English proficiency, which is rarely measured unlike 
gender, age or experience, can be a confounding variable, especially when online systems 
are used in a global setting; and (4) the combination of a laboratory and quasi-field 
setting reveals strong and weak effects.  
This study indicates that the gain frame was favorable for competitive dyads and 
unfavorable for collaborative ones because it encouraged concession-making. 
Conversely, the loss frame distracts competitors from making concessions. De Dreu and 
Carnevale (1995) suspected that the loss frame causes competitors to resist concession-
making until either one side gives in or walks away. Three observations from the 
laboratory experiment supported such an explanation: (1) the only dyad that did not reach 
an agreement was the one given the competitive orientation in the loss frame; (2) the 
quality of offers (measured in terms of cooperativeness) was lower for competitive than 
collaborative dyads in the loss frame; and (3) the contract balance was greater for the 
collaborative dyads than the competitive ones in the loss frame. Therefore, any approach 
or manipulation that affects the judgment of concessions can produce greater gains for 
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both orientations, as long as competitors are encouraged to make concessions and 
collaborators are discouraged from doing so.  
9.2 Implications for Practice 
For negotiators, this thesis provides some practical recommendations. Since the 
motivational orientation and framing were manipulated in the experiments, negotiators 
can also do the same. If the dyadic composition is known, then the framing of the 
problem and offers can be established through communications with the other party. For 
example, one may say: ―accepting this offer will give you a profit of x.‖ to induce a gain 
frame. If the dyadic composition is competitively oriented, then a greater emphasis must 
be placed on establishing a gain frame and/or promoting concession-making as 
competitors are less influenced by framing than collaborators.  
Alternatively, if the counterpart has a set frame in gains or losses (e.g., some 
people unequivocally see ―the glass as half empty‖, i.e. in negative terms) then the 
orientation may be induced by changing the objective of the negotiation. For example, 
one may say: ―whatever deal we reach, I can give you x percentage of my profit from the 
settlement‖. The motivational orientation may be changed by affecting any one or all of 
the four contextual dimensions (substantive, relational, divergent and emotional).   
9.3 Limitations and Future Research 
The major limitation of this study is the generalizability of the findings. As negotiation is 
a complex process that includes many stages, the case addressed only the conduct of 
negotiation and more specifically the discussion involving two integrative and one 
distributive issues. The experiment controlled for external factors (e.g., power, past 
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history, etc), which are found in real-life negotiations, in order to isolate the effects of 
framing. Another limitation is that each participant negotiated once, which may have 
influenced the subjective assessment of framing.   
 Another limitation of this study is that only offers were analyzed, the messages 
between negotiators were not considered. The text-based communication between 
negotiators can provide further clues on the effects of framing, such as whether 
competitive dyads were more willing to reveal their preferences in the gain versus the 
loss frame.  
In order to expand on the present study, several avenues can be explored. Firstly, 
mixed frames could be used to investigate theories on frame adoption, which would show 
the differences between a buyer (who is believed to be negotiating in a loss frame) and a 
seller (who is believed to be negotiating in a gain frame). Secondly, motivational 
orientations could be mixed to form mixed dyads. Experiments on mixed dyads could 
show whether the competitor‘s dominance over collaborator exists only in the gain frame 
or is also present the loss frame. Thirdly, a repeated measure design may enhance the 
subjective findings on framing effects, because participants who get to experience both 
frames could provide a better comparison of the two. Finally, a different scenario (e.g., 
one involving ethics in an organization) could extend the findings beyond business 
negotiations and increase the external validity of the findings. 
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Appendix A: Case of Retailer and Producer of Movies 
 
HYPERFLIC 
You own an online retail store, called HYPERFLIC, selling independent films that buyers can view through 
streaming. You are in negotiation with UBERSHIFT, a producer of independent, European films. Both 
parties have settled on the industry standard of price per film, but three other issues still need to be 
discussed. These issues are: delivery time, discount terms and financial terms.  
 Delivery time refers to the lag time between the release of the movie and the upload of the movie 
by UBERSHIFT to your server. 
 Discount terms describe the markdown that UBERSHIFT provides you for selling the films. 
 Financial terms center on the percentage of the price that you pay UBERSHIFT before they 
upload the movie to your server. The rest of the price is paid three months after you received the 
film.  
 
The following table shows your profit schedule for the negotiation. It helps you determine what each 




 Discount terms  Financial terms 
   0 day $20,000  10% $30,000  0  % $50,000 
1 day $17,500   9 % $26,250  13 % $43,750 
2 day $15,000  8 % $22,500  25 % $37,500 
 
3 day $12,500  7 % $18,750  38 % $31,250 
4 day $10,000  6 % $15,000  50 % $25,000 
5 day $7,500  5 % $11,250  63 % $18,750 
 
6 day $5,000  4 % $7,500  75 % $12,500 
7 day $2,500  3 % $3,750  88 % $6,250 
8 day $0  2 % $0  100% $0 
 
This profit schedule applies only to you. UBERSHIFT uses a different profit schedule. 
 
For example: based on the profit schedule, if you and your counterpart agree to the delivery time of 7 days, 
a discount term of 6% and a financial term of 13%, then your total profit is $61,250. 
 
 
 Options Profit 
Issues 
Delivery time 7 days $2,500 
Discount terms 6 % $15,000 
Financial terms 13% $43,750 
Your total profit   $61,250 
 
Negotiation objective:  
Collaborators UBERSHIFT is an important producer that has made (and will make) many 
lucrative films, and therefore, the welfare of your counterpart is important to you. 
Your goal is to try to earn as much profit for you and for UBERSHIFT as 
possible. 
Competitors UBERSHIFT is new producer that may (or may not) stay in business, and 
therefore, you care only about your gains. Your goal is try to earn as much 




You are a producer of independent, European films, called UBERSHIFT. As a new method of distribution, 
you plan to sell your products to HYPERFLIC, an online retail store of independent films that allows 
buyers to view movies through streaming. In the contract negotiation, both parties have settled on the 
industry standard of price per film, but three other issues still need to be discussed. These issues are: 
delivery time, discount terms and financial terms.  
 Delivery time refers to the lag time between the release of the movie and the upload of the movie 
to HYPERFLIC‗s server. 
 Discount terms describe the markdown that you provide HYPERFLIC for the sale of the films.  
 Financial terms center on the percentage of the price that you receive from HYPERFLIC before 
you upload the movie to their server. The rest of the price is paid three months after they received 
the film.  
 
The following table shows your profit schedule for the negotiation. It helps you determine what each 





 Discount terms  Financial terms 
   8 day $50,000  2 % $30,000  100  % $20,000 
7 day $43,750  3 % $26,250  88 % $17,500  
6 day $37,500  4 % $22,500  75 % $15,000 
 
5 day $31,250  5 % $18,750  63 % $12,500 
4 day $25,000  6 % $15,000  50 % $10,000 
3 day $18,750  7 % $11,250  38 % $7,500 
 
2 day $12,500  8 % $7,500  25 % $5,000 
1 day $6,250  9 % $3,750  13 % $2,500 
0 day $0  10 % $0  100% $0 
 
This profit schedule applies only to you. HYPERFLIC uses a different profit schedule. 
 
For example: based on the profit schedule, if you and your counterpart agree to the delivery time of 7 days, 




 Options Profit 
Issues 
Delivery time 7 days $43,750 
Discount terms 6 % $15,000 
Financial terms 13% $2,500 
Your total profit   $61,250 
 
Negotiation objective:  
Collaborators HYPERFLIC is an important retailer that has sold (and will sell) many 
independent films, and therefore, the welfare of your counterpart is important to 
you. Your goal is to try to earn as much profit for you and for HYPERFLIC 
as possible. 
Competitors HYPERFLIC is new retailer that may (or may not) stay in business, and 
therefore, you care only about your gains. Your goal is try to earn as much 




























Appendix C: Recruitment process for participants 
The proliferation of e-markets and collaborative systems are an integral part of the 
globalization of business operations and creation of virtual team environments. On one 
hand, Web 2.0, social network, wikis and document sharing tools are some of the 
technologies that support collaborative decision making to encourage new product 
development. On the other hand, supply chains are expanded to partners across continents 
through the use of e-market systems that bring demand and supply of online participants 
to balance.  
 This proposal suggests the teaching of e-market and collaborative systems to 
students through three stages: 
Lecture:  The first stage consists of a lecture on such systems by (1) defining these 
systems, (2) highlighting their present use in business, and (3) suggesting potential 
application for creating new business models or enhancing present operations. (The time 
required depends on that allocated by the instructor.) 
Experiment: The second stage gives students a practical experience with an e-
negotiation system (type of e-market system), which enables them to learn first-hand the 
functions of negotiating a contract online. The experiment is composed of the following 
activities: 
 Assessment of disposition (either collaborative or competitive) ---(15 min) 
 Read a business contract case ---(15 min) 
 Answer a quiz on the case ---(10 min) 
 Negotiate with a counterpart by exchanging offers and messages ---(30 min) 
 Answer a post-questionnaire on system features and evaluation of outcomes ---(20 
min) 
The total activities will take about 1½ hours that take place outside of class. A website 
will be setup for students to register and select the different sessions that they can present 
themselves in.  
 
The students will be given a grade on participation and performance (z-score advocated 
by Raiffa 1982). Depending on whether the students participated in a collaborative or 
competitive treatment, the performance is based on the profit that the individual achieves 
for the company in a competitive setting and both parties get in a collaborative setting. 
Short report: The third stage asks students identify issues that a mobile service company 
would use in online negotiations with potential customers. In addition, they need to 
describe two advantages and disadvantages associated to using a collaborative and 
competitive strategy.  
 
The overall grade for this learning experience is:  
Experiment participation (40%) + Experiment performance (40%) + Short report (20%) 
 
The contribution to the course is: 
 Introduction to e-market and collaborative systems and their place in business 
 First hand experience with an e-negotiation system 
 Discover the application of such systems in the industry 
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Appendix D: Assessment of Motivational Orientation  
In this task, we ask you to imagine that you have been randomly paired with another person (the Other). 
The Other is someone you do not know and that you will not meet in the future.  
 
Imagine a situation in which you and the Other can choose separately one of three available options. You 
decide without knowing the option chosen by the Other. Likewise, the Other does not know your choice 
when deciding.  
 
Each option gives points for yourself and the Other. For example, if the options available for each one are: 
(1) you get 250, other gets 250 
(2) you get 500, other gets 0 
(3) you get 0, other gets 500 
 
After each one has picked an option, the total points you receive is the sum of points from your choice and 
that of the Other. For example, if you choose option (2) and the Other picks option (1). You get a total of 
750 points. The more points you receive, the better for you. 
 
Please keep in mind that there is no right or wrong answer—choose the option that you, for whatever 
reason, prefer most. Below are nine independent situations. Please tell us which one of the three available 









You get 480 540 480 
Other gets 80 280 480 
Your choice    








You get 560 500 500 
Other gets 300 500 100 
Your choice    








You get 520 520 580 
Other gets 520 120 320 
Your choice    








You get 500 560 490 
Other gets 100 300 490 
Your choice    








You get 560 500 490 
Other gets 300 500 90 
Your choice    








You get 500 500 570 
Other gets 500 100 300 
Your choice    
 
 









You get 510 560 510 
Other gets 510 300 110 
Your choice    








You get 550 500 500 
Other gets 300 100 500 
Your choice    








You get 480 490 540 
Other gets 100 490 300 
Your choice    





Appendix E: Quiz  
 
Example quiz for Collaborators 
 
Questions Answer options 
1. HYPERFLIC is a (1) online retail store selling independent 
films 
(2) producer of independent European films 
(3) software producer 
2. UBERSHIFT is a (1) online retail store selling independent 
films 
(2) producer of independent European films 
(3) software producer 
3. The three issues for negotiation are (1) financial terms, price per film, discount 
terms 
(2) price per film, delivery time and 
discount terms 
(3) delivery time, discount terms and 
financial terms 
4. For example: if you send an offer for 
a delivery time of 4 days (worth 
$25,000), discount terms of 6 percent 
(worth $15,000) and financial terms of 5 
percent (worth $10,000), and your 
counterpart accept this offer, then your 
total profit is (in thousands of $)  
(1) 50 
(2) 25  
(3) 45 
5. Your objective in this negotiation is to (1) earn as much profit for myself as I can 
(2) earn as much profit for myself and my 
counterpart as I can 
 
Answers: 1(1), 2(2), 3(3), 4(1), 5(2) 
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Appendix F: Instruction for Experiments 
You are participating in an experiment that involves negotiating with another person (the 
counterpart). All interactions take place on this website. The moment you receive the 
signal to start negotiations, you have 45 minutes to negotiate with your counterpart, who 
is in another laboratory. After 45 minutes, your will be asked to end negotiations even if 
you have not reached an agreement. 
 Please, follow the instructions shown on your screen that will guide you through the 
experiment.  Once you have reach an agreement or you wish to terminate all interaction 
with your counterpart, click ―End negotiation‖. ―End negotiation‖ will terminate all 
interaction with your partner, so please be sure when you click on this button. The final 
step requires you to fill out a questionnaire. The questionnaire is imperative to 
completing your participation in the experiment.  
Your identity is never revealed throughout the experiment. All communication between 
you and the other participant must remain anonymous. You are not allowed to reveal 
your real name or any personal information that can identify you to the other participant, 
and vice versa.  
As responses from the other participant may take some time, your patience is highly 
appreciated during the experimental process.  
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Appendix G: Questionnaire on Subjective Variables and 
Manipulation Check 
 
The sections measure: a) Outcome satisfaction, b) relationship, c) cognitive effort, d) 
discussion climate, and e) manipulation check for motivational orientation. 
 
 
Based on your experience in this negotiation, please answer the following questions as 












































































































1.    the achieved outcome?        
2. the results compared to your expectations?        
3. the outcome when looking at what you originally 
wanted? 
       























































































5. my counterpart listened to my concerns.        
6. a good foundation was set for future relationships 
with my counterpart. 
       
7. my counterpart acted in good faith.        
8. my counterpart was honest.        
 












































































9. acting in my role was…        
10. meeting the objectives of the case was…        
11. making decisions was…        

























The questionnaire was built from items adapted from other studies on negotiation and 
ENS. First a list of items was selected for each constructs, then three senior and five 
junior researchers revised the items to help construct the questionnaire. 
 
Questions measuring outcome satisfaction  
1 How satisfied (or dissatisfied) are you with the quality of the outcome which you 
and the other party reached? (original from Suh 1999) 
How satisfied (or dissatisfied) are you with the achieved outcome? 
2 Did the negotiation meet your prior expectation? (Vetchera et al. 2004) 
How satisfied (or dissatisfied) are you with the results compared to your 
expectations? 
3 To what extent are you confident that the outcome is optimal? (Suh 1999) 
How satisfied (or dissatisfied) are you with the outcome when looking at what you 
originally wanted? 
4 To what extent does the final solution reflect your input (Suh 1999) 



























































































13. the atmosphere was agreeable.        
14. I felt comfortable.        
15. my counterpart listened to me.        
16. the interaction was sociable.        
17. I could openly discuss disagreements        
e) In the case…        
18. I was instructed to try to reduce expenses 
for me only. (loss frame) 
       
19. I was instructed to try to reduce expenses 
for me and my counterpart. (loss frame) 
       
In negotiation, …        
20. Always gave others the benefit of the 
doubt. 
       
21. Your loss is my gain.        
22. Take a problem solving approach.        
23. The best defense is a good offense.        
24. Negotiate fair.        
25. Winner takes all.        
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Questions measuring relationship 
5 Do you feel your counterpart listened to your concerns? (Curhan et al. 2000) 
In the negotiation, my counterpart listened to my concerns. 
6 Did the negotiation build a good foundation for a future relationship with your 
counterpart? (Curhan et al. 2000) 
In the negotiation, a good foundation was set for future relationships with my 
counterpart. 
7 During the negotiation, at times, I felt suspicious about the other negotiator’s 
statement. (Jones and Jelassi 1990) 
In the negotiation, my counterpart acted in good faith. 
8 During the decision-making task, the others were honest with me. (Beersma and 
De Dreu 2002) 
In the negotiation, my counterpart was honest. 
 
Questions measuring cognitive effort 
9 In the negotiation process, acting in my role was… (Chen et al. 2009) 
In the negotiation process, acting in my role was… 
10 In the negotiation process, meeting the objectives of the case was…(Chen et al. 
2009) 
In the negotiation process, meeting the objectives of the case was… 
11 In the negotiation process, making decisions was…(Chen et al. 2009) 
In the negotiation process, making decisions was… 
12 In the negotiation process, interacting in the business scenario was… (Chen et al. 
2009) 
In the negotiation process, interacting in the business scenario was… 
 
Questions measuring discussion climate 
13 During the decision-making task, the atmosphere was agreeable. (Beersma and De 
Dreu 2002)  
During the negotiation process, the atmosphere was agreeable. 
14 During the decision-making task, I felt comfortable. (Beersma and De Dreu 2002) 
During the negotiation process, I felt comfortable.  
15 During the decision-making task, the others listened to me. (Beersma and De Dreu 
2002) 
During the negotiation process, my counterpart listened to me. 
16 During the negotiation, our interaction was sociable. (Beersma and De Dreu 
2002) 
During the negotiation process, the interaction was sociable.  
17 During the negotiation, for the most part, the other negotiator and I could discuss 
our disagreements (Foroughi et al. 1995) 
During the negotiation, I could openly discussion disagreements 
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Appendix H: Facilitation Instructions 
Thank you for your involvement in our experiments. You should receive these 
instructions at least 2 days prior to the experiment. In order to maintain consistency from 
one experiment to another we ask you to please follow instructions closely. Please restrict 
communication with the participants to a minimum. 
 
1. Meet project manager 
 
  Check 
A. Make sure you know how to use FirstClass Chat (If you do not have a FirstClass 
account, one will be provided for you) 
 
⁯ 
B. Read these instructions beforehand and contact the manager should you have 
questions. You must meet the manager 15 minutes before the schedule start 
time for experiments at GM 903-07  
 
⁯ 
C. Collect from the manager the Facilitator’s folder, which contains: 
 Pen 
 Facilitator note sheet 
 Copy of Instructions for Facilitators 
 AMO questionnaire 
 Public Information sheet (General instructions) 
 Private Information sheet 
 System Guide sheet 
 Handouts for participants 












E. Go to your lab  
 2
nd
 floor lab (210)  
 5
th





2. Setup lab for experiment 
 
A. Login to every computer in the lab: 
 2
nd
 floor lab, username: dsmis password: dsmis 
 5
th
 floor lab, username: lc password: lc 
 
⁯ 
B. Login to FirstClass on the facilitator’s computer and initiate chat session with 
co-facilitator and manager. 
 2
nd
 floor lab, use the computer in the 1
st
 row closest to the door  
 5
th
 floor lab, use the computer next to the door  
 
⁯ 
C. Setup the participants’ computers: 
 check system time if synchronized on all machines 
 open the browser 
 check the screen setting (1024 X 768 pixels) 
















3. Greet participants 
 
A. Welcome the participants, check their name off the list, and assign them to the 
computer that matches their number card. 
 
⁯ 
B. Wait for manager to report the number of participants sent to the lab.  
 Count the number of participants  
 Once the number of participants in the lab matches that reported by the 
manager Confirm the number of participants with manager 
 At this time no more participants may join the experiment 




C. Read aloud the following instructions: 
 
 “Welcome to our experiment” 
 “Please do not touch the system until I signal the start of experiments” 
 “Please do not speak to other participants in the lab” 
 “Please do not use any other items, other than what I give you” 
 “Please turn off all cell phones” 
 
 
D. Receive signal from manager that match-up is successful 










F.  Confirm that participants in both labs have signed the consent form and 
see the above screen 
 Post on FirstClass that you are ready for AMO 
 
⁯ 
G. Ask students to click continue on the welcome page 
 
Tell the participants: 
 
“The next page that you see is a short personality test. There are no 
























J. Read the public instructions aloud 
Ask if they have any questions 
⁯  
K. Make sure participants see this screen once they completed public information 
 
⁯  
L. Read the private instructions aloud 
Ask if they have any questions 
⁯  
M. Tell participants they will proceed to a quiz to help them understand the case ⁯  
O. Ask participants to turn to System Guide and tell them aloud: 
 
 “You are about to engage in negotiation with your counterpart” 
⁯  
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 “You do so by proposing offers and sending messages to communicate with 
your counterpart” 
 “The negotiation activities are on your right hand side: send message and 
offer, read last offer and view history” 
 
Read the orange box  
 
 “Once your time is up we will ask you to click end negotiation, but don’t press 
it in the meantime or your session with be terminated and we can’t get it back” 
 “The bottom picture shows the view graph function that allows you to see the 
progress of the offers” 
 “Click refresh to view new offers from the counterpart” 
 “Once you have reached an agreement, just click End Negotiation. Don’t worry 
about post-settlement analysis” 
 “When we ask you to evaluate the Invite system at the end of negotiations, 
please disregard the screenshots shown before and consider the screens 
starting from now” 
 
 Ask if they have any questions 
 Tell participants to click “continue” 
 
P. Instruct participants: 
 
“After this point, please refrain from talking out loud. And if you have any questions, 
please raise your hand at any time and I will come to you.” 
⁯  
Q. Inform co-facilitator that you are ready for negotiations and coordinate start time to 45 min 









4. Start negotiation 
 
A. Inform participants: 
 
 “You have 45 minutes to negotiate” 
 “Please proceed to make an offer and/or send a message” 
 
⁯  




C.  During negotiations, if participants finish negotiating before the deadline 
 go to them  









E. Instruct participants: “Please proceed to Post-questionnaire and raise your hand 








5. End experiment 
 
A.  When participants raise their hand to signal an end, 
 Thank them for their participation and tell them they can leave 
 collect the printouts and consent form 
 
⁯  
B. Wait for everyone to leave 
 tidy up the lab 
 logout and turn off computers 
 lock the lab door 
⁯  
 
Watch out for: 
A. Participants, who talk to each other and look at other screens. 
B. Participants with difficulties, remind them that they can ask questions if they have 
any problems. 
 Especially be careful not to give your opinion on the experiment, systems, 
negotiation etc. when answering questions, because this can bias the outcome. 
 If there is a software problem, e-mail Shikui (FirstClass) 
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If the participants accidentally close their window before they start negotiating on 





Appendix I: System Guide 
 
(1) Offer construction page 
 
(a) Gain Frame 
 
 
Your profit of an offer represents 
the gains (in thousand $) you get 
compared to the worst ($0) possible 
offer.  
If you make an offer with the value 
of 10 and it is accepted, then it 
means you gain $10,000 of profit.  
The greater the value means the 
higher the profits. 
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(b) Loss Frame 
 
 
Your expense for an offer 
represents the losses (in thousand $) 
compared to the best ($0) possible 
offer.  
If you make an offer with the value 
of 10 and it is accepted, then it 
means you lose $10,000 of profit.  
The greater the value means the 
higher the losses. 
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Once you have reach an agreement 
or you wish to terminate all 
interaction with your counterpart, 
click ―End negotiation‖.  
 
Don‘t press ―End negotiation‖, if 
you still wish to exchange offers 
and messages. Your negotiation 
can’t be reset once you press this 
button. 
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Appendix K: Consent Form 
This is to confirm that I agree to release the data collected in this experiment to the 
InterNeg research team headed by Dr. Gregory Kersten of the Department of Decision 
Sciences & MIS, John Molson School of Business, Concordia University.  
 
A. Purpose 
I have been informed that: 
 
 The purpose of the research is to investigate the use and effectiveness of 





 Participate in an experiment of no more than 2 hours; 
 Follow the instructions given during the process; 
 Use a computer and web browser to negotiate with another party; and 
 Fill out questionnaires. 
 
C. Conditions for participation 
I understand that: 
 
 The experimenters cannot impose any negative consequences on me should I 
decide to withdraw from the experiment. I am free to withdraw my consent and 
discontinue my participation in the experimental process at anytime.  
 My identification information in this study is fully anonymous to the researchers. 
 Only the instructor for the course will know my identity.  
 The data for this study may be publish without revealing information that can 
identify me; 
 I have the right to see any research report arising from data that I have 
contributed. 
 
I have carefully studied the above and understand this agreement. By printing my name 
and signing this form, I freely consent and voluntarily agree to participate in this study. 
 
Name:  Signature:   
 (please print)    
  Date:    
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Appendix L: Sample Transcripts 
 
The following is an unedited transcript of a participant playing the role of the retailer 
(Hyperflic) in a collaborative, loss frame treatment. 
 
UBERSHIFT accepted this offer on 2009-11-20 18:56:33 (GMT)  
HYPERFLIC's(your) offer: 2009-11-20 18:51:52(GMT) 
Issue Option 
Delivery time 8 days 
Discount terms 6%  
Financial terms 0%  
 
I think w e should both go for this offer. It's the low est possible one if w e w ant g
This costs me $35, and you too right?
 




HYPERFLIC's(you) message: 2009-11-20 18:51:09(GMT) 




UBERSHIFT's message: 2009-11-20 18:49:10(GMT) 
35000










HYPERFLIC's(you) message: 2009-11-20 18:48:08(GMT) 
my amount for your latest offer w as 46.25









UBERSHIFT's offer: 2009-11-20 18:46:11(GMT) 
Issue Option 
Delivery time 7 days 
Discount terms 9%  
Financial terms 50%  
 
just w ant to check w hat your amount is for this offer?
 




HYPERFLIC's(your) offer: 2009-11-20 18:45:40(GMT) 
Issue Option 
Delivery time 8 days 
Discount terms 6%  
Financial terms 0%  
 
How  much does this come out to for you?
 




HYPERFLIC's(you) message: 2009-11-20 18:43:49(GMT) 
oh
ok, gimme a second to see if I can come up w ith something that gives us
a low er than 50,000 expense. If not, w e should settle on the 50/50.










UBERSHIFT's message: 2009-11-20 18:41:49(GMT) 
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nope,
those are the rates for my days?
those are the rates for your financial?
btw  I think no matter w hat w e do the expenses w ill also total 100000
for both of us. So w e have to find something that w ill give us 50/50,
because thats the best possible thing.
 
 
HYPERFLIC's(you) message: 2009-11-20 18:40:05(GMT) 
Your
latest one comes out to 55,000 for me, so I'd rather split it 50/50, so
you both have good and the same expenses. Unless there's a w ay to make
us both guess less than 50,000.







UBERSHIFT's message: 2009-11-20 18:37:11(GMT) 
if I put 4,6 and 50 I get 50000 also. Do you think w e can go low er?
 
 
UBERSHIFT's offer: 2009-11-20 18:35:44(GMT) 
Issue Option 
Delivery time 5 days 
Discount terms 7%  
Financial terms 63%  
 
58750, how  about this one?
 







HYPERFLIC's(you) message: 2009-11-20 18:34:49(GMT) 
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If I put it at 4, 6% and 50%, my total comes out to $50,000. Same for you?
 
 
HYPERFLIC's(your) offer: 2009-11-20 18:33:59(GMT) 
Issue Option 
Delivery time 3 days 
Discount terms 6%  
Financial terms 38%  
 
How  much w ill this offer come out for you?
 





UBERSHIFT's message: 2009-11-20 18:32:58(GMT) 
my
low est expense is 12500 just like you
but the offer you sent me has the expense of 87500. If I do the same,
your expenses w ould be 87500 w hile mine w ould be 12500. So w hat happens
if w e put it in the middle, say like 4 days, 6% and 50%?
 
 
HYPERFLIC's(you) message: 2009-11-20 18:31:48(GMT) 






HYPERFLIC's(you) message: 2009-11-20 18:31:18(GMT) 
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Yup,
w e should pick in betw een my low est possible expenses and your low est
possible expenses. My low est expenses (w ithout any "zero expense
choices" is 12500.
So if yours is something like 9500, w e should settle on something that




UBERSHIFT's message: 2009-11-20 18:30:43(GMT) 
its exactly w hat I said before, the low est expense for me w ill be the highest for you
so w e have to pick something in the middle
by the w ay w hat are the factors you are using in calculating the expenses. Delivery Time, Discount terms, and F
 
 
HYPERFLIC's(your) offer: 2009-11-20 18:29:25(GMT) 
Issue Option 
Delivery time 1 days 
Discount terms 9%  
Financial terms 13%  
 
 
w hat does your low est possible offer add up to if you don't have any expenses of zero?
 




UBERSHIFT's message: 2009-11-20 18:28:44(GMT) 
6250 + 3750 + 2500 = 12500
im sure that w hen w e use my low est epxenses, it w ill make your expenses higher, and vise versa.
So w e probably have to pick something in betw een
 
 
HYPERFLIC's(you) message: 2009-11-20 18:26:48(GMT) 
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How  bout w e each see how  the low est possible expenses w e can have for the month. Besides zero.
If I pick my most beneficial situation, I w ill have expenses of 2500 + 3750 + 6250. So $12500




UBERSHIFT's message: 2009-11-20 18:26:13(GMT) 
did you get my other message?
 
 




UBERSHIFT's offer: 2009-11-20 18:25:09(GMT) 
Issue Option 
Delivery time 5 days 
Discount terms 3%  
Financial terms 50%  
 
hey, how  are you doing?
Since the goal is to minimize the expenses for both of us, how  w ould like like to
 





The following is an unedited transcript of a participant playing the role of the producer 
(Ubershift) in a competitive, gain frame treatment. 
You accepted this offer on 2009-11-13 20:50:05 (GMT)  
HYPERFLIC's offer: 2009-11-13 20:46:27(GMT) 
Issue Option 
Delivery time 8 days 
Discount terms 6%  
Financial terms 0%  
 
 
What say you w e split it at 6%? That halves my possible profit from Discount, but I think it w ill halve it for you as w
 




UBERSHIFT's(your) offer: 2009-11-13 20:44:36(GMT) 
Issue Option 
Delivery time 8 days 
Discount terms 5%  
Financial terms 0%  
 
The
delivery time is good for me and I am w illing to give you the deal on
the financial terms. How  w ould you say these discount terms w ork for
you?
 




HYPERFLIC's offer: 2009-11-13 20:40:41(GMT) 
Issue Option 
Delivery time 8 days 
Discount terms 7%  
Financial terms 0%  
 
Financial terms are good for me, and I can give you your delivery time if you rais
 






UBERSHIFT's(your) offer: 2009-11-13 20:38:14(GMT) 
Issue Option 
Delivery time 8 days 
Discount terms 2%  
Financial terms 0%  
 
 
The issue that is most important to me is deliver time. How  about this offer? What in this w orks for you and w hat d
 




HYPERFLIC's offer: 2009-11-13 20:36:01(GMT) 
Issue Option 
Delivery time 3 days 
Discount terms 9%  
Financial terms 13%  
 
 
I need low er financing terms from your end. What issue is most important for you?
 




UBERSHIFT's(you) message: 2009-11-13 20:33:56(GMT) 
I am doing w ell as w ell. Thank you for asking.
 
 
UBERSHIFT's(your) offer: 2009-11-13 20:32:58(GMT) 
Issue Option 
Delivery time 6 days 
Discount terms 5%  
Financial terms 63%  
 
 
I'm sorry but the terms of your last offer do not w ork for me. How  about this offer?
 





HYPERFLIC's offer: 2009-11-13 20:30:53(GMT) 
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Issue Option 
Delivery time 2 days 
Discount terms 8%  
Financial terms 0%  
 
I am doing w ell today, thanks for asking. How  are you? 
 




UBERSHIFT's(your) offer: 2009-11-13 20:28:54(GMT) 
Issue Option 
Delivery time 6 days 
Discount terms 4%  
Financial terms 75%  
 
Hello. I hope that you are doing w ell today. This is my opening offer.
 




HYPERFLIC's offer: 2009-11-13 
20:28:08(GMT) 
Issue Option 
Delivery time 0 days 
Discount terms 10%  
Financial terms 0%  
 
Your profit for this offer: 
0
 
 
